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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS AT
THE AGENCY LEVEL: THE
FTCA ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS
George A. Bermann*
Tort actions against the federal government and its agencies are currently gov-
erned by the FTCA and various other statutes, agency rules and procedures. Claims
against the government are increasing rapidly, and the agencies enjoy broad settle-
ment authority, often at the expense of coordination among the appropriate statutes.
This Article examines the various procedures allowed and those that are actually
practiced by the agencies. The author points out that, though claims officers are sup-
posed to be fair-minded, the process can take on an adversarial nature, often a prel-
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1984), codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7 [hereinafter cited as ACUS Recommendations]. Only
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ude to litigation rather than settlement. He proposes that the current processes be
made fairer for claimants. He advocates, among other things, liberalizing the rules
dealing with bringing the claim, giving notice of reasons for denying a claim and the
reconsideration process as means of removing obstructions to agency-level settlement
INTRODUCTION
AFTER NEARLY forty years, the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) is still regarded principally as a vehicle for suing the
federal government in tort. Historically, this conception of the stat-
ute is not inaccurate, for what Congress enacted in 1946 was a stat-
utory waiver of sovereign immunity to suit. But the reality of the
FTCA is quite different. Virtually every FTCA claim passes
through a mandatory administrative phase in which the agency di-
rectly involved in the incident, rather than the Justice Department
or United States Attorney's Office, investigates the factual and legal
bases of the claim and, more importantly, exercises primary respon-
sibility for determining whether and at what level the claim should
be paid.
The administrative process for handling federal tort claims is
not merely a formality. Not only does the investigative file that it
yields continue to shape events even after a claim enters judicial
channels, but the administrative process actually prevents litigation
of the vast majority of tort claims against the government. While
the litigation origins of the FTCA and the ultimate availability of a
court for claims that are not settled give the FTCA administrative
process much of its coloration, the scope and statistical significance
of agency-level activity demand that it be studied in its own right.
There is in every sense an administrative process to the FTCA,
however much the FTCA literature and popular conceptions of the
federal tort claim phenomenon may neglect it. In addition, as
claimants and claimants' attorneys press the outer boundaries of the
common law tort concept in the public law context and as Congress
moves closer to assimilating constitutional and traditional torts for
procedural purposes, tort initiatives increasingly become a means of
obtaining not only monetary relief but also administrative and judi-
cial review of agency action.
This Article provides a comprehensive account of the adminis-
trative handling of tort claims against the federal government.
Parts I and II explore in a preliminary fashion the agencies' statu-
tory authority to entertain such claims. In that discussion the
FTCA occupies center stage, but not the whole stage. Part III out-
lines and critiques the regulatory framework that the Justice De-
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partment and agencies have developed to organize their statutory
claims activity under the FTCA. Since the statute and the regula-
tions give many procedural choices to individual claims officers, an
inquiry into the actual practice of the agencies is also needed. This
is the subject of Part IV. The Article concludes with thematic sug-
gestions for reform.
I. AGENCY AUTHORITY To ENTERTAIN CLAIMS IN TORT
The prominence of the FTCA as a statutory vehicle for handling
tort claims against the government has had two interesting side ef-
fects. First, it has tended to preempt the question of whether agen-
cies might enjoy claim settlement authority apart from any such
statutory mandate. It has also obscured, if not for most agency law-
yers then at least for most students of government tort law, the ar-
ray of narrow statutory bases that coexist with the FTCA in the
agencies' claims payment arsenal. Before turning the focus upon
the FTCA as such, these two neglected issues are examined.
A. Do Agencies Have Inherent Authority to Settle Tort Claims?
The fact that Congress has given agencies express statutory set-
tlement authority leads virtually all agency claims officers to assume
that they would not otherwise have it. In fact, the question whether
agencies have inherent authority to settle tort claims arising out of
their activities has not been judicially decided; a claimant, after all,
is unlikely to challenge an agency's willingness to exercise it. But
the General Accounting Office (GAO) unhesitatingly and unfail-
ingly maintains that agencies lack any inherent authority to enter-
tain and satisfy tort claims, however fair and equitable it might be
to do so under certain circumstances. The GAO describes its posi-
tion as "but a corollary of the principle that no one is authorized to
give away Government money or property."' As a practical mat-
1. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW
11-17 (1982) [hereinafter cited a GAO PRINCIPLES]. The Constitution provides that: "No
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by
law." U.S. CONST. art I, § 9. E.g., Op. Comp. Gen. No. B-201054 (Apr. 27, 1981). Cf. 31
U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982) ("Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the
appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law."). See also id. § 1532. If an
account is disallowed by the GAO, the responsible officer may be held personally liable to the
United States for the amount of any improper payment already made. Id. § 3528(4). See also
D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 162 (1970).
For information on the GAO, see generally Baer, The General Accounting Office: The Fed-
eral Government's Auditor, 47 A.B.A. J. 359 (1961); Keller, The Role of the General Account-
ing Office, 21 Bus. LAW. 259 (1965).
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ter, all claims officers, however generally sympathetic to claimants,
seem to proceed on the same assumption.
This is not to say that things could not, as a matter of law or
policy, be otherwise. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, rou-
tinely invoked in this context, should not end the inquiry. It is true
that the sovereign's immunity to suit without its consent2 may be
waived only by Congress, not by an officer or employee of the
United States,' and that such waivers are strictly subject to the con-
ditions Congress chooses to place upon them.4 But to say that the
federal government may not be sued except on the basis of a legisla-
tive waiver of sovereign immunity is not to say that the government
may not pay a just claim of its own accord. As a policy matter,
agencies might well consider compensation of tort victims to be a
cost of doing business and, as such, an ordinary operating expense
chargeable to general agency appropriations. Payment of similarly
just claims by private enterprise is commonly regarded as a legiti-
mate business expense.
A more probable rationale for the prevailing government view is
the need to legitimate any agency expenditure of public money that
does not directly and specifically advance the statutorily defined
mission of that agency. While vague statutory mandates and the
attendant risk of unaccountability permeate the life and work of the
administrative agencies, and implicate far greater sums of money
than the ordinary exercise of claims settlement authority, they at
least correspond positively to the agencies' reason for existence.
If the agencies in fact do not assert an inherent right to compen-
sate for government-inflicted injury to person or property, the legis-
lative branch bears the burden of defining the authority they have.
Congress has gone about this in a patchwork manner. As we shall
see,5 there exists alongside the FTCA a disparate collection of nar-
row authorizations, many agency-specific, all legislated on a piece-
meal basis, and collectively establishing no discernible overall
design.
Of course, even without monetary settlement authority,6 an
2. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
3. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940); Munro v. United States, 303
U.S. 36, 41 (1938).
4. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 587 (1941).
5. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
6. For an exceptionally rare instance of a compensation program knowingly instituted
by an agency without express statutory support, see Department of Defense Directive No.
5220.6 (Dec. 20, 1971) (reimbursement for loss of earnings from the suspension, revocation or
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agency still may remedy a claimant's legitimate grievances by exer-
cising other authority in its possession. It can roll back the specific
action that gave rise to the objection. For example, if the agency
has statutory authority to condemn property, it can exercise that
authority to give the claimant what an inverse condemnation suit
would have achieved. Agency real estate departments sometimes
negotiate with private parties after the fact over money to be paid
for the unplanned use of real property and call upon general operat-
ing funds as a source of payment, a procedure the Army has formal-
ized.7 Contracting officers also may use funds appropriated for a
contract, or seek contract modification, in order to answer claims
for damage to or loss of property in connection with the perform-
ance of a contract.' If the full range of specific statutory authorities
at the agencies' disposal is canvassed, in light of the available appro-
priations under each, it becomes apparent that the agencies are not
as disarmed in the face of claims for monetary redress as it first
appears.
But agencies do not in all circumstances have the authorization
that would enable them to satisfy a deserving tort claim by other
available means. They may also be unwilling, in the larger public
interest, to roll back the action they have taken, assuming they can
do so and that doing so would make the claimant whole. In fact,
some monetary claims on which the government actually may be
sued simply have no identifiable administrative settlement counter-
part. Though not true of claims cognizable under the FrCA, this is
true of many claims upon which suit may be brought in the United
States Claims Court.9 In these situations, recourse may be had to
final denial of an industrial security clearance). Claims are processed and settled by the Gen-
eral Claims Division, United States Army Claims Service, and paid from "Claims, Depart-
ment of Defense" appropriations. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-20, Legal Services: Claims
§ 13-12e (Sept. 18, 1970).
7. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 405-15 (Sept. 6, 1967), also referred to in Dep't of Army
Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6 § 13-11. The procedure is evidently contemplated in connection
with military maneuvers, training exercises and emergency situations.
8. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6 §§ 13-9f, 13-10.
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (1982) (Tucker Act claims); id. § 1495 (unjust
conviction and imprisonment); id. § 1497 (damage to oyster growers); id. § 1498 (patent in-
fringement); id. § 1505 (Indian tribe claims). The Court of Claims, as established in 1855,
could only find and report facts and opinions to Congress, its original purpose being to relieve
congressional claims committees from the press of private relief bills. Act of Feb. 24, 1855,
ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. The same 1855 statute gave the court jurisdiction over "all claims
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States." Id. § 1.
Not until 1887, however, did Congress make the court's judgments final, subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, § 3 (1887). It was the Tucker Act
1985]
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the Attorney General who enjoys authority to settle claims referred
to him under the rubric of defense of imminent litigation."0
Whether this amounts to an administrative rather than litigation
remedy is open to question.
The statutory authority of the GAO to "settle all claims . . .
against the United States Government" also must be mentioned.'1
The statute presumably makes the GAO an available forum for re-
lief when the responsible agency lacks power to satisfy a monetary
claim based on recognized legal grounds.12 The GAO may even be
available where an agency does have authority, but its determina-
tions are not regarded as final and conclusive. 13 Such a broad GAO
authority, however, does not exist for claims sounding in tort. 4
The Comptroller General also has been empowered since 1928 to
"report to Congress on a claim against the government . . . that
may not be adjusted by using an existing appropriation, and that
[he] believes Congress should consider for legal or equitable rea-
sons."15 This mechanism is seldom invoked,16 probably because the
that added jurisdiction over claims "founded. . . upon the Constitution" and "for damages,
liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort." Id. § 1.
The Court of Claims was reorganized and renamed the Claims Court as part of the Fed-
eral Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 40 § 133(b)-(c), amending
28 U.S.C. § 1491.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (1982). Settlements made pursuant to this authority are paid, like
judgments and compromise settlements, out of the Permanent Indefinite Appropriation estab-
lished by the Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, §§ 1, 2(m)(2), 96 Stat. 917, 1062,
codified in 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1982). The Deputy Attorney General may exercise this au-
thority for the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. § 0.161(b) (1984). Furthermore, authority to
accept settlement offers of up to $750,000 in compromise of claims against the United States
has been delegated to the Assistant Attorneys General of the litigating divisions, except that
referral to the Deputy Attorney General is required when a compromise will practically con-
trol or influence the disposition of claims totalling more than $750,000, or where the presence
of a question of law or policy or opposition by the agency involved suggests that the Deputy
Attorney General be consulted. Id. § 0.160. The authority of the Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral is not limited by any monetary ceiling when it comes to rejecting compromises or admin-
istrative settlements though the exceptions for questions of law or policy or for cases of
agency opposition still apply. Id. § 0.162. There has been further limited redelegation to
subordinate division officials such as the Torts Branch Director and to United States Attor-
neys. Id. § 0.168. See also id. pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App. (details of the delegations and the
requirement of action memoranda for the closing of claims).
11. 31 U.S.C. § 3702(a) (1983). The statute requires that the Comptroller General re-
ceive the claim within six years after it accrues.
12. See GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-5 to 11-11 (1982) (for a discussion of the
nature of this authority and the limitations the GAO has placed on its exercise).
13. See infra notes 698-99.
14. See infra note 700.
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3702(d) (1983). The purpose of the provision was to facilitate congres-
sional consideration of private relief bills by giving Congress the benefit of recommendations
from a body with expertise in investigating and adjudicating monetary claims. S. REP. No.
Vol. 35:509
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GAO uses its recommendation authority sparingly and because the
statutory framework for agency and court consideration of mone-
tary claims is more comprehensive than it was in 1928.17 GAO rec-
ommendation is also not needed for the enactment of a private relief
bill.
The previous discussion should not suggest that tort claim pay-
ments never take place at the agency level without statutory author-
ization. According to claims officers at more than one agency,
agency heads occasionally pay meritorious claims from contingency
funds to which only they, through the agency's chief fiscal officer,
have access. According to one officer, payment from contingency
funds might occur in his agency as often as four or five times a year,
though seldom for sums in excess of a few thousand dollars at a
time. Another officer surmises that only politically well-connected
claimants have any realistic chance of collecting from such a fund,
and even then only under highly unusual circumstances or those
constituting a source of embarrassment to the agency. Apparently,
access to a contingency fund is only through political channels, and
the agency's chief claims attorney and General Counsel may even
be unaware of the largely undocumented transaction. An agency's
contingency fund cannot properly function as a consistent source
for systematic compensation of claimants. Furthermore, it is highly
questionable whether agency contingency funds should be used for
compensation at all, given the risk of political favoritism and the
absence of any real accountability.
On the other hand, the Chief of the General Claims Division of
the Army Claims Service believes that agency operating divisions
tend to underestimate the extent to which program-related appro-
priations are legitimately available for making monetary payments
to claimants. The result is too many matters coming before the
684, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1928). A six-year statute of limitations applies to the Comp-
troller General's meritorious claims authority. For a full discussion of the standards the
GAO has developed for exercising this authority and for certain statistics on its use, see GAO
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-137 to 11-163. See also Holtzoff, The Handling of Torts
Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 321 (1942).
16. GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-139.
17. The GAO does not view its meritorious claims authority as applicable to claims
sounding in tort. Id. at 11-143 to 11-145, and decisions of the Comptroller General cited
therein. The GAO presumes that where Congress has enacted legislation providing relief for
certain kinds of claims, including tort, the limits on that relief must be respected. Similarly,
the GAO will not entertain, under the meritorious claims heading, claims for which agencies
possess their own meritorious claims settlement authority or might afford remedies such as
veterans' benefits or payments under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims
Act. Id. at 11-149 to 11-150.
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Judge Advocate's Office in the form of tort claims that could and
should be handled at program levels."8 The Office of the Chief of
the General Claims Division spends considerable resources trying
to identify sources of authority which program officers could, but
do not, legitimately draw upon to satisfy valid monetary demands
that then must be treated as tort claims. Agency claims units might
enlist other divisions of their offices of general counsel, and possibly
the GAO, to prepare an agency-by-agency inventory of legal means
apart from the FTCA for responding to monetary claims. 19
B. Special Tort Claims Legislation
If the FTCA constitutes the centerpiece of agency authority to
entertain tort and tort-like claims, the rest of the arrangement is in
disarray. The multitude of ancillary statutes affording agencies the
opportunity to satisfy such claims defy even elementary typology.
The leading authority on the FTCA reports no fewer than forty,2 °
but the number far exceeds that if the term "monetary" claim is
construed broadly. Most statutes are agency-specific, some cover-
ing only certain kinds of incidents and activities; but others, includ-
ing some of the most significant, cut completely across agency lines.
A few, like the FTCA, condition claims payment on a showing of
fault; others do not. Some require a federal officer or employee to
be acting within the scope of employment when causing the injury,
while others require only a connection between the injury and a
government program of some type, not necessarily of a particular
agency. Only a few statutes deal specifically with the claimant's
contributory negligence. Most place fixed monetary ceilings on the
amount of recovery and, rarely, on the amount of allowable attor-
neys' fees. They carry varying statutes of limitations. Almost all
preclude or are assumed to preclude judicial review of the disposi-
tion of a claim. In some cases, the agency may not only determine
the claim, but also pay it. In others, the agency has authority only
to recommend to Congress that the claim be paid. A few of these
statutes purport to be the exclusive remedy for any covered claim.
Most leave open the question of whether exclusiveness, or at least a
requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies, should be inferred.
18. Personnel in the Claims Division of the GAO lend support to the suspicion that
some payments are being processed as tort claims-and drawn from the judgment fund-
when they should properly be charged to agency appropriations as a program-related or gen-
eral operating expense.
19. See, e.g., Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6 § 13.
20. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 1-11 (1984).
[Vol. 35:509
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Almost all of the statutes show virtual inattention to questions of
claims procedure. Although each of these specific pieces of legisla-
tion is fundamentally idiosyncratic, most can be understood either
as complementing the FTCA (for example, addressing claims cate-
gorically exempt from that act),2 0 A or as true meritorious claims
statutes requiring no predicate of fault on the government's part.2 °B
Even confining the inquiry to meritorious claims statutes, it is
20A. Department of Health and Human Services, 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k) (Supp. 1983); De-
partment of Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(e) (1982); Panama Canal Commission, 22 U.S.C.
§ 3761(e) (Supp. 1983); Department of State, 22 U.S.C. § 2669(0 (1982); Tennessee Valley
Authority, 16 U.S.C. § 831c(b) (1982); United States Information Agency, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1474(5) (1982); Veterans Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 236 (1982); Suits in Admiralty Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (Supp. 1983); Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1982); Patent
Infringement, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (Supp. 1983); Copyright Infringement, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(b) (Supp. 1983)
20B. E.g., Department of Agriculture, 16 U.S.C. §§ 502(d), 574 (1983) (authority to re-
imburse owners for the damage or destruction of private property as a result of action by
federal employees in connection with national forests); Federal Bureau of Investigation, 42
U.S.C. § 233 (1983) (amending 58 Stat. 710 (1944)) (authority to settle claims for property
damage or personal injury or death arising from actions of FBI personnel where not amena-
ble to settlement under the FTCA); Department of Health and Human Services, 42 U.S.C.
§ 223 (1983) (authority to settle claims for damages caused by collision with or otherwise
incident to the operation of Public Health Service vessels where such vessels are responsible
for the damage); Department of the Interior, 16 U.S.C. § 17(f) (1983) (amending 46 Stat. 382
(1930)) (authority to reimburse owners for the loss, damage or destruction of private property
while in custody of the National Park Service or the Department where the property is used
for firefighting or other official purpose); 25 U.S.C. § 388 (1983) Department of Justice, 31
U.S.C. § 3722 (1983) (amending 63 Stat. 167 (1949)) (authority to settle claims for damage or
loss of personal property of employees of federal penal institutions); 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1982);
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 42 U.S.C. § 2473(c)(13) (Supp. 1983)
(amending 72 Stat. 429 (1958)) (authority to settle claims for property damage or personal
injury or death arising out of NASA activities); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, 33 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. 1983) (amending 41 Stat. 929 (1920)) (authority to settle
claims for property damage of personal injury or death due to actions for which the National
Oceanographic Survey is responsible); Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2207
(1983) (amending 68 Stat. 952 (1954)) (authority to settle claims for property damage or
personal injury or death resulting from explosion or radiation in connection with the detona-
tion of explosive devices); Id. § 2211 Peace Corps, 22 U.S.C. § 2509(b) (1983) (amending 75
Stat. 617 (1961)) (authority to settle claims to non-residents or aliens for property damage or
personal injury or death arising abroad from the act or omission of any Peace Corps em-
ployee or volunteer); Postal Service, 39 U.S.C. § 2603 (1983) (amending 48 Stat. 1207 (1934))
(authority to settle claims for property damage or personal injury or death resulting from
operations of the Postal Service where "a proper charge [is made] against the United States"
and where the cause of action is not recognized under the FTCA); Department of State, 22
U.S.C. § 2669(b) (1983) (authority to settle meritorious claims for property damage or per-
sonal injury or death suffered by a foreign national resulting from any U.S. government activ-
ity, where the claim is presented by the government of the foreign country and where the
cause of action is not recognized under the FTCA); Id. § 277(e); 31 U.S.C. § 3725 (1983);
Veterans Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 626 (1982); Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733
(1983); Foreign Claims Act, Id. § 2734; National Guard Claims Act, 32 U.S.C. § 715 (Supp.
1983).
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difficult to account for Congress' singling out a handful of agencies
for meritorious claims settlement authority. Judging by the avail-
able examples, Congress occasionally may find such authorization
to be an appropriate response to the government's conduct of espe-
cially hazardous or sensitive activities,20 C to situations where pri-
vate property is destroyed in aid of a public purpose,2 °D and to
settings where fuller agency claims authority would serve America's
foreign relations interests.2 °E Still, attributing an orderly rationale
to the existing pattern of meritorious claims legislation is naive.
Some statutes simply cannot be explained in terms of any general
principle,21 but only as responses to the prospect of litigation and
liability in connection with a new government program or as the
immediate reaction to a particular incident. More importantly, the
government activities chosen for coverage by meritorious claims
statutes cannot all be regarded as uniquely suited to that treatment.
Many equally deserving activities remain outside their reach.
Without researching the legislative purpose of current meritori-
ous claims statutes, or the actual use agencies have made of them
over the years, it cannot be recommended that they be extended to a
greater number of agencies, or even that their modest payment ceil-
ings be raised. To be sure, most claims officers whose agencies en-
joy meritorious claims authority would like to see that authority
extended. For example, the Assistant Legal Advisor of the State
Department regrets that his agency only has meritorious claims au-
thority over foreign claims.22 An Agriculture Department attorney
finds that, under the FTCA, state recreational use statutes effec-
tively bar him from making what would seem to be an appropriate
award for injuries caused by hazards in the national parks.23 The
20C. E.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2207 (1983) (damage resulting
from explosion or radiation connected with the detonation of an explosive device).
20D. E.g., Department of the Interior, 16 U.S.C. § 17(f) (1983) (private property dam-
aged or destroyed in firefighting or other official business of the Department or National Park
Service).
20E. E.g., Peace Corps, 22 U.S.C. § 2509(b) (1983) (claims of non-residents or aliens con-
nected with activities of Peace Corps employees or volunteers).
21. E.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 31 U.S.C. § 3701 (1982);
Postal Service, 39 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982); Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-
1781 (1982). The patent, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1982), and copyright infringement claims stat-
utes, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1982), not properly speaking meritorious claims statutes, may be
necessitated by the constitutional guarantee against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation.
22. Interview with Thomas T.F. Huang, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State,
in Washington, D.C. (June 8, 1983).
23. Interview with Jeffrey L. Nesvet, Attorney, Research and Operations Division, Of-
fice of General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 16, 1983).
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Chief of the FBI Civil Litigation Unit believes that the five hundred
dollar ceiling on his ability to pay just claims all too often renders it
an inadequate remedy.24 On the other hand, some agency officials
who currently enjoy a generous measure of such claims authority
feel uncomfortable with it and use it rarely.
25
Certainly, Congress should view sympathetically requests for a
higher payment ceiling on meritorious claims coming from agencies
that in the past have made principled use of their authority, for
inflation has done violence to many monetary limits. But much
more needs to be known about the utility of these provisions to
those agencies that have them-and of the safeguards that might
advantageously be put in place for their use-before suitably in-
formed recommendations can be made.
C. The FTCA: An Introduction
The FTCA26 is singular among claims statutes due to its gener-
ality of application. Confined neither to specific agencies nor to spe-
cific categories of claimants, it contemplates virtually any situation
marked by a "negligent or wrongful act or omission" on the part of
a federal officer or employee, as well as an open-ended category of
losses without monetary ceiling under the rubrics of personal in-
jury, death or property damage. For these and related reasons, the
FTCA is foremost among existing statutory vehicles for the disposi-
tion of tort and tort-like claims against the government.
The FTCA subjects the federal government to liability in ac-
cordance with the same principles that govern the liability of pri-
vate persons under the law of the place where the alleged tort
occurred, 7 except that it does not allow prejudgment interest or
punitive damages.2 8 The FTCA, however, limits the government's
exposure through thirteen categorical exemptions.2 9  A claimant
24. Interview with Thomas A. Kelley, Chief, Civil Litigation Unit, FBI, in Washington,
D.C. (May 27, 1983).
25. See infra notes 558-64 and accompanying text.
26. The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946, §§ 401-24, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812-44, and is presently codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1982).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1982).
28. Id. § 2674.
29. Id. § 2680.
The FTCA is subject, apart from the express statutory exceptions, to two other sets of
exemptions. First, an occasional statute may recite that it constitutes the exclusive remedy
for a certain category of claims or simply immunizes the government from liability alto-
gether. E.g., Federal Civil Defense Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2294 (1951) (terminated by
own terms on June 30, 1974) (government immunity in connection with a civil defense emer-
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may bring suit in the federal district court for the district where
either the alleged tort occurred or the plaintiff resides,30 provided
the claimant filed a prior administrative claim with the appropriate
federal agency for its consideration within two years of the claim's
accrual and instituted suit within six months of that agency's final
denial. 3' The 1966 amendments that made the prior filing of a
claim a prerequisite to suit also greatly expanded the agencies' stat-
utory authority to settle and pay claims cognizable under the
FTCA.
In 1946, when the FTCA was enacted, federal agencies had little
opportunity to entertain and pay tort and tort-like claims against
them. The then Court of Claims32 and the Supreme Court 33 had
consistently declined to read the Court of Claims Act as embracing
tort claims, a view ultimately endorsed in the drafting of the Tucker
Act.34 Since the agencies were deemed to lack settlement authority
even over claims falling within Tucker Act jurisdiction, unless an-
other statute expressly gave it to them, they could hardly be ex-
pected to entertain the payment of claims sounding in tort. By way
of reasonably general legislation, only the patent infringement stat-
ute of 1910, 31 the admiralty statutes of 192036 and 1925, 37 and the
gency); Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1982) (FECA is the ex-
clusive remedy against the United States for the injury or death of a federal employee in the
course of duty); Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (1982) (no government liability for
damage from or by floods or flood waters); Panama Canal Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3761(e) (1982)
(FTCA inapplicable to claims arising from operation of the Canal or related facilities).
Under exceptional circumstances other exemptions have been inferred by the courts on
the basis of available alternative remedies. See infra notes 73-76.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1982).
31. Id at § 2401(b).
32. E.g., Dykes v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 289 (1880); Dennis v. United States, 2 Ct.
Cl. 210 (1865); Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863).
33. E.g., Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879); Morgan v. United States, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 531 (1871); Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868). The
Court opined in Morgan that "Congress has wisely reserved to itself the right to give or
withhold relief where the claim is founded on the wrongful proceedings of an officer of the
government." 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 534.
34. The original version of what was to become the Tucker Act did provide a general
tort remedy. According to the report accompanying the House Judiciary Committee bill,
enactment of the Court of Claims Act did not affect the "large class of cases in equity, in
admiralty, and in tortious acts of the Government through its agents which are left to Con-
gress, [but] for which a court of justice is better fitted to attain the right between the liti-
gants." H.R. REP. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1886), quoted in 1 L. JAYSON, supra
note 20, at 2-17 to 2-18 (1984). As enacted, however, the legislation expressly excluded cases
"founded upon torts." See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168 (1894).
35. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982)).
36. Act of March 9, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1982)).
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Small Claims Act of 192238 offered government tort victims a mon-
etary remedy. Furthermore, of these, only the Small Claims Act
could be said to cut across different fields of tort and to afford an
administrative rather than a judicial means of relief.
In reality, the Small Claims Act was a modest piece of legisla-
tion, confined to property damage claims39 of up to $1,000 arising
out of the negligent acts of government employees acting within the
scope of their employment and filed within one year of accrual. It
authorized the head of each executive department or other in-
dependent governmental body to consider and adjust any such
claim and to certify it to Congress for payment out of appropria-
tions to be made for that purpose. A claimant's acceptance of the
amount offered was deemed to be in full settlement of the claim and
judicial review was not available.'
Although the Small Claims Act was enacted to relieve Congress
of the pressures of private claims bills and to assist those claimants
unable to present their case to Congress effectively,41 its stringent
limitations made attaining those goals virtually impossible. No
sooner was the Small Claims Act in place than Congress felt pres-
sure to provide a more liberal and procedurally better defined rem-
edy for governmental torts. The years 1925 through 1946 saw no
fewer than thirty different bills introduced in Congress for the pur-
pose of providing a more extensive measure of liability and at the
same time a more uniform substantive and procedural framework
for the handling of claims.42 The formula ultimately adopted in
1946 still characterizes the FTCA to this day.43
37. Public Vessels Act, ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790
(1982)).
38. Ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066 (1922) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3723 (1982)) (repealed in part
1946).
39. Personal injury and death claims were thought to be unusually susceptible to fraud,
collusion and excessive compensation. 62 CONG. REc. 2297 (1922).
40. See generally Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Statutory Interpretation, 35
GEO. L.J. 1, 13 n.42 (1946) (describing the numbers of small claims brought annually against
various government departments).
41. Reportedly, nearly one-third of private relief claims were for amounts under $1000
and arose out of accidents involving government vehicles. H.R. REP. No. 342, 67th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1921).
42. McGuire, Tort Claims Against the United States, 19 GEO. L.J. 133, 141 (1931). See
S. RFP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-34 (1946), accompanying S. 2177, discussing the
limitations of the Small Tort Claims Act.
43. The purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act were set forth by the Supreme Court in
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950):
Relief was often sought and sometimes granted through private bills in Congress,
the number of which steadily increased as Government activity increased. The vol-
ume of these private bills, the inadequacy of a congressional machinery for determi-
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The Small Claims Act still exists, notwithstanding the enact-
ment of the FTCA. It has been slightly modified, but only to facili-
tate the payment of claims. Rather than reporting to Congress for
special appropriations, agencies now may pay administrative settle-
ments out of the permanent indefinite appropriation (otherwise
known as the judgment fund), which is also the source for judg-
ments, litigation settlements, and most administrative settlements
under the FTCA.4 Far from repealing the Small Claims Act, the
FTCA expressly saved the Act as to claims not cognizable under its
own provisions. 5 Theoretically, then, agencies may authorize pay-
ment of up to $1000 on claims for property damage negligently
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment whenever those claims fall within one of the FTCA's several
exclusions. Arguably, FTCA-exempt claims are precisely those for
which the Small Claims Act was saved.46 On the other hand, the
appropriateness of resort to the Small Claims Act for claims that
are not cognizable under the FTCA (because they fail to state a
cause of action under the law of the relevant state or because they
succumb to certain state tort law defenses or to certain technical
bars to recovery under state law) is doubtful. But as a practical
matter, there are few occasions when an agency that is disposed to
pay a claim essentially as a matter of good will under the Small
Claims Act would find itself unable to do so under the FTCA.
D. The Relation of the FTCA to Other Settlement Authority
Given the proliferation of ancillary claims statutes, meritorious
and otherwise, the question of their relationship to one another and
to the FTCA is of obvious importance. The FTCA itself provides
guidance with respect to administrative claims statutes predating it,
by expressly repealing all provisions of law in effect at the time of its
enactment that authorize the adjustment of claims based on "the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
ernment while acting within the scope of his office or employment
nation of facts, the importunities to which the claimant subjected members of
Congress, and the capricious results led to a strong demand that claims for tort
wrongs be submitted to adjudication. Congress already had waived immunity and
made the Government answerable for breaches of its contracts and certain other
types of claims. At last, in connection with the Reorganization Act, it waived im-
munity and transferred the burden of examining tort claims to the courts.
44. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1304(a)(3)(B), 3723(c) (1982).
45. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753 § 424(b), 60 Stat. 812, 847. See also
31 U.S.C. § 3723(a)(2) (1982).
46. The Comptroller General has taken this view, at least with respect to tort claims
falling within the FTCA exemption for claims arising abroad. See infra note 53.
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. . . in respect of claims cognizable under [the Act]."'47 Otherwise,
they expressly remain in effect.48 Thus, a claim that could have
been settled administratively under prior existing law still may be
settled under that law after the FTCA, provided the claim is not
covered by the FTCA and the law in question is otherwise still in
force.
Unfortunately, what constitutes a cognizable claim under the
FTCA is ambiguous.49 If a cognizable claim is one based on tor-
tious acts of federal officers within the scope of their office, then
arguably a tort claim falling within one of the FTCA exemptions
remains cognizable under the Act, and is no longer amenable to
settlement under some earlier statute. This interpretation-which
the courts have given to the FTCA's explicit bar against tort actions
under a particular agency's statutory authority to sue and be sued in
its own name°---has the virtue of promoting a uniform govern-
ment-wide framework for handling tort claims. Agencies may use
their additional settlement authority to satisfy meritorious claims
not sounding in tort, but not tort claims that happen to be exempt
under the FTCA.51
47. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753 § 424(a), 60 Stat. 812, 846-47. The
section gives a nonexhaustive enumeration of statutes so repealed, including the Small Claims
Act and the Military Claims Act.
48. Id. § 424(b). See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); S. REP. No.
1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1942); 26 Comp. Gen. 149 (1946).
49. Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 550-51 (1947).
50. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753 § 423, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (Supp.
1983). See SHEPARD'S/McGRAW HILL CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS
AGENCIES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 343 (1982). By judicial interpretation, the limitation
on use of agency "sue and be sued" authority has been construed to bar any action in tort
against the agency, even on a claim exempt from coverage of the FTCA. See Peak v. Small
Business Admin., 660 F.2d 375, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1981); see also FDIC v. Citizens Bank &
Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979). In fact,
legislative history of the FTCA strongly supports the view that the Act was meant to displace
any "sue and be sued" clause in tort matters so as to "place torts of 'suable' agencies of the
United States upon precisely the same footing as torts of 'nonsuable' agencies." H.R. REP.
No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34
(1946).
This wider interpretation of the exclusion was made explicit in the drafting of the Postal
Service's "sue and be sued" clause in the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C.
§§ 401(a), 409(c) (1980). See Insurance Co. of North America v. United States Postal Ser-
vice, 675 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1982) (in actions under "sue and be sued" provision sounding in
tort, FTCA restrictions still apply); see also Sportique Fashions, Inc. v. Sullivan, 597 F.2d
664 (9th Cir. 1979) ("sue and be sued" clause does not repeal express FTCA exemption).
51. An attorney in the United States Postal Service Law Department reads the term
cognizable just this way for purposes of limiting his use of the Service's meritorious claims
statute. By considering any claim involving fault and scope as a cognizable claim, he has
reduced the reach of that statute. It is some measure of the ambiguity of the term that the
Assistant General Counsel of the Law Department is inclined to read the term cognizable
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On the other hand, a cognizable claim may be defined more nar-
rowly as a tort claim arising out of acts within the scope of office
and also not falling within any of the FTCA exemptions. Commen-
tators commonly describe an exempt tort claim as simply not cogni-
zable under the FTCA. The language of the FTCA's repealer
clause-terminating agency settlement authority over torts commit-
ted by a federal employee acting within the scope of his office "in
respect of claims cognizable under [the FTCA]" 52 -strongly im-
plies that there are some tort claims, presumably the exempted
ones, that are not cognizable under the FTCA.
Ultimately, the issue should not be decided in terms of plain
meaning, because there is none. Policy considerations, however,
strongly favor the second view. Congress enacted the FTCA chiefly
in order to broaden the government's accountability in tort, not to
force its response to tort claims into a single standardized mold. It
would therefore be incorrect to deprive agencies of their preexisting
settlement authority over tort claims that Congress chose to exempt
from its general waiver of immunity in 1946. FTCA exemptions
generally seek to avoid dangerous intervention by the courts, not
action by agencies to remedy their own wrongs. Leaving pre-FTCA
administrative settlement authority intact would preserve the liber-
alizing purposes of those earlier statutes, without ignoring the litiga-
tion-oriented concerns that form the FTCA's own exemptions.5 3
Much the same reasoning applies to the interpretation of post-
1946 claims legislation. Obviously, the meaning of any such claims
statute depends primarily on its own language. Some enactments-
the NASA, 54 Peace Corps," and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
more narrowly to require not only fault and scope, but also the nonapplicability of any FTCA
exemption. In view of the Postal Service's scant use of its meritorious claims statute under
either version, the disagreement is of more theoretical than practical interest.
52. See supra note 47.
53. The leading authority on the FTCA, without directly addressing the problem, ap-
pears to conclude that exempt claims should not be considered cognizable under the FTCA
for these purposes. 1 L. JAYSON supra note 20, at 2-75. The Comptroller General has ruled
to the same effect, at least so far as the foreign claims exemption is concerned. Op. Comp.
Gen. No. B-123479-OM (June 21, 1955) (Small Claims Act remains in effect for claims aris-
ing in a foreign country); Op. Comp. Gen. No. B-120773 (Mar. 22, 1955) (same).
My narrow interpretation of cognizability under the FTCA is easily squared with the
broad interpretation given to the exclusion of tort suits under agencies' "sue and be sued"
clauses. See supra note 50. Those clauses were the predicate for judicial determination of
tort claims; the statutes discussed here mostly entail administrative settlement by the agencies
themselves.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2473(c)(13) (Supp. 1983), 72 Stat. 426 (1958).
55. 22 U.S.C. § 2509(b) (1979), 75 Stat. 612 (1961).
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statutes56-- make no reference at all to the FTCA. In applying
them, the agencies should not consider themselves bound by the
FTCA exemptions, although they might allow certain policy con-
siderations underlying the exemptions to influence the exercise of
their own statutory settlement authority. 7 On the other hand,
where a subsequent statute refers to the FTCA, the situation is
more problematic. For the reasons advanced earlier, however, a
statute allowing an agency to setile claims not cognizable under the
FTCA58 should not, without more, be read to disallow the settle-
ment of tort claims exempt under the FTCA.
Some post-1946 claims statutes strike a still different pose in re-
lation to the FTCA. The State Department59 and Veterans Admin-
istration,60 for example, are now authorized to settle tort claims
arising abroad in conformity with the provisions of the FTCA.
When it conferred that authority, Congress clearly meant only to
allow the named agencies to disregard the FTCA foreign claims ex-
emption;6' their statutes do not entitle them to disregard any or all
of the other exemptions. Even here, however, Congress could have
made its purpose clearer.
In enacting legislation that enlarges an agency's authority to sat-
isfy claims for loss or injury, Congress should precisely define the
parameters of the new authority, particularly as it relates to the
agency's existing FTCA authority. The viability and meaning of
pre-1946 settlement statutes have been clouded by their own vague-
ness and the ambiguity of the FTCA's saving and repealer clauses.
Now that each agency has a reasonably well-defined baseline settle-
ment authority under the FTCA, Congress has every reason to use
the utmost precision whenever extending it. A successful example
of exact drafting in this connection is the Swine Flu Immunization
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2207 (1973), 68 Stat. 952 (1954).
57. Thus, the easy availability of postal insurance-said to explain in part the FrCA's
exemption for loss of postal matter-has led the Postal Service to deny claims for loss of
simple postal matter under its own claims statute as well.
58. Examples include the Job Corps statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1781 (1982), and the
State Department statute governing claims by foreign nationals, 22 U.S.C. § 2669(b) (1983),
as well possibly as the Military, 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1982), and Foreign Claims Acts, 10 U.S.C.
§ 2734 (1982), comprehensively revised in 1956. The meritorious claims statute of the Postal
Service, however, may present a different picture 39 U.S.C. § 2603 (1983). While it speaks
only of claims not cognizable under the FrCA, another statute directs the Service to apply
the provisions of the FrCA to all tort claims presented to it Id. § 409(c). This may rule out
payment of an FrCA-exempt claim.
59. 22 U.S.C. § 2669(0 (1979), 82 Stat. 1305 (1968).
60. 38 U.S.C. § 236 (1979), 79 Stat. 1110 (1965).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1965).
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Act of 1976.62 There Congress clearly expressed its intent to en-
large the bases of recovery under the FTCA by including strict lia-
bility and breach of warranty,63 imputing vicarious liability for the
acts of drug manufacturers and distributors as well as federal em-
ployees,64 and waiving the discretionary function exemption and
that exemption alone.65
Most discussions of the FTCA's impact upon alternative agency
claim statutes conceal the underlying question of the FTCA's own
reach. In fact, both claims officers and claimants need to know as a
threshold inquiry whether the FTCA applies to the claim before
them. In enacting the FTCA Congress acknowledged that for some
claims "adequate remedies are already available."66 Such is the ra-
tionale for a fair number of existing FTCA exemptions: claims aris-
ing out of the assessment or collection of a tax or customs duty,67
administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act,68 activities of
the Tennessee Valley Authority69 and the Panama Canal Com-
pany,7° and claims cognizable under the admiralty statutes.7 t In
such cases, the categorical inapplicability of the FTCA dispels any
problem of competition among remedies. The same result should
obtain with respect to statutes outside the FTCA that by their own
terms purport to be the exclusive remedy for a designated category
of claims.7 2 The courts have inferred from the availability of alter-
native remedies still other exclusions from the FTCA 7 3 -notably
claims for personal injury or death or property damage of service-
men incurred as an incident to service," and prisoner claims for
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247bj)-() (1976).
63. Id. at § 247b(k)(2)(A)(i).
64. Id. at §§ 247b(k)(3), (5)(A). But cf § (k)(7) (U.S. has right of indemnity for dam-
ages and litigation costs resulting from breach of contract or from "any negligent conduct on
the part of any program participant in carrying out any obligation or responsibility in connec-
tion with the swine flu program").
65. Id. at § 247b(k)(5)(C).
66. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1965).
68. Id. § 2680(e).
69. Id. § 2680(1).
70. Id. § 2680(m).
71. Id. § 2680(d).
72. See supra note 29.
73. If Congress agrees, it should add these exclusions specifically to the FTCA's exemp-
tion section.
74. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Preferred Ins. Co. v. United
States, 222 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837 (1955) (both denying right of action
against government under Federal Tort Claims Act for physical injury or property damage
incident to military service).
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which a fair, reasonable and comprehensive remedy exists 7 5 -but
far more often than not they decline to do so.
76
Claimants often have recourse to the FTCA, notwithstanding
the fact that their claims may be compensable, for example, under
the Court of Claims Act,7" the Military Claims Act,78 certain ser-
vicemen's 79 or veterans' benefits laws,8" or the meritorious claims
provision of the Atomic Energy Act.8" These are only the few en-
actments whose impact on the FTCA actually has been an issue in
litigation. Claimants are also not required to elect remedies.82
Apart from the FTCA's administrative claim procedure, the law
does not even require the exhaustion of other administrative reme-
dies before filing suit. 3 This is consistent with the FTCA's policy
of providing simple and direct means of access to the federal
courts.8 4 Moreover, the pendency of parallel remedies does not bar
the FTCA claim.8 5 In fact, claimants' counsel have been specifi-
cally cautioned, in order to avoid expiration of the statute of limita-
tions on any potentially applicable remedy, to pursue all possible
claims at once.86 Finally, agency findings are not binding in a re-
75. United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 0966) (availability of remedial relief under 18
U.S.C. § 4126 (1934), a prison compensation law, bars suit under FTCA).
76. See, eg., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (no exclusion of prisoner
claims); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (no exclusion of veterans' claims);
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (no exclusion of non-service-connected injuries of
servicemen).
77. Eg., Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1957).
78. E.g., United States v. Gaidys, 194 F.2d 762, 763-64 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v.
Wade, 170 F.2d 298, 301 (1st Cir. 1948); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 251 F. Supp. 221, 227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
79. E.g., Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
80. E.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954).
81. E.g., Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D. Utah 1955). The question
of FTCA preclusion was not raised by the parties, but by the court sua sponte.
82. Arkwright Mut. Ins Co., 251 F. Supp. at 227. See also United States v. Huff, 165
F.2d 720, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1948) (31 U.S.C. § 273b remedy neither conclusive nor required);
Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1051, 1057 (Ct. Cl. 1970) ("Foreign Claims Act
provides an ex gratia remedy which does not preclude later relief."). The result is different if
acceptance of payment is deemed by statute to be in full and final satisfaction of the claim or
a release is actually entered into.
83. Beins v. United States, 695 F.2d 591, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
84. 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL ToRT CLAIMS 11-18 (1984).
85. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 20, at 5-255.
86. Id. at 5-258. The FTCA statute of limitations is unaffected by the filing of any other
claim or suit. E.g., Beins, 695 F.2d at 599 (appeals under Federal Aviation Act); Mendiola v.
United States, 401 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1968) (state workmen's compensation); Winston
Bros. Co. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 130, 134-35 (D. Minn. 1973) (contract claim in
Court of Claims); Dancy v. United States, 668 F.2d 1224, 1228 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (appeal of
separation from service before Merit Systems Protection Board).
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lated FTCA proceeding,87 although any recovery under the Act is
reduced by a prior award for the same loss. 8
8
The question whether Congress or the courts, as a policy matter,
should oust the FTCA remedy where a narrower statutory remedy
exists has no single answer. Both ousting and not ousting have their
inconveniences. In any event, individual claims officers should
make it a practice of apprising claimants of other available remedies
and where permissible administer them.8 9 Unfortunately, this sug-
gestion presupposes a familiarity with an agency's overall inventory
of claims authority that any given tort claims officer may or may
not possess. Interests are best served when all agency channels for
satisfaction of a monetary claim are explored in the most expedi-
tious and practical way possible. And since claims officers situated
within the legal department of the agency out of whose activities
such claims arise can best accomplish this, those officers should be-
come familiar with the full range of channels and explore them as
the circumstances logically suggest.90 The notion that one adminis-
trative remedy necessarily excludes all others, or must be exhausted
before any other is entertained, tends to interfere with flexibility of
this sort. The situation is different where Congress establishes a
comprehensive framework for administrative relief. An exclusive
remedy designed to take advantage of agency expertise and to pro-
mote uniform and orderly disposition of claims must be respected.
But, as a general rule, limitations on access to the FTCA should not
be easily inferred.
87. Joseph v. United States, 505 F.2d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 1974) (Veterans Administration
findings not resjudicata in later FICA action). Accord Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp.
908, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Military Claims Act).
88. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954); accord Brooks v. United States,
337 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1949). When the claimant executes a release of the United States either
voluntarily or implicitly by statute, no FTCA recovery is available. 2 L. JAYSON supra note
84, at 11-18 n.20.
89. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 536.6(h)(1) (1984) ("Prior to the disapproval of a claim under
a particular statute, a careful review should be made to insure that the claim is not properly
payable under a different statute or on another basis."). In addition, when it comes to notify-
ing the claimant of his or her appeal rights, the Army suggests calling attention to all the
alternatives. Id. § 563.1 l(e). The Army Claims Service provides its officers with a list of all
military and non-military authority to pay claimants. Dep't of Army Reg. No. 27-20, Legal
Services: Claims, supra note 6, § 13.1 le.
90. A claims officer should be careful that the statutes of limitations on some remedies
do not expire while other remedies are explored.
"Each agency General Counsel's office should compile and publish in the CFR a list
briefly describing statutes under which the agency is authorized to entertain monetary claims
and the name and telephone number of the agency personnel in charge of each program. In
appropriate circumstances, claims officers should make a copy of the list available to claim-
ants." ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(1)(b) (1984).
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II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The notion of administrative settlement of tort claims substan-
tially predates the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in
1946.91 Through the haphazard collection of statutes alluded to
earlier, Congress had authorized certain agencies to settle and
sometimes pay particular types of claims. The Small Claims Act of
1922 gave severely limited settlement authority to all agencies.92 In
fact, the earlier federal tort claims bills of the 1920's and 1930's
contemplated a predominantly administrative model for implement-
ing the general tort liability that Congress by then was prepared to
have the federal government bear.93
The bills that eventually produced the FTCA took a different
approach, adopting a judicial model for the disposition of tort
claims. They vested basic decisional authority in the federal courts,
empowering the agencies only to dispose of judicially cognizable
tort claims within the strictest monetary limits.94 This litigation-
oriented model was the eventual shape of the FTCA.
The FTCA, as enacted, permitted the United States to be sued,
with no amount limitation, for the negligent or wrongful acts of its
employees who were acting within the scope of their employment.
It authorized the Attorney General to compromise and settle such
suits. Heads of federal agencies could administratively settle only
claims not exceeding $1000, 9' a figure later raised to $2500 to allow
for inflation.96 More importantly, the Act made the decision to sub-
mit an administrative claim entirely optional, and even allowed the
91. See supra note 26.
92. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
93. See Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 2. One proposal provided that the General Account-
ing Office, the Employees' Compensation Commission and the agencies share responsibility
for handling tort claims. Recourse to the Court of Claims was limited to property damage
claims and was available on a review not a de novo basis. H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1927). For greater detail on this and similar bills, see Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims
Bill, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1933).
94. See Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 3.
95. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753 § 403(a). The $1000 figure referred
to the amount of the claim, not to the size of any proposed settlement. The claimant's accept-
ance of an administrative settlement constituted a complete release of both the United States
and the employee. Id. § 403(d).
96. Act of Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-238, § 2, 73 Stat. 471,472 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2672 (1983)). The Senate Report urged increasing the limit to $3000 while recognizing that
most claims were in excess even of that amount. S. REP. No. 797, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2272, 2273. The House Committee on the
Judiciary thought $2000 adequate. Id. The figure of $2500 was a compromise. See generally
Williams, The $2,500 Limitation on Administrative Settlements Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 1960 INs. L.J. 669, 673 (1960).
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claimant, on fifteen days' written notice, to withdraw the claim
from agency consideration and bring suit.97 The sole effect of filing
an administrative claim was to create a ceiling on the sum that
could be sought in court-a restriction that only discouraged pru-
dent claimants from turning to the agency first. The easy access to
court shows that the FTCA's architects contemplated a modest role
for administrative settlement.
Agency settlement authority under the FTCA was expanded
greatly in 1966, one of the few times the statute has been altered in a
basic way. The 1966 reform gave agency heads settlement authority
without regard to amount9" and made submission of claims to the
agencies an absolute prerequisite to suit.99 The previous $2500 ceil-
ing had made administrative settlement all but impossible except in
modest property damage claims and exceptionally small personal
injury claims; for larger claims, claimants had no choice but to
bring suit, with the later possibility of negotiated settlement. The
decision to require agency submission before filing suit was based on
evidence that claimants bypassed the agencies when the administra-
tive settlement process was optional."° Under the amended FTCA,
claims initially brought to court, rather than to the responsible
97. A claim rejected by the agency or withdrawn from its consideration, could still be
sued upon within the two-year limitations period. If the two-year period expired before an
administrative decision, a six-month filing extension became available, starting from the date
the agency mailed the denial or from the date the claim was withdrawn from the agency, as
appropriate. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753 § 420. See Williams, supra
note 96, at 670-71.
98. Settlements in excess of $25,000, however, must receive prior written approval from
the Attorney General or his designee. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506 §§ l(a), 9(a),
80 Stat. 306 (1966) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2672).
99. Id. § 2 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Note that the 1966 amendments only gov-
ern claims accruing on or after January 18, 1967.
Considerations of judicial economy create the only exception to the agency submission
requirement-assertion of tort claims by way of third party complaint, cross-claim or coun-
terclaim. Id. But the courts have limited the counterclaim exception to compulsory counter-
claims, Northridge Bank v. Community Eye Care Center, Inc., 665 F.2d 832, 836 (7th Cir.
1981); United States v. Chatham, 415 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (N.D. Ga. 1976), and the third
party claim exception to claims by the principal defendant. Rosario v. American Export-
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
The constitutionality of the prior claim requirement was upheld in Montalvo v. Graham,
390 F. Supp. 533, 534 (E.D. Wis. 1975). A few state courts have invalidated notice of claim
requirements in state tort claims legislation as violative of equal protection or lacking a ra-
tional relation to a valid public purpose. See generally Note, Notice of Claim Provisions An
Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 417 (1975).
100. Hearings on Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Liti-
gation Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-
14 (1966) (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
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agency, should be dismissed as premature.' ° '
Congress clearly intended by the 1966 amendments to en-
courage and facilitate administrative disposition of tort claims.
Thus, if the original Act was designed to ease the burdens on Con-
gress by shifting primary responsibility for government tort claims
to the courts, 10 2 the 1966 amendments sought in turn to transfer the
burden to the agencies. Legislative history also suggests that the
benefits of avoiding unnecessary litigation were expected to flow to
claimants, the Department of Justice, and the agencies alike. 103
The 1966 changes required an adjustment in the statute of limi-
tations. Under the original Act, claims had to be brought to court
within one year of accrual. If a claimant chose first to present a
claim to the agency, that also had to be done within one year, but a
new statute of limitations on suit began with the mailing of the de-
nial or withdrawal of the claim and ran for six months or until the
end of the original one-year limit, whichever was longer."° The
1966 amendments applied the basic statute of limitations, which by
then had been extended to two years,10 5 to the mandatory adminis-
trative claim, and attached a further six-month limitation on suit to
run from the agency's mailing of a written notice of final denial of
the claim.' 0 6 As before, failure to meet the FTCA's time limits
eliminated federal jurisdiction over the matter. 0 7
To help enforce the jurisdictional prerequisite, Congress re-
tained the provision requiring agency action before an administra-
101. Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977); Cummins v. Ciccone, 317
F. Supp. 342, 343 (W.D. Mo. 1970). Moreover, the premature filing of a complaint does not
toll the statute of limitations on filing an administrative claim. E.g., Morano v. United States
Naval Hosp., 437 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Gutelius v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 51,
53 (E.D. Va. 1970).
102. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549 (1951) (the FTCA "merely
substitutes the District Courts for Congress as the agency to determine the validity and
amount of the claims"); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950) (the Act "waived
immunity and transferred the burden of examining tort claims to the courts").
103. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1966), quoting from H.R. REP. No.
1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515-20;
Hearings, supra note 100, at 12-15 (Statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney
General).
104. See supra note 97.
105. Act of Apr. 25, 1949, ch. 92, § 1, 63 Stat. 62 (1949) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
The extension was meant to bring the limitations period into conformity with analogous state
statutes. H.R. REP. No. 276, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 1226, 1227.
106. Act of July 18, 1966, § 7 (1966) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
107. Id. E.g., Stewart v. United States, 655 F.2d 741, 742 (7th Cir. 1981); Best Bearings
Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972) (the requirement, being jurisdic-
tional, is not waivable).
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tive claim could be sued upon, 8 and dropped the provision
enabling a claimant to withdraw a pending claim from agency con-
sideration and sue.' 0 9 Congress also addressed the case of failure by
an agency to dispose of a claim within six months. If that occurs, a
claimant may either treat the inaction as a final denial and proceed
to litigation, or allow the agency to consider the claim further, with-
out giving up the right to sue any time thereafter. 110
The amendment package contained additional provisions
designed to facilitate tort claim settlements. It eliminated the origi-
nal requirement of court approval of litigation settlements by the
Attorney General,1 1 ' and more importantly increased the allowable
attorneys' fees. The amendments raised the statutory ceiling on fees
from ten percent to twenty percent of the amount recovered in
agency settlements, and from twenty percent to twenty-five percent
of judgments and litigation settlements. 112 These increases not only
resulted in fees more commensurate with those in private tort litiga-
tion, 113 but also narrowed the difference between fees recovered in
agency settlements compared to litigation. Because of the much
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982). The bar to suit during this period has been consistently
enforced. E.g., Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); Caton v. United
States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 561 F.
Supp. 106, 117-18 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Nixon v. NLRB, 559 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (W.D. Mo.
1983); Cooper v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 116, 118-19 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Walley v. United
States, 366 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
109. Act of July 18, 1966, § 3.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a) (1982). See Mack v. USPS, 414 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (E.D.
Mich. 1976); Corboy, Shielding the Plaintiff's Achilles' Heel: Tort Claim Notices to Govern-
mental Entities, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 609, 638 (1979); Silverman, The Ins and Outs of Filing
a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 41, 42 (1980).
A final denial, even if issued beyond the six-month period allotted the agency, presumably
triggers a fixed six-month limitations period on suit. See Silverman, supra.
111. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506 § 3, 80 Stat. 306, 307 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2677). Justice Department determinations to settle were evidently rarely overruled. S.
REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 8, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2520;
Jayson, Federal Tort Claims Act Amendments: Trial Counsel Warns Problems Ahead, 2
TRIAL 19 (1966).
112. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 4, 80 Stat. 306, 307 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2678). The increase had a dual purpose: to help afford claimants competent representation
and to provide their attorneys reasonable compensation. The percentages stated merely place
a limit on the allowable amount. The actual fee is determined between the litigant and attor-
ney; agency or court approval of the agreed amount is no longer required. S. RaP. No. 1327,
supra note 103, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2520. A remaining
question pertains to the allowable fee in cases of no recovery. See infra notes 693-95 and
accompanying text.
113. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2520.
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greater time and effort generally required in litigation, the change
gave attorneys an obvious incentive to settle before suit.
No less important in encouraging agency settlements was the
change in the source of payment for tort claim settlements. The
FTCA originally provided that administrative settlements be paid
out of agency appropriations.'1 4 Under the amended act, agency-
level settlements not exceeding $2500 continue to be so paid,"' but
larger agency settlements, as well as all litigation settlements, come
out of the judgment fund." 6 The combination of independent set-
tlement authority (subject to Attorney General approval only for
settlements above $25,000) and a very limited exposure of agency
appropriations for the payment of settlements clearly was calcu-
lated to strengthen agency disposition to settle.1'7
Finally, the amendments provided that the agencies' new and
largely independent settlement authority should be exercised "in ac-
cordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General."11
A concern that the government would not have legal representation
during all settlement proceedings prompted this provision for sub-
stantive legal guidance on the part of the Attorney General. 119 In
fact, the regulations promulgated provide little such guidance. In-
stead, they direct the agencies to submit proposed settlements
greater than $5000 for review by a legal officer. 120 A second con-
cern was that agency settlement policies and procedures might vary
widely. However, the Justice Department has not used its rulemak-
ing authority under the amended FTCA to provide the agencies
with guidance on substantive issues, but rather has confined itself to
114. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 403(c), 60 Stat. 812, 843. Since
litigation settlements were also paid out of agency appropriations, the agencies in effect paid
all but actual judgments.
115. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506 § 1(c), 80 Stat. 306 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2672). However, the $2500 cutoff now refers to the size of the settlement rather than the
amount of the claim. Id.
116. Id. See also 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1983).
117. A possible repercussion of this fiscal irresponsibility is the heightened potential for
collusion between the agency and claimant. Neither Congress nor the General Accounting
Office has explored whether this potential has been exploited.
118. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506 §§ 1, 9(a), 80 Stat. 306, 308 (amending 28
U.S.C. § 2672).
119. Hearings, supra note 100, at 17.
120. 28 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1984). Another regulation provides for prior consultation with
the Justice Department even with respect to settlements not in excess of $25,000, where some
other named element is present. These include a novel legal issue or policy question, a poten-
tial government claim for indemnity or contribution from a third party, the pendency of a
related claim against the United States on which the amount to be paid might exceed $25,000,
and the pendency of any litigation arising out of the same incident. Id. § 14.6(b), (c).
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procedural matters. 121
Even before the vast new settlement opportunities created by the
1966 amendments, the agencies played a crucial role in the investi-
gation and initial evaluation of claims. They prepared detailed liti-
gation reports on both the factual and legal dimensions of a claim,
and consulted with the Justice Department on substantive aspects
of the litigation and on the advisability of settlement at every
stage. 122 Nevertheless, the amendments brought the agencies new
autonomy in claims evaluation, prompting some critics seriously to
question whether agency legal staffs were equipped to handle their
new responsibilities. 123 The amendments brought a similarly dra-
matic change for claimants and private practitioners handling fed-
eral tort claims. A claims officer attached to the agency, often far
from the events, now supplanted the local Assistant U.S. Attorney
as their primary negotiating partner.
The FTCA administrative claims process betrays in many ways
its origins as a fundamentally judicial remedy in tort. The general
consensus is that agencies have no broader substantive authority
under the FTCA to issue an award than Congress conferred on the
courts." 4 Although a decent argument could be made that agencies
may administratively settle claims falling within an FTCA exemp-
tion,12 5 Congress almost certainly did not intend that the agencies
121. Cf. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1212, 1214 (1967).
122. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2519. Agencies also prepare routine accident reports in the event of known mishaps.
123. I. GOTTLIEB, A NEW APPROACH TO THE HANDLING OF TORT CLAIMS AGAINST
THE SOVEREIGN 28-29 (1967).
124. As a practical matter, agency claims officers uniformly view their settlement author-
ity as no broader than the government's exposure to legal liability. Williams, supra note 96,
at 672. Except to acknowledge that even doubtful claims legitimately command a certain,
albeit reduced, settlement value, they disavow any authority to settle a claim that is truly
exempt, time-barred or otherwise infirm under the FTCA.
125. The argument is best made by reference to the discretionary function exemption.
The legislative history of that provision suggests an intent to keep the courts from second-
guessing the agencies on matters of policy or judgment. Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 44. But
that concern recedes when an agency chooses of its own accord to compensate a tort victim.
The same may be said of the so-called intentional torts exemption, whose purpose is to spare
the government from having to defend against such categories of claims in litigation or hav-
ing to bear the large and speculative judgments that a court might render. See Note, supra
note 49, at 547.
A parallel argument may be made with respect to the statute of limitations. Clearly, no
claim may be sued upon unless first presented to the agency within two years of accrual. 28
U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (Supp. 1983). But the government, like a private party, might conceivably
want to pay a claim that, though no longer timely for purposes of suit, remains just and
meritorious.
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do so. It meant to enable agencies to entertain and pay litigable
claims without awaiting litigation. By the same token, Congress did
not apparently design for these purposes any particular administra-
tive process. Nevertheless, agency handling of tort claims has taken
on a substantial life of its own. It has become one of the conven-
tional responsibilities of an agency's office of general counsel, as
well as a highly standardized operation, especially in agencies with
a high claims volume. In both its conduct and its results, the ad-
ministrative claims process has proven to be, as the Torts Branch
Director within the Justice Department's Civil Division has re-
marked, "more than a perfunctory exercise that serves merely as the
necessary springboard for a judicial claim." '126
Although the 1966 amendments have been credited with success
in shifting disposition of government tort claims from court to
agency,127 any precise assessment of the gains is difficult to make.
A proper evaluation requires a clear sense of the drafters' purposes
and expectations. Statistics provided by the Justice Department at
the 1966 hearings suggested that roughly eighty percent of all meri-
torious FTCA claims in litigation were settled prior to trial.128 The
Department did not offer statistics on the incidence of prelitigation
settlements, but considering the then $2500 ceiling on agency settle-
ment authority, it is likely that all substantial settlements were
reached only after suit had been fied. 129 In recommending passage
of the 1966 amendments, the Department clearly anticipated that
many settlements reached after litigation began might be settled
sooner.110 The availability of administrative settlement was ex-
pected to rid congested court dockets of many claims that, in the
126. Axelrad, Litigation Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 LITIGATION 22, 24 (Fall
1981).
127. Id. at 24, 55.
128. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2516. Accord Laughlin, Federal Tort Claims Act Amendments: A New Charter for
Injured Citizens, 2 TRIAL 18 (1966).
129. However, in some agencies the volume and settlement rate of claims amenable to
administrative settlement were impressive. In 1965, the Post Office processed over 5000
claims ranging from $100 to $2500, and allowed 3800 of them. Field officers allowed an
additional 5200 claims of less than $100. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 5, reprinted in
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2519.
130. The stated prediction was not undisputed. One insider, writing just after passage of
the amendments, described the expected shift to agency-level settlement as "the most falla-
cious of all sorcery since the volume of claims which will descend upon the agencies and their
limited staffs will make effective settlement a literal or practical impossibility." I. GOTTLIEB,
supra note 123, at 29. Nevertheless, the Justice Department cited statistics showing that only
40% private tort claimants filed suit for personal injury in New York City. S. REP. No.
1327, supra note 103, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2516-17.
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private tort claim sector, would not have proceeded that far. The
Department's immediate purpose may have been to husband its liti-
gation resources, 13' but the advantages to deserving claimants in
time and money saved are no less compelling. The benefits are not
to be measured only in terms of expedited settlement. An adequate
agency claims process may also effectively demonstrate either the
weakness of a claimant's case or the strength of the government's
defense, thus preventing futile litigation. 132  The availability of
agency-level settlement may also encourage the filing of additional
meritorious claims which would not be pressed if litigation were the
only avenue. Still, despite the enthusiasm over administrative set-
tlement, neither the Justice Department nor Congress anticipated
that a substantial majority of claims could ever be disposed of with-
out litigation.133
To what extent have expectations been met? Currently, the tort
claim filing and settlement figures necessary to justify a precise ap-
praisal are simply not maintained. The agencies should develop
more complete and refined statistics than are now available.1 34 For
any given fiscal year, each agency should be able to tell the volume
and dollar value of administrative tort claims filed, broken down by
type of claim and by the agency program or activity involved. They
should know the percentage, both in numbers and dollar values, of
claims that were eventually settled, denied or abandoned. Appar-
ently no agency has this kind of information on its own claims oper-
ations; nor is it information that the Justice Department or the
General Accounting Office can develop on a government-wide basis
if the agencies do not furnish them with the underlying data. With-
out this information-which would also have important risk-man-
agement value to the bodies that generate it 135-the agencies cannot
131. The Justice Department thought its resources in the tort area might better be de-
voted to cases involving difficult legal or technical questions in such areas as medical mal-
practice, products liability and aviation accidents. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 6,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2520. Of course, the Department fully
expected to perform important advisory services to the agencies as they assumed their more
substantial claims evaluation functions. Laughlin, supra note 128, at 38.
132. Hearings, supra note 100, at 15 (Statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney
General).
133. One reason for this prediction was that very large personal injury claims, involving
difficult questions of fact and dubious assertions of damages, could not realistically be settled
without use of the discovery devices provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Laughlin, supra note 128, at 38. Also, some claimants will simply demand their day in court
even if they have an agency offer in hand, whether in hopes of a more generous judgment or
litigation settlement, or out of a litigious spirit.
134. See also infra notes 610-23 and accompanying text.
135. See infra note 616 and accompanying text.
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know the efficacy of their claims processes. It would also be helpful
for agencies to correlate administrative with judicial outcomes for
any given body of claims. Data should be collected to show the
percentage of administrative claims denied or deemed denied that
went on to litigation and of those the percentage that ended in com-
promise settlement or judgment. The inferences to be drawn from
the resulting correlations may not be obvious or unambiguous, but
without correlations, no inferences can be drawn at all.
Even agencies with the best documentation now maintain data
that are segregated by fiscal year or other fixed time period.136 Un-
fortunately, fiscal year data do not detail the disposition of a single
set of original claims; they instead reflect action taken on claims
filed during the previous four or five fiscal years, while ignoring
claims not acted on in the fiscal year in question. The difference is
between a static and a dynamic picture of tort claims events. Since
all agencies have somewhat erratic yearly claim patterns, distortions
inevitably result.
Keeping in mind the relatively unscientific character of the
claims data available, consider one example. The Air Force in fiscal
year 1982 received 1,727 administrative filings under the FTCA, to-
talling $741,319,922 in claims. 137 In the same period it settled 1,143
claims, totalling $17,544,161.138 Because the claims it settled in fis-
cal year 1982 were not all filed that year, and because not all claims
filed in fiscal year 1982 could possibly have been settled that year, a
fiscal year 1982 Air Force settlement rate cannot sensibly be deter-
mined. Assuming it could, the figures would be impressive: sixty-
six percent of the total claims filed were disposed of by payments
representing a tiny fraction-barely two percent-of the amounts
initially sought. 139 Compared with litigation settlements and judg-
ments reached in fiscal year 1982, the impression is still very
favorable. Payment was made on a mere eighty-nine claims at that
stage, though the dollar value admittedly was very high:
$13,178,587.14° The evidence suggests that the administrative pro-
136. For example, Central Office AnnualAdministrative Tort Claim Report FY 1982, Oct.
1, 1981 - Sept. 30, 1982 (Office of General Counsel, Veterans Administration).
137. Statistical Review, AF Claims and Tort Litigation Activity, Fiscal Year 1982, at 7.
138. Id. at 3.
139. By way of additional example, the Veterans Administration settled 156 medical mal-
practice claims in fiscal year 1982, paying out some $6.2 million. In the same period, it
received claims totalling $775 million. See Central Office Annual Administrative Tort Claim
Report FY 1982, supra note 136; Field Office Annual Administrative Tort Claim Report FY
1982, Oct. 1, 1981 - Sept. 30, 1982.
140. Comparable Air Force claims data for the first six months of fiscal year 1983 reflect
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cess resolves an extremely high proportion of claims worth pay-
ing.141 The fact that the per claim dollar value of postlitigation
settlements and judgments greatly exceeds the per claim dollar
value of prelitigation settlements142 is hardly surprising, since the
larger the claim the more likely claimant and government alike will
view it as worth litigating. The more relevant figure is probably the
number rather than the dollar value of claims. In this respect the
administrative process appears to be handsomely vindicating
itself. 143
The agency-level claims process also helps expose the meritless
character of many claims that are filed administratively, denied or
deemed denied, and taken no further. Figures furnished by a few
a similar pattern: Claims filed-899, totalling $445,801,800; claims paid administratively-
531, totalling $4,893,101; claims paid after litigation-21, totalling $2,169,188. Statistical Re-
view, AF Claims and Tort Litigation Activity, March FY 1983, at 7-10.
Similar results are found in other agencies. In calendar year 1982, the Postal Service
received 9323 tort claims, while in the same period 435 FTCA lawsuits were filed arising out
of Postal Service activities. That year, $7,878,444 was paid out in administrative settlement
of tort claims, compared to $2,122,210 in litigation settlements (206 in number) and $873,201
in judgments (32 in number). The Postal Service successfully defended to judgment 188 tort
suits. Information supplied by Paul M. Levin, Supervising Attorney, Claims Division, Law
Dep't, U.S. Postal Service.
141. The figure is more impressive when one considers that constraints on litigation re-
sources compel the Justice Department to settle a certain number of tort suits based on claims
that were simply not strong enough to justify settlement at the agency level. See infra notes
370-71 and accompanying text.
In any event, the results compare very favorably with the New York City settlement
statistics that the Justice Department cited with approval in 1966. See supra note 130. The
Chief of the General Claims Division of the Army Claims Service guesses that of the 5000 to
6000 tort claims filed annually with the Army, only ten percent have gone to court in recent
years and many fewer to an actual judgment. Interview with Joseph H. Rouse, Chief, Gen-
eral Claims Division, U.S. Army Claims Service, at Fort George G. Meade, Md. (Aug. 29,
1983).
142. Government-wide statistics compiled by the General Accounting Office on tort pay-
ments from the judgment fund suggest that the dollar value of postlitigation tort payments far
outstrips that of prelitigation payments. Thus, for fiscal year 1983, the GAO reported admin-
istrative settlements in tort totalling $32,416,118, but litigation settlements and judgments
totalling $104,423,334. The disparity would be reduced by an uncertain figure if the total
government-wide value of agency-level settlements not in excess of $2500 (none of which is
reported by the agencies to the GAO) was added to the administrative settlement total. (An
additional $4 million was paid out of the judgment fund in fiscal year 1983 for that portion of
individual agency-level settlements under the Military, Foreign and National Guard Claims
Acts in excess of $25,000.) Telephone interview with Sharon Green, Chief, Claims Adjudica-
tion, Claims Group, Accounting and Financial Management Division, General Accounting
Office, (Feb. 21, 1984).
143. Adding agency level-settlements not in excess of $2500 to the numbers compiled by
GAO would further vindicate the administrative process. Even without them, GAO records
show a government-wide total of 1114 administrative settlements under the FTCA in fiscal
year 1983 (not including 40 for amounts in excess of $25,000 under the Military, Foreign and
National Guard Claims Acts), compared to 997 for litigation settlements and judgments. Id.
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agencies suggest that such claims represent a considerable percent-
age of all claims ified.' 44 To what extent such claims might have
fruitlessly clogged the courts if not for their ventilation at the
agency level, one can only guess. A good deal stands to be learned
from gathering and analyzing data on what claimants do when they
receive an agency-level denial.1 45 Arguably, disappointed claimants
who accept denial of a claim have greater confidence in the fairness
and accuracy of the administrative process.
Quite apart from the utility of the administrative process in di-
verting tort claims from litigation,1 46 the distribution of agency-
level outcomes seems to vary widely with the agency. At the high
end, a Department of Interior attorney supposes that seventy-five
percent of all claimants achieve an agency-level settlement, which
may or may not approximate the amount initially claimed. 47 The
144. For example, data gathered from each of NASA's field installations for the last three
fiscal years show very little evidence of litigation in any year despite a considerable percentage
of denials throughout the period. Letter from Richard J. Wieland, Assistant General Coun-
sel for Litigation, NASA, to George A. Bermann (Aug. 8, 1983). The Chief of General
Claims at the Army Claims Service supposes that disappointed claimants are on the whole as
likely to accept defeat as to litigate. See Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
Yet, other agency claims attorneys insist that upwards of ninety percent of claimants
receiving agency-level denials proceed to court. See Interview with Aleta Bodolay, Torts
Branch, Civil Div., Dep't of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (May 26, 1983). The assertion is
not entirely credible. Most agencies report making payments in the case of no more than
sixty or seventy percent of the claims filed, at the outside. See Nesvet Interview, supra note
23. If the overwhelming majority of disappointed agency-level claimants sued, we would find
a much larger ratio of FTCA lawsuits to FTCA administrative claims than we seem to have.
No accurate ratio can be posited given the absence of reliable filing figures on an agency-by-
agency basis. However, informal estimates both in the literature and in the author's conver-
sations would put the ratio at no more than one to ten and more likely at one to fifteen or
twenty. See Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, Director, Torts Branch, Civil Div., Dep't of
Justice, in Washington, D.C. (May 18, 1983).
In 1977, the leading authority on the FTCA estimated new lawsuits filed under the Act to
be in excess of 1500 yearly and new administrative claims to number "some 10 to 20 times
that amount." I L. JAYSON, supra note 20, § 1-8 (1985). Annual reports of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts reflect a doubling since then in tort actions commenced
against the United States in the district courts: 2973 in the year ending June 30, 1982, 3084
in the year ending June 30, 1983. But there is no reason to doubt that the number of new
administrative claims has kept fully apace. No one has gathered the figures on a government-
wide basis, but a figure of 60,000 to 70,000 would probably not be an exaggeration.
145. Denials due entirely to a failure to agree on a settlement sum presumably trigger
litigation.
146. See supra notes 141-44, and figures cited therein. If administrative claims estimates
are correct, the agencies are disposing of as high a percentage of claims as ever, notwithstand-
ing the rise over time in the number of FTCA suits. (Incredibly, the Justice Department had
expected the 1966 amendments to reduce in absolute terms the volume of FTCA litigation.
See Laughlin, supra note 128, at 38.)
147. Interview with Robert A. Feeley, Attorney-Advisor, General Law Division, Office
of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1983).
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Postal Service estimates that it enters into monetary settlements at
least as often, though the amounts involved tend to be lower and the
differences between recovery and initial demand greater, than the
Interior Department reports. 148  At the other extreme, Veterans
Administration attorneys estimate that only twenty-five percent of
total yearly tort claims result in final settlements at the agency
level. 149 This figure reflects the relatively high incidence of large
and often speculative medical malpractice claims against that
agency.' 50  Most agencies put settlement rates somewhere in
between. 5'
Claims officers also point out that the settlement rate of a single
agency fluctuates widely according to the dollar value or type of
claim. In the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), a crudely estimated settlement rate of as high as eighty
percent on small claims drops to a fraction of that for claims in
excess of $25,000. 152 The Department of Agriculture shows a wide
148. Interview with Clinton I. Newman, Assistant General Counsel, Law Department,
U.S. Postal Service, in Washington, D.C. (June 7, 1983). Nevertheless, the total is impres-
sive. The Law Department estimates aggregate administrative tort payments in the vicinity
of ten to thirteen million dollars a year, a figure, however, that must be put in the perspective
of a $25 billion annual agency operating budget.
Settlement rates may vary within a given agency depending on the locus of authority.
Thus, postal service claims adjudicated at Law Department headquarters show a somewhat
lower settlement rate than those adjudicated in the field, but this may be due to the generally
greater amounts or greater legal or factual complexity of the claims involved. Id.
149. Interview with James P. Kane, Assistant General Counsel, Irving Schmetterling,
Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and E. Douglas Bradshaw, Staff Attorney, all of the Of-
fice of General Counsel, Veterans Administration, in Washington, D.C. (July 26, 1983). No
guess was hazarded as to the percentage of denials that go into litigation, but Veterans Ad-
ministration attorneys estimate that no more than forty percent of claims that do go into
litigation are compromised, and that among those going to judgment the agency prevails at
least nine times out of ten. Id.
150. See infra note 391.
151. Interviews with Ray Semeta, Chief, Air Force Claims and Tort Litigation, Office of
the Judge Advocate General, Headquarters, United States Air Force, in Washington, D.C.
(July 27, 1983); Rouse Interview, supra note 141; Kelley Interview, supra note 24; Nesvet
Interview, supra note 23; Huang Interview, supra note 22. The Chief of General Claims at
the Army Claims Service imagines that the number of administrative claims producing an
agency-level settlement of some sort and the number resulting in a denial come out about
evenly, though the dollar values not surprisingly do not. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. A
table of general claims which may include non-FrCA matters, suggests that the percentage of
claims paid administratively in recent fiscal years has ranged between thirty and forty,
although this is another example of the use of a noncomparable claims data base. Table
provided to author by Joseph H. Rouse on Aug. 29, 1983 (on file with Case Western Reserve
University Law Review).
152. Interview with Richard J. Wieland, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation, Office
of General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in Washington, D.C.
(June 29, 1983). Other claims officials agree that larger claims are not as well suited for
administrative adjustment. See Letter from Jeffrey Axelrad, Director, Torts Branch, Civil
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disparity in the percentage of claims honored as between the rising
number of regulatory and program-related torts, on the one hand,
and the more conventional vehicular accident claims, on the
other.15 But, if these data and impressions show that we do not
know as much as we might about tort claim outcomes in agency-
level and judicial channels, they at least do not suggest that the ad-
ministrative claims process fails to achieve its intended purpose or
that Congress' faith in the agencies was misplaced.
III. BASIC LEGAL ISSUES
The administrative claim process under the FTCA looks decep-
tively simple. The Act simply requires that a claimant, prior to
commencing a tort suit against the United States, present the claim
to the appropriate federal agency and give that agency six months in
which to consider it."54 If the agency denies the claim, the claimant
has six months from the date the letter of denial was mailed to com-
mence an FTCA suit. 55 The failure of an agency to make a final
disposition of the claim within six months after it is filed may be
taken by the claimant as a denial. 56 Within this apparently simple
and straightforward statutory framework, 57 however, lurks a host
of legal issues.
A. The Prior Claim
Although the statutory prior administrative claim requirement
has been the source of confusion and occasional injustice to claim-
ants, 58 the fact of the matter is that the government usually asserts
Division, Dep't of Justice, to Charles Pou, Jr., Administrative Conference of the United
States (May 18, 1984) (available at Case Western Reserve University Law Review); Letter
from Frederic L. Conway, III, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Veterans Adminis-
tration, to Charles Pou, Jr., Administrative Conference of the United States (May 25, 1984)
(available at Case Western Reserve University Law Review).
153. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23. The theme is echoed by others, including the chief
claims attorney at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Kelley Interview, supra note 24. The
Assistant Legal Advisor for claims of the State Department distinguishes sharply between
vehicular incidents, which yield settlements somewhere in the sixty percent range, from what
he describes as the "esoteric" claims, in which even a ten percent rate of administrative settle-
ment might be an exaggeration. Huang Interview, supra note 22.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1983).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. For an excellent review of the statutory framework, see Silverman, supra note 110,
at 60.
158. One commentator found 267 reported cases between 1966 and 1982 on the adminis-
trative procedures of the FTCA alone. The vast majority dealt with the sufficiency of the
administrative claim as a prerequisite to suit. Zillman, Presenting a Claim Under the Federal
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a jurisdictional defense based on the failure to file an administrative
claim only when the claimant did not purport at the time of the
alleged prior claim to have filed one. The plaintiff may learn of the
requirement only after having filed suit and then attempt to charac-
terize some previous action or communication as satisfying it.
These purported prior claims take a multitude of forms: verbal re-
quests to the alleged wrongdoer for restitution or other relief,5 9
communications with the United States Attorney, 160 notice of in-
tent to file a claim, 6' a letter of complaint, 162 the initiation of state
court, 16 3 workmen's compensation'" or other state agency proceed-
ings, 165 and assorted other forms of actual or constructive notice to
the agency.1 66 This panoply of forms shows the wisdom of retain-
ing the present statutory requirement of a claim "in writing to the
Tort Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REv. 961, 962 n.7 (1983). Undoubtedly, many disputes over the
sufficiency of a claim never reached the courts and have passed unrecorded. Critics of the
1966 amendments had predicted substantial litigation over procedural issues. Eg., Corboy,
The Revised Federal Tort Claims Act: A Practitioner's View, 2 FORUM 67, 73-74 (1967).
For a useful compilation of case law on certain aspects of the prior claim requirement,
along with substantive aspects of the Act, see U.S. ARMY CLAIMS SERVICE, FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT HANDBOOK 1-19 (rev. ed. Apr. 1983).
159. See, eg., Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972);
Shubert Constr. Co., Inc. v. Seminole Tribal Hous. Auth., 490 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla.
1980); Mayo v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D. Ill. 1977); Franklin State Bank v.
United States, 423 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mims v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 839,
844 (W.D. Va. 1972).
160. See, eg., Best Bearings Co., 463 F.2d at 1179; Grasso v. USPS, 438 F. Supp. 1231,
1237 (D. Conn. 1977); Turtzo v. United States, 347 F. Supp. 336, 337 (E.D Pa. 1972).
161. See, e.g., Wright v. Gregg, 685 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1982); Bailey v. United
States, 642 F.2d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. United States, 588 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th
Cir. 1978).
162. See, e.g., Di Lorenzo v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 79, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Shubert
Constr. Co. v. Seminole Tribal Hous. Auth., 490 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Mayo
v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (E.D. Va. 1976). A widely cited example of an
alleged prior claim which was held to be insufficient involved the service of a "Notice to Pay
Rent or Quit Premises" upon the Postal Manager of the post office in the plaintiff's building.
Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293, 295 (10th Cir. 1977). The court
noted that by state statute, the tort of unlawful detainer did not arise unless possession con-
tinued three days beyond service of the Notice. Thus, to treat the Notice as a tort claim for
FTCA purposes would be to allow notification of a tort before it even occurs.
163. See, e.g., Flickinger v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Gush v. Bunker, 344 F. Supp. 247, 249 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). Likewise, filing pleadings in
federal court will not relieve a plaintiff from the prior claim requirement set forth in the
FTCA. See, e.g., McWhirter Dist. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 668 F.2d 511, 526 n.24 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1981); Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. Supp. 724, 728-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
164. E.g., Mendiola v. United States, 401 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1968).
165. E.g., Hejl v. United States, 449 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1971).
166. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 641, 644 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (administra-
tive claim filed on behalf of another); Dancy v. United States, 668 F.2d 1224, 1228 (Ct. Cl.
1982) (appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board for a hearing on an alleged wrongful
separation from a civil service position).
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appropriate Federal agency." '167 Claimants can reasonably be re-
quired to present agencies with tort claims that are recognizable as
such, especially as the requirement is well-publicized and coupled
with a generous statute of limitations.
On the other hand, while the statutory requirement of a prior
written claim is sound in itself, the agencies should not be rigid in
enforcing it. Neither the FTCA 6 8 nor the Justice Department reg-
ulations' 69 require that the prior claim take any particular form.
The agencies should be no less flexible in their requirements, pro-
vided they do not thereby prejudice the government's interest in
sound claims adjudication. One situation calling for flexibility is
when the claimant applies to an agency for a statutory benefit, or
responsibly pursues some other administrative channel, and learns,
after the statute of limitations for filing an administrative tort claim
has run, that the FTCA was the only appropriate remedy under the
circumstances. 170
The case of Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. United States17 illustrates
the difficulty of establishing a general rule for such situations. In
Gordon H. Ball, the plaintiff was contractually obligated to the
United States to construct a new dam on the Snake River in Idaho.
As work was about to commence, the river rose to flood level due to
the failure of the Teton Dam. As a result, the plaintiff incurred
standby labor and equipment costs. 172 Within two years of the oc-
currence, the plaintiff filed a claim under the Teton Dam Disaster
Assistance Act with the designated officer of the Department of In-
terior. The Department denied relief on the ground that it could
only entertain claims arising in a location declared by the regula-
tions to be a "major disaster area."' 173 Rather than appeal that de-
termination, the plaintiff brought suit under the FTCA, arguing
that the Teton Dam Disaster benefits application should be consid-
ered the equivalent of an administrative claim under the FTCA.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1983). To help reduce misunderstanding, Congress should also
clarify 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the prior claim requirement, by explicitly requiring that the prior
administrative claim be in writing.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1983).
169. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (1985).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides that a claim must be presented "within two years after
such claim accrues." Flexibility is not as imperative when the limitations period has not yet
run, since the claimant usually suffers no substantial prejudice in being asked to start over
again.
171. 461 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1978).
172. Id. at 312.
173. Id.
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Only under this view would the action still be timely.'74
The court in Gordon H. Ball assumed that an application for
benefits could fairly and reasonably be treated as a claim for FTCA
purposes if the government was afforded the same opportunities to
review and settle the claim as it would have enjoyed if plaintiff had
filed under the FTCA.' 75 Prejudice to the agency may in turn de-
pend on the similarity of factual and legal issues between the tort
remedy and the other remedy. Applying this standard to the facts
in Gordon H. Ball, the court noted that liability under the Teton
Dam Disaster Assistance Act was without regard to fault or proxi-
mate cause, and that the plaintiff's claim under that Act under-
standably made no allegation of negligence. As a result, the
application for benefits under the Teton Dam Disaster Assistance
Act did not afford the agency the same practical opportunity to re-
view and settle the claim as if the plaintiff had initially proceeded
under the FTCA.
As a general rule, unless an agency is presented with a claim and
a claims context that fairly alert it to the presence of a tort, and
otherwise satisfy the bare essentials of an administrative filing under
the FTCA, it should not be required by the courts to accept it as
such.'76 At the same time, however, what an agency is required to
174. Id. at 311-12. In Gordon H. Ball, the timing of the denial still permitted plaintiff to
file a tort claim with the Department of the Interior within the statute of limitations period.
Id. at 312.
175. Id. at 315.
176. For cases in which courts appear to have been guided by this proposition, see Latz v.
Gallagher, 562 F. Supp. 690, 692 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (flood insurance claim filed with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency); Kelly v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (claims for veterans benefits); Vanderberg v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 279, 282-
83 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (request for benefits under CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services)); Knight v. United States, 442 F. Supp. 1069, 1070
(D.S.C. 1977) (claim for Veterans Administration service-related compensation benefits);
Dancy v. United States, 668 F.2d 1224, 1228 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (appeal to the Merit Systems
Protection Board).
A related issue is whether an administrative claim should be construed for settlement or
for jurisidictional purposes as covering a theory of liability other than those specifically stated
in the claim. When faced with the issue, the courts properly tend to view an additional
theory as covered if the agency's investigation of the claim should fairly have revealed the
basis of that theory. See, e.g., Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494-95 (11th Cir. 1983)
(wrongful death claim sufficient to put government on notice of negligence claim); Rooney v.
United States, 634 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1980) ("administrative claim was sufficient to
apprise the government of the nature and extent of the claim based both upon the fall and the
alleged medical malpractice."); Rise v. United States, 630 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1980);
Dundon v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 469, 476-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Dillon v. United States,
480 F. Supp. 862, 863 (D.S.D. 1979) (negligence claim sufficient to permit suit on a theory of
lack of informed consent). In fact, most courts have not required that claimants spell out a
particular theory of liability in order to perfect a valid administrative claim. E.g., Barnson v.
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do as a matter of law and what it should do as a matter of sound
and enlightened administrative practice do not necessarily coincide.
An agency should not decline to consider a claim under the FTCA
simply because it determines that a court would not require it to do
so. Thus, even if a claim fails on its face to designate that it has
been filed pursuant to the FTCA,177 or is cast in terms of some
other remedy, an agency may consider it sufficient for tort claim
purposes. In other words, agencies have and should exercise discre-
tion to decide whether a claim properly filed with them under some
other rubric sufficiently enables them to investigate and evaluate the
circumstances from a tort perspective.
Applications for statutory benefits are only a single variant of
the much more general problem of deciding when communications
should be treated by agencies as claims for FTCA purposes. As-
suming that most oral requests, informal inquiries, and applications
for different statutory benefits do not satisfy the jurisdictional pre-
requisite to a tort suit, agency personnel still might undertake as a
matter of administrative practice to inform the private party, when
feasible, of the existence of a tort remedy. Inquirers should be ad-
vised of the written claim requirement and referred to Standard
Form 95 as a vehicle for compliance."' That would also provide
agency personnel an opportunity to bring the statute of limitations
and sum certain requirement to the party's attention. 7 9 In short,
United States, 531 F. Supp. 614, 623 (D. Utah 1982) ("claim need not elaborate all possible
causes of action or theories of liability"); Mellor v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 641, 642 (D.
Utah 1978) (" 'claim' which must be presented . . . is not equivalent to a 'legal cause of
action' that may eventually be articulated by counsel in the course of a subsequent lawsuit").
177. For an example of such a case, see Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126, 1128-
29 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (filing of Treasury Department form, "Report/Application for Relief on
Account of Loss, Theft or Destruction of United States Bearer Securities (individuals),"
deemed a valid FTCA administrative claim). But cf. Santiago Rivera v. United States, 405 F.
Supp. 330, 331 (D.P.R. 1975) (etter to VA inquiring whether compensation being paid to
relatives in the form of VA benefits included compensation for veteran's death resulting from
food poisoning at VA hospital is not a valid FTCA claim).
178. For cases in which agency personnel followed the suggested practices, see Benitez v.
Presbyterian Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.P.R. 1982) (district counsel acknowledges re-
ceipt of letter claiming damages by sending Standard Form 95 and requesting completion so
further investigation can take place); Shelton v. United States, 615 F.2d 713, 714 (6th Cir.
1980); Muldez v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Va. 1971).
179. Claims officers should also apprise the claimant of any other potentially applicable
remedy of which they may be aware and actually entertain the claim under those rubrics if
authorized and otherwise in a postion to do so. See, eg., 32 C.F.R. § 536.6(h) (1983) (Army)
("Prior to the disapproval of a claim under a particular statute, a careful review should be
made to insure that the claim is not properly payable under a different statute or on another
basis"). See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. See also ACUS Recommendations, 1
C.F.R. § 305.84-7 (A)(1)(b) (1984).
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nothing in the FTCA suggests that agencies act improperly when
they prevent a potentially deserving claimant from innocently fail-
ing to perfect a valid FTCA claim. Only the assumption that the
relationship between claimant and agency is from the beginning
strictly adversarial' 80 would preclude such assistance. Certainly,
agencies do not thereby solicit claims in violation of law or agency
regulation'"' or assume responsibility for giving detailed assistance
in the filing of claims.
One distinctive and recurring pattern of hardship related to the
administrative claim requirement is that of the deserving claimant
who innocently fails to recognize that the tortfeasor was a federal
officer acting within the scope of employment. The most common
scenario involves the government driver, for whom the federal gov-
ernment, pursuant to the Drivers Act,8 2 typically substitutes itself
as sole defendant in automobile accident cases. The case is then
removed, if need be, from state to federal court and in any event
180. Courts have expressed such an assumption in passing upon the sufficiency of a prior
administrative claim. In Green v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Cal. 1974), the court
declined to take a child's duly filed administrative claim for personal injury as fairly embrac-
ing her mother's claim for medical expenses in connection with that same injury. The court
denied that the government was already on notice of the possibility of a related claim by the
mother, and stated inter alia:
[I]nherent in plaintiffs' argument is a suggestion that if the United States has re-
ceived some sort of constructive or actual notice of a possible claim it then has a
duty to go out and solicit an administrative claim to ensure that the jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit by the claimant is properly laid. Such a proposition is not only
alien to the adversary concept ofAmerican jurisprudence, but is also unsupported as
a matter of law.
Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
For a clear statement of the Justice Department's belief in "the true adversarial nature of
the tort claim administrative process," see Letter to Loren A. Smith, Chairman, Administra-
tive Conference of the United States, from Richard K. Willard, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division [herinafter cited as Willard Letter].
181. It generally is a criminal offense for a federal officer or employee to act as agent or
attorney for anyone prosecuting a claim against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 205 1983).
Significantly, it is no offense where doing so is "in the proper discharge of [the officer's or
employee's] official duties." Id. A number of agencies essentially restate the prohibition in
their regulations or internal manuals, but then provide that agency personnel may and even
must on request assist a claimant in preparing the claim and assembling evidence.
Standard Form 95, as revised in July 1985, following the Administrative Conference's
recommendations, supra note 179, advises claimants that they may obtain from the agency
upon request instructions and information on preparation of their claim and directs them to
the Justice Department regulations.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1983). Doctors and other medical personnel of various agencies
have likewise been immunized from suit on claims arising out of action within the scope of
their employment. 38 U.S.C. § 4116 (1983) (Veterans Administration); 42 U.S.C. § 233
(1983) (Public Health Service); 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1983) (armed forces, National Guard, De-
partment of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency); 22 U.S.C. § 2702 (1983) (Department
of State).
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treated as if it had been originally filed under the FTCA. Normally,
a claim will not yet have been filed with the agency. Courts grap-
pling with the inevitable government motion to dismiss for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies usually do so without prejudice
in order to allow the filing of an administrative claim when still
possible. However, the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations by
then may have already expired.
Most courts have not been sympathetic to plaintiffs in this situa-
tion. Generally, they do not consider the filing of a claim in state
court as the equivalent of an FTCA administrative claim,'8 3 though
it may have occurred within two years of the accrual of the cause of
action.' 84 Timely personal communications with the government
employee also have been held not to satisfy the requirement, 85 even
when the employee almost certainly brought the matter to the
agency's attention or plaintiff sent copies of the correspondence di-
rectly to the agency.' 86 Although some recent decisions question
whether the prior claim requirement should apply at all to removals
under federal officer immunization statutes such as the Drivers
Act,"' there are more balanced ways to accommodate the relevant
concerns.
One effective solution is to give the plaintiff who mistakenly
brings suit against the driver individually a short additional period
183. Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982); Rogers v. United States,
675 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir. 1982); Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980), reh'g en
banc denied, 646 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Melo v. United States,
505 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1974); Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1970); Flick-
inger v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604
(N.D.N.Y. 1978); Fuller v. Daniel, 438 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Miller v. United States,
418 F. Supp. 373 (D. Minn. 1976); Driggers v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1377 (D.S.C. 1970).
But cf. Henderson v. United States, 429 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1970) (government as a
matter of law became a party to the action as soon as it was filed in state court).
184. Wilkinson, 677 F.2d at 999; Melo, 505 F.2d at 1027; Meeker, 435 F.2d at 1220;
Flickinger, 523 F. Supp. at 1373.
185. Binn v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 988, 991 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
186. Driggers, 309 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
187. Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978)
(suit brought within two years of accrual); Van Lieu v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 862, 864,
868 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (suit brought after two years from accrual but within state statute of
limitations). See also Comment, Administrative Claims and the Substitution of the United
States as Defendant Under the Federal Drivers Act" The Catch 22 of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 29 EMoRY L.J. 755, 786-87 (1980) (discussing whether Congress intended to create ex-
ception to administrative exhaustion requirement for removal to federal court in Drivers Act
cases). Other courts would waive the requirement only where the government can be said to
have lulled the claimant into a false sense of security. Wilkinson, 677 F.2d. at 999; Melo, 505
F.2d at 1027; Meeker, 435 F.2d at 1220; Flickinger, 523 F. Supp. at 1373.
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of time in which to file an administrative claim,'88 thereby rescuing
the claim with minimal prejudice to the government. The Swine
Flu Immunization Act, a statute which, like the Drivers Act, makes
the United States an exclusive defendant in cases that otherwise
would be heard against a private defendant in state court, 18 9 in ef-
fect adopts this approach. A minor disadvantage of the automatic
extension is that it confers a windfall on those claimants who are
aware of the defendant's capacity as a government employee acting
within the scope of employment. One court confronted this di-
lemma by distinguishing between those claimants who are
excusably unaware of the tortfeasor's status and those who are
either aware or inexcusably unaware of it.'19 Claimants of the latter
sort may not avoid the prior claim requirement, even though the
opportunity to satisfy it has passed. Claimants of the former sort,
on the other hand, are relieved of the requirement altogether.' 9'
This approach suffers from having to categorize claimants as of the
time the state court suit began, without regard to what a claimant
may or should have learned thereafter. More importantly, this pol-
icy too quickly surrenders the advantages of the administrative pro-
cess as a means of dispute resolution. In sum, a simple fixed
extension of the statute of limitations is probably preferable. An
acceptable alternative would be a rule that postpones accrual of the
claim for statute of limitations purposes until the claimant first
knows or should reasonably have known of the government connec-
tion.192 Such a rule places due responsibility on the claimant and at
the same time allows agency consideration of tort claims before they
reach the courts; but it has the drawback of requiring findings on
the claimant's actual and constructive state of mind.
B. Presentation of the Claim
The FTCA provides that a tort claim must be presented to the
188. Comment, supra note 187, at 790. See ACUS Recommendations, I C.F.R.
§ 305.84-7(B)(3) (1984).
189. The statute expressly provides that where a civil action is brought within two years
of the administration of the vaccine and dismissed for failure to file a prior administrative
claim, "the plaintiff. . . shall have 30 days from the date of such dismissal or two years from
the date the claim arose, whichever is later, in which to file such administrative claim." 42
U.S.C. § 247b(k)(2)(A)(iii) (1976) (emphasis added).
190. Harris v. Burris Chem., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
191. Id.
192. Cf. United States v. LePatourel, 593 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1979) (claim against
federal judge accrued when court determined that federal judges were covered by the Act, as
plaintiffs should not have reasonably foreseen this decision).
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appropriate federal agency within two years of its accrual. 193 In the
absence of any formal guidance either from Congress or the Justice
Department, the courts approach the issue of when a tort claim ac-
crues in substantially the same manner as they approach the accrual
issue for virtually every claim to which a statute of limitations at-
taches. Though the Supreme Court has recently sought to clarify
the FTCA ground rules, at least on the vexing problem of accrual in
medical malpractice claims, 194 little of its analysis is unique to the
tort claim context or to governmental liability in general.'95
The Attorney General, however, has addressed the question of
when a claim is "presented" within the meaning of the statute. Ac-
cording to the regulations, this occurs when a written notification of
the incident, accompanied by a claim for damages, is received by
the agency. 196 Although this rule probably simplifies matters for
the agencies, it has on occasion served to extinguish an otherwise
valid claim mailed to the appropriate agency in the waning days of
the two-year limitations period. 197 One means of averting hardship
to the occasional claimant who has not been alerted by the wording
of the statute to the risks of an eleventh hour filing would be to
consider the date of postmark of the administrative claim or other
evidence of due delivery as the moment of presentation. 98 A dis-
patch rule also would avoid an ungenerous asymmetry in the opera-
tion of the statute of limitations, for both the FTCA and the
regulations provide that the six-month period within which suit
must be brought following a final agency denial begins to run from
the date the denial is mailed. 9 Such a rule would not necessarily
193. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (Supp. 1983).
194. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1979) (claim accrues at the time
plaintiff knows both the existence and cause of his injury, but not necessarily the fact of
malpractice). See Zillman, supra note 158, at 983-84. Kubrick establishes that federal rather
than state law governs the question of accrual under the FTCA. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 121
n.8.
195. In Kubrick, the Court relied on the FTCA for little more than the observation that
Congress intended "the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims." Kubrick, 444 U.S. at
123.
196. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1983). See infra note 198.
197. Steele v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (claim forever
barred when mailed on the final day of the limitations period and received two days
thereafter).
198. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(2)(a) (1984). However, in
revising Standard Form 95 in July 1985 following the Administrative Conference's recom-
mendations, id., the Justice Department chose to reaffirm the receipt rule categorically: "A
claim is presented when it is received by the appropriate agency, not when it is mailed." At
least the revision constitutes a warning to claimants who use Standard Form 95. It also
specifically mentions, as prior versions did not, the two-year statute of limitations period.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (Supp. 1983). Even one of the most cynical recorded critics of
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
disadvantage the agencies by shortening the time in which they may
act on a claim. The six-month period that the statute gives them for
that purpose could easily be made to commence upon their receipt
of the claim.
The current regulation, strictly applied by the agencies, also
places on the claimaint the entire risk of loss in the transmission of
a claim, even when the claim can be shown to have been dispatched
in a timely manner. In Bailey v. United States,200 attorneys repre-
senting the estate of a man killed in an explosion at an Air Force
gunnery range delayed filing a claim pending appointment of a per-
sonal representative under state law.2 1 A proper claim was mailed
sixteen months after the accident, thus within the statute of limita-
tions.2 2 Nine months thereafter-and just over two years from the
incident-the attorneys learned that the agency had denied a com-
panion claim which they had filed on behalf of one of the decedent's
colleagues injured in the same explosion, and which had been under
agency consideration for twenty-two months.20 3 A prompt inquiry
about the estate's claim revealed that the Air Force had no record
of any such claim and, because two years and one month had
elapsed since the incident, was unwilling to give it belated consider-
ation, even on the basis of the original submission.2' Though tech-
nically justified under the receipt rule, the result was harsh. The
attorneys waited less than three months from the time of the acci-
dent to file related claims not requiring appointment of a personal
representative. 0 5 Moreover, the Air Force, which was already fa-
miliar with the incident from these other claims, knew that a claim
for the estate was imminent. Correspondence over the estate's
the 1966 amendments assumed that the Attorney General, for reasons of parallelism and ease
of application, would fix the moment of presentation at the date of mailing. Corboy, supra
note 158, at 75.
200. 642 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Barlow v. Avco Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 273
(E.D. Va. 1981) (administrative claim mailed but not received).
201. Bailey, 642 F.2d at 345.
202. Id. at 346.
203. The fact that the Air Force had the companion claim under consideration for that
length of time before issuing a notice of denial suggests that it was not unreasonable for
counsel not to be alarmed by the passage of eight months without action on the estate's claim.
In fact, as the dissenting judge points out, it is curious that the Air Force took so long in
denying the companion claim in the first place.
For unknown reasons the Air Force withheld its decision on the [companion] claim
until the statute of limitations had run on the [estate's] claims. If the [companion]
claim had been denied but a few weeks earlier, it is obvious that duplicates of the
missing. . . papers would have been remailed in time.
Id. at 34849 (Jameson, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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claim, which included an autopsy report, a wage statement, and a
funeral bill, had been exchanged by the attorneys and the Air Force
within ten months following the incident.2"6 During that period,
the claims officer requested and received information regarding the
decedent's dependents, earnings and length of employment. 0 7 At
one point, he wrote that the Air Force had not yet received a claim,
but understood that one would be filed as soon as a personal repre-
sentative was appointed, and undertook to "keep counsel advised of
the status of [all] the claims. ' 208
In fact, the Air Force had already investigated the same incident
in order to deny the companion claims which had been fied earlier,
and had received ample information regarding the decedent's own
losses.20 9 The only information which was not at the Air Force's
disposal was the total amount claimed, and this the claimant
promptly resupplied.z l In short, entertaining the duplicate claim
one month beyond the limitations period would not have meant res-
cuing an irresponsible claimant or prejudicing the government in its
consideration of the claim. Nevertheless, both agency and court
sidestepped the question of whether the claim under the circum-
stances should have been deemed timely, asserting simply that the
claimant had failed to comply with a "jurisdictional prerequisite."
A related problem is whether a claim has been presented to the
"appropriate" agency, as required by the FTCA.21' Since most in-
cidents which give rise to government tort claims involve a single
readily identifiable federal agency, the issue rarely arises. However,
one practitioner suggests that claimants, in order to avert a poten-
tial problem, file a complete claim "against each and every Federal
agency which might be involved. '212
The Justice Department has framed regulations that apparently
ease matters for the claimant in such a situation, without prejudic-
ing the government or working a result at variance with the under-
lying legislative purpose. The regulations provide that should the
wrong agency receive a claim, it "shall transfer it forthwith to the
appropriate agency, if the proper agency can be identified from the
206. Id. at 345.
207. Id. at 346.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 348.
210. Id.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (Supp. 1983).
212. McCabe, Observations on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 3 FORUM 66, 78-79 (1967).
The July 1985 revision of Standard Form 95 advises claimants, where more then one agency
is involved, to state each agency.
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claim, and [shall] advise the claimant of the transfer. If transfer is
not feasible, the claim shall be returned to the claimant." ' 3 This
has provided the courts a basis for deeming a claim transferred to
the proper agency when in fact it was not, 14 and even for tolling
the statute of limitations at the time of the initial filing where neces-
sary to render the claim timely.z' 5 In an apparent response to such
gestures, the Attorney General recently amended the regulations to
specify that a claim shall be deemed "presented as required by 28
U.S.C. § 2401(b) as of the date it is received by the appropriate
agency." '216 Assuming the Attorney General has authority to deter-
mine the operation of a statute of limitations, this particular exer-
cise of that authority is regrettable. A regulation that directs the
transfer where practicable of a wrongly filed but otherwise valid
claim from one agency to another, and also provides that that origi-
nal date of filing governs its timeliness, 1 7 would be entirely consis-
tent with legislative purpose and substantially fairer to claimants.
213. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (1984).
214. See, eg., Barnson v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614, 623-24 (D. Utah 1982) (failure
to file with correct agency did not result in dismissal for lack of exhausting administrative
remedies). A claim as originally filed should rarely be so devoid of information as to free the
receiving agency of any obligation to transfer it. See Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157,
1159 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980). Case law under the FTCA prior to its amendment did not mandate
the transfer of claims. See Johnson v. United States, 404 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1968).
215. Kirby v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.S.C. 1979) (claim valid where
United States Attorney received it on the last permissible day, and the agency on the next day
thereafter); Stewart v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 871, 872 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (claim deemed
valid where filed with the wrong agency one week prior to tolling of limitations period and
reaches the proper agency several months later). But see Lotrionte v. United States, 560 F.
Supp. 41, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
216. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (1984). The amendment originates from a version of the At-
torney General's original regulations of 1966, which was abandoned under criticism. See I.
GoTrLIEB, supra note 123, at 11.
217. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(B)(2) (1984); cf. 32 C.F.R.
§ 536.150 (1984) (Army) (statute of limitations on filing claims under National Guard Claims
Act deemed tolled when claim filed with another agency, provided it is forwarded to the
Army within six months or claimant otherwise contacts the Army within that time).
A related problem arises when the claimant alleges tortious conduct by employees of
more than one agency. The prudent claimant will file a separate timely claim with each
agency and cross-reference the claim to all others that have been filed. The failure to so act
has adverse consequences. A claimant who files a claim for the entire amount of loss with
just one agency may be charged with failing to file the required prior claim with the other
agency or agencies with respect to that portion of the loss attributable to them. Even a
claimant who duly files a claim with each appropriate agency runs a risk if he fails to cross-
reference them. The regulations stipulate that if the claimant fails to cross-reference and one
of the agencies takes final action on the claim submitted to it, the statute of limitations will be
triggered with respect to the claims submitted to the other agencies, unless the others choose
to treat the matter before them as a request for reconsideration of a final denial. 28 C.F.R.
§ 14.2(b)(3) (1984).
Similarly, where a claim is filed with only one agency, the Attorney General's transfer
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C. Contents of a Valid Claim
The FTCA is virtually silent about what an administrative claim
must contain in order to be considered by the agency or to satisfy
the jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. The regulations promulgated
by the Attorney General fill that breach.218
Section 14.2(a) of the regulations identifies the essential ele-
ments of a claim as "an executed Standard Form 95 or other writ-
ten notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money
damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal
injury, or death alleged to have occurred by reason of the inci-
dent."2 19 Originally, the regulation linked this description of a
claim to the agencies' exercise of settlement authority under section
2672 of the FTCA.2 0 By recent amendment, the regulation makes
it equally applicable to section 2401(b), the jurisdictional prerequi-
site to suit.221
Standard Form 95 requires claimants to state their identity, pro-
vide minimal personal information, indicate the place and time of
the incident, and describe all known facts and circumstances sur-
rounding their loss. This includes identifying the cause of the inci-
dent and the persons and property involved, reporting the nature
and extent of the damage or injury and any insurance coverage, pro-
viding the names and addresses of witnesses, and stating a separate
amount of damages for property damage, personal injury and
directive should apply and cause the original filing date to govern all claims fairly encom-
passed in the original claim. The regulations provide that:
when more than one Federal agency is or may be involved in the events giving rise
to the claim, an agency with which the claim is filed shall contact all other affected
agencies in order to designate the single agency which will thereafter investigate and
decide the merits of the claim.
Id. § 14.2(b)(2) (1984). Such a case has not yet arisen. In the only similar decided case, the
administrative claim actually filed addressed the conduct of the sole agency to which the
claim was presented (wrongful detention by Interior Department officers). The claim was
properly held inadequate for purposes of the claimant's charges of subsequent and distinct
tortious conduct by a second agency (medical malpractice by Public Health Service).
Provancial v. United States, 454 F.2d 72, 74 (8th Cir. 1972).
218. See generally Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim Requirement, 67
MINN. L. REV. 513 (1982) (examination of what constitutes sufficient notice).
219. Prior to this regulation, some agencies refused to entertain tort claims which were
not filed on a Standard Form 95. This practice was occasionally supported by the courts.
See, eg., Johnson v. United States, 404 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1968). The rule is otherwise
today. See Crow v. United States, 631 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1980) (neither Form 95 nor other
particular form of claim required).
220. Comment, The Act of Claimsmanship: What Constitutes Sufficient Notice of a Claim
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 149, 164 nn.l 11-12 and accompany-
ing text (1983).
221. For the significance of this amendment, see infra note 274 and accompanying text.
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wrongful death. Substantiation of the claim is also required.2 22 The
form, which must be dated and signed, recites that the claimant
"agree[s] to accept said amount in full satisfaction and final settle-
ment of this claim."
Apart from their apparent incorporation by reference of the ele-
ments of Standard Form 95, the regulations set forth for each basic
category of claim the evidence or information that the claimant
"may be required to submit., 223 For death claims, this includes
evidence of death, past employment and earnings, survivors, depen-
dents' support, health at the time of death, medical and burial ex-
penses, and the decedent's condition in the interval between injury
and death.224 Personal injury claimants may be required to provide
doctors' reports, itemized bills, and evidence of anticipated medical
expenses and lost income. In addition, they may have to submit to
a physical or mental examination by a government physician.221
For property damage claims, the agency may request proof of own-
ership, itemized repair bills or estimates, purchase price and date,
and salvage value.226 Although the regulations invite the agencies
to supplement these requirements,227 most agencies have not signifi-
cantly expanded upon the Justice Department's definition of a claim
or on the categories of evidence or information that a claims officer
may request. Their greatest problem has been dealing with the
claimant who refuses to comply with their specific informational
demands.228
D. The Sum Certain Requirement
The regulatory requirement that claimants state a claim for
damages in a sum certain has generated little controversy as a mat-
ter of principle, but a good deal of litigation over its application.
Although the terms of the FTCA do not impose the requirement,
virtually every court called upon to address the question agrees that
222. Standard Form 95 requests, in the case of claims for personal injury or death, a full
written report by the attending physician and itemized bills for medical, hospital and burial
expenses. In cases concerning property damage claims, Standard Form 95 requires either
signed receipted bills, two estimates of repair, or detailed information on value when repair is
not feasible.
223. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4.
224. Id. § 14.4(a).
225. Id. § 14.4(b).
226. Id. § 14.4(c).
227. The agencies are authorized to "issue regulations and establish procedures consis-
tent with" the Justice Department regulations. Id. § 14.11.
228. See infra notes 250-305 and accompanying text.
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the Attorney General has a sound statutory basis for doing So. 2 2 9
The sum certain requirement has been justified on three grounds.
First, it serves as a reference point to the Attorney General, whose
office must approve any award against the United States in excess of
$25,000.230 It also enables courts to police the statutory provision
barring FTCA suits for sums in excess of the amount claimed from
the agency.231 Finally, it facilitates internal agency delegations of
settlement authority. The requirement seems consistent with legis-
lative history and commonsense notions of the term "claim," 232 and
also probably helps expedite the settlement process. Few claims of-
ficers seriously consider making settlement offers without a specific
statement of loss on the table.
There is little to be said for abolishing the sum certain require-
ment. Though some would criticize it as encouraging claim infla-
tion,2 33 this charge is more appropriately leveled at the underlying
statutory rule barring a litigant, absent newly discovered evidence
or intervening facts, from seeking higher damages in court than at
the agency level. Once that rule is accepted, the sum certain re-
quirement all but follows.
A study of the cases suggests that most claimants are aware of
the requirement and that the courts are reasonably able to distin-
guish between claims that state a sum certain2 34 and those that do
229. See, eg., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Molinar v.
United States, 515 F.2d 246, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1975); Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635,
637-38 (9th Cir. 1974); Avril v. United States, 461 F.2d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1972); see also
Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1971) (initial purpose for requiring
specific sum claimed is to enable federal agency to determine if claim falls within jurisdic-
tional authority to adjudicate).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982).
231. Id. § 2675(b).
232. Avril, 461 F.2d at 1091.
233. Zillman, supra note 158, at 973. Certain agency claims attorneys voiced this com-
plaint. Letter from Sarah Hertz to Charles Pou, Jr. (May 21, 1984) (available from Case
Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Hertz Letter]; Rouse Interview, supra note
141.
234. E.g., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1981) (personal injury
claim for "$149.42 presently"); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 106,
117 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("approximately $170,000 in face amount" of bearer bonds); Industrial
Indem. Co. v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (qualified reference to
a $560 claim); Fallon v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Mont. 1976) ("approxi-
mately $15,000.00"); Walley v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 268, 268-69 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
("approximate[ly] $100,000.00"), a#'d merr, 546 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1976). A fair number of
courts have deemed the requirement met by bills, repair costs or other statements of value
found in supporting documents. Crow v. United States, 631 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1980);
Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975); Lester v. United States, 487 F.
Supp. 1033, 1038 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126, 1128-29 (W.D.
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not.2 35 If a claim does lack a sum certain, claims officers usually
notify the claimant of the deficiency.2 36  Some also relate the
amended claim back to the original filing date where necessary to
avoid a time bar,2 37 even though neither Justice Department nor
agency regulations indicate that it is proper to do so. Thus, only
claimants who genuinely cannot quantify their loss will find it diffi-
cult to meet the sum certain requirement, and they may fie an in-
flated claim as a result. Still, a claims officer is normally able to tell,
from the frequent and open exchanges that characterize the admin-
istrative settlement process in most agencies, whether a claim has
been inflated because of honest uncertainty on the part of a claimant
or as a result of tactical considerations.
Concededly, the lack of a sum certain seldom prevents an
agency from conducting an investigation or assessing damages, pro-
vided the claimant has otherwise furnished sufficient factual infor-
mation. But, absent a showing of general prejudice to claimants,
Pa. 1980); Mack v. USPS, 414 F. Supp. 504, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Contra HIlavac v. United
States, 356 F. Supp. 1274, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
235. E.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 841-42 (2d Cir.) ("$1,088,135 and
... an additional amount yet to be ascertained"), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Caton v.
United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[u]nknown at this time"); Bialowas v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049-50 (3d Cir. 1971) ("neck, chest and right arm"); Robin-
son v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 312, 313 (W.D. Pa. 1983) ("amount undetermined");
Cooper v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 116, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Pending No Fault Bene-
fits"); Raymond v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 740, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("in excess of
$50,000.00"); DeGerena v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 93, 94 (D.P.R. 1975) ("on treat-
ment"); Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("$2,135.45
plus personal injury"). Some claims do not recite even the semblance of a sum certain. Beni-
tez v. Presbyterian Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.P.R. 1982).
236. See, e.g., Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 1974); Bialowas v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1048 (3d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F.
Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Interview with Aleta Bodolay, Torts Branch, Civ. Div.,
Dep't of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (May 26, 1983); Interview with Lt. Col. Richard L.
Purdon, Chief, Torts Branch, Air Force Claims and Tort Litigation Staff, Office of the Judge
Advocate General, Headquarters, United States Air Force, in Washington, D.C. (July 29,
1983). See also Hertz Letter, supra note 233; Letter from Col. Nolan Sklute to Charles Pou,
Jr. (May 21, 1984) (available from Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Sklute Letter].
237. For a case requiring the agency to relate the delayed furnishing of a sum certain
back to the original claim lacking it, see Apollo v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137, 139 (M.D.
Pa. 1978). Most courts have refused to do so. Allen v. United States, 517 F.2d 1328, 1329
(6th Cir. 1975); Cooper v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 116, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Jordan v.
United States, 333 F. Supp. 987, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd mem., 474 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir.
1973).
In Williams v. United States, 693 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1982), the court of appeals
required that the sum certain relate back to the original filing. However, the court's position
was eased somewhat because the claimant had brought suit in state court against the driver
individually with a full description and itemization of damages. Contra Gonzales v. USPS,
543 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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the requirement offers sufficient advantages for the agencies and the
settlement process to justify its retention by the Justice Department
and its enforcement by the courts. Three limited reforms of agency
practice would suffice to eliminate most of the misunderstanding.
First, because of the importance attached to the statement of a
sum certain, both the regulations and Standard Form 95 should be
amended to advise claimants that a precise damages figure for all
categories of claims is essential to the validity of a claim for all pur-
poses, including the jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.2 38  Since
claimants do not invariably consult the regulations or use Standard
Form 95, agencies should also advise individual claimants promptly
if their claim lacks a sum certain, and warn them that failure to
provide one by a given date will disqualify the claim from agency
and possibly court consideration.2 39 At present, the regulations re-
quire no such measures and the courts for the most part have not
presumed to do so either.
Second, the Justice Department should adopt a uniform policy
on whether the subsequent furnishing of a sum certain relates back
in time to the initial filing. Both the agencies2' and the courts241
appear to be divided on this point. If, as the Justice Department
appears to prefer, no relation back may take place, then the regula-
tions and Standard Form 95 should so specify.242 And claims of-
238. Several courts have expressed muted displeasure at the silence, particularly of Stan-
dard Form 95, on these points. Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975).
The Standard Form 95 put into use in 1978 calls attention to this issue by reciting that:
"[flailure to completely execute this form or to supply the requested material within two
years from the date the allegations accrued may render your claim 'invalid.'" Nonetheless,
this language fails to communicate the particular rigors of the sum certain requirement and,
more importantly, the consequences of an "invalid" claim. A July 1985 revision of the form,
prompted by the Administrative Conference recommendations, infra note 239, now conspicu-
ously adds the following: "Failure to specify a sum certain will result in invalid presentation
of your claim and may result in forfeiture of your rights."
239. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(2)(b) (1984).
240. For example, the Assistant Legal Adviser at the State Department reports relating
back the late statement of a sum certain. Huang Interview, supra note 22. However, Veter-
ans Administration attorneys report not doing so, though they will use the telephone rather
than the mails for communications with the claimant in order to meet a fast-approaching
deadline and also may relax the rules on place of filing. Interview with James P. Kane,
Assistant General Counsel, Irving Schmetteding, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, E.
Douglas Bradshaw, Jr., Staff Attorney, all of Office of General Counsel, Veterans Adminis-
tration, in Washington, D.C. (July 26, 1983).
241. See supra note 237.
242. The instruction on the reverse side of Standard Form 95 fairly warns that an agency
might choose not to relate back the delayed submission of a sum certain. Until recently, the
form did not indicate the consequences of an "invalid" claim. As revised in July 1985, it
warns that forfeiture of rights may result. See supra note 238.
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ficers, when corresponding with claimants and their attorneys over
the sufficiency of a claim, should emphasize the point. However, a
better policy, with respect to claims lacking a sum certain, would be
to give the claimant a reasonable length of time without prejudice in
which to supply one.
Third, agencies should discontinue the practice of refusing to
entertain satisfactory property damage claims simply because the
personal injury or death claim arising out of the same incident, and
filed on the same form, lacks a sum certain. Problems usually can
be avoided by discussing with claimants the nature and significance
of the sum certain requirement. However, if for some reason the
death or personal injury claim remains unquantified, the agencies
should sever the death or personal injury claim and proceed with
the property damage claim as stated. The Attorney General should
require claims officers to proceed in this fashion, even if the courts
do not.243
As observed, a claimant may not sue for damages in excess of
the amount sought from the agency unless the increase is based on
"newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time
of presenting the claim. . . or upon allegation and proof of inter-
vening facts, relating to the amount of the claim." 2" Although the
courts have the ultimate responsibility for defining the scope and
applicability of these two exceptions, the agencies should see to it
that claimants, particularly those who are unrepresented, learn
early in the administrative process of the existence of a claim ceil-
243. Allen v. United States, 517 F.2d 1328, 1329 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. United
States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1983). The stated ceiling on damages dates back to the original
Act in which filing an administrative claim was optional. Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 601, § 410(g), 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946). The rationale, to gauge by the
scant legislative history, was that "otherwise a claimant would stand only to gain by pursuing
both the administrative and judicial remedies." Hearings on S. 2221 Before the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (unpublished statement of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Francis M. Shea), quoted in Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 24 n.71.
For general observations regarding this provision, see Zillman, supra note 158, at 991. A
claimant seeking to increase his damage claim has the burden of establishing the required
statutory preconditions. See Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944, 954-55 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975); Campbell v. United
States, 534 F. Supp. 762, 766 (D. Hawaii 1982); Joyce v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 1242,
1247-48 (W.D. Pa. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 474 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1973). In Kielwien
v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), however, a
district court judgment substantially in excess of the administrative claim was reduced to the
amount of that claim on the ground that plaintiff was in fact sufficiently apprised of the
nature and extent of her injuries at the time she filed it. Accord Schwartz v. United States,
446 F.2d 1380, 1382 (3d Cir. 1971); Nichols v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 6, 10 (E.D. Va.
1957).
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ing.z45 Not only should the Attorney General's regulations and
Standard Form 95 be amended to provide a conspicuous alert, but
claims officers should also caution claimants on an individual ba-
sis,246 for some claimants genuinely believe they can freely reserve
the right to present additional bills to the agencies as they are
received.247
Aside from invoking the exceptions for newly-discovered evi-
dence or intervening facts, claimants may avoid the statutory ceiling
on damages by amending a claim while it is still in administrative
channels. Although the FTCA does not address the question, the
Attorney General's regulations provide that a claim "may be
amended by the claimant at any time prior to final agency action or
prior to the exercise of the claimant's option [to sue after six
months].1 24 8 The sum certain is presumably no less freely amenda-
ble than any other element of the claim. The sole disadvantage a
claimant suffers upon amending a claim is the automatic renewal of
the six-month period during which the agency may evaluate the
claim and the claimant may not sue.24 9 In fact, some amendments
may be so minor as not to warrant a six-month extension. But, to
prescribe a set of different extensions according to the substantiality
of the amendment is impractical, and to leave the extension period
indeterminate would be still worse. A fixed six-month rule is there-
fore optimal.
E. Substantiation
1. The Requirement
The FTCA does not as a formal matter require a claim to be
documented or substantiated. Regulations of the Justice Depart-
ment and of specific agencies, however, specify a long list of evi-
245. Even some attorneys who are not versed in the FTCA may wrongly assume that the
liberal provisions for the amendment of pleadings in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply with full force. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (1981). See Corboy, supra note 158, at 69.
246. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(2)(b) (1984). When the Jus-
tice Department revised Standard Form 95 in July 1985 to emphasize the importance of a
sum certain, supra note 238, it declined to call attention to the ceiling feature.
247. As an example, see Odin v. United States, 656 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1981), discussed
at infra notes 329-40 and accompanying text.
248. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(c) (1984). The regulation further requires that the amendment be
in writing and signed by the claimant or his or her representative.
249. Id. A claimant, for this reason, may disregard the opportunity to amend the claim
and simply seek a higher sum in subsequent litigation on a showing of newly discovered
evidence. A court has recently held that claimants are not obligated to amend a pending
administrative claim to reflect evidence discovered after its initial presentation. McCormick
v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 n.2 (D. Colo. 1982).
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dence or information that a claimant "may be required to
submit." 5 0 They also contain the catchall provision that claimants
"may be required to submit . . . [a]ny other evidence or informa-
tion which may have a bearing on either the responsibility of the
United States for death [or personal injury, or injury to or loss of
property] or the damages claimed." '51 The agencies do in fact "re-
quire" substantiation and, in its absence, often regard a claim as
invalid for all purposes. Furthermore, Standard Form 95, the rec-
ommended form of claim, directs claimants to attach specified kinds
of information and advises them that failure to do so within two
years of the incident may render a claim "invalid. 252
Unfortunately, the substantiation requirement is uncertain in its
meaning and in its effect. For this reason, it has generated substan-
tial litigation25 3 and left the courts and commentators divided.
Since the mandatory prior claim was intended to reduce litigation,
it is proving to that extent counterproductive. Responsibility for
the situation is shared, on the one hand, by claimants and attorneys
who are needlessly unresponsive to agency demands for information
and, on the other, by government attorneys who view compliance
with their demands as just another litigable issue under the FTCA.
To begin with, the substantiation requirements present certain
problems on their face. Though the regulations clearly set out the
information that an agency is authorized to demand,254 they do not
indicate what is meant by "the claimant may be required. 25 5 More
specifically, the regulations may mean either that failure to furnish
the information requested renders the claim insufficient to satisfy
the prerequisite to suit, or merely that the agency is unlikely to set-
tle the claim. One court, emphasizing the term "required," favored
a strict interpretation;2 56 another, stressing the "may" language, fa-
vored a looser meaning.257 Conceivably, the Attorney General in-
tended only to give the agencies authority to make documentary
demands in aid of their settlement efforts, a view that comports with
the regulatory definition of a claim as merely a "written notification
of an incident, accompanied by a claim for damages in a sum cer-
250. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
251. 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(5) (1984).
252. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 261-91 and accompanying text.
254. For a different view, see Note, Claim Requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act:
Minimal Notice or Substantial Documentation?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (1983).
255. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (1984).
256. Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
257. Tucker v. USPS, 676 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1982).
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tain."2 58 However, the instructions for completing Standard Form
95 clearly state that failure to supply requested material on a timely
basis may compromise the claim's validity.259
If this latter interpretation of government policy is correct, the
question remains whether it has been communicated effectively to
the public. The instruction and warning on Standard Form 95 do
not in fact convey the force of the government's demands. They
state only that the amounts claimed "should" be substantiated, and
that nondocumentation "may render [a] claim 'invalid'," without
telling a layman what that means. More importantly, since Stan-
dard Form 95 is not the only vehicle for submitting claims under
the FTCA,260 neither its requests for information nor its instruc-
tions to substantiate constitute effective notice of what a "valid"
claim requires. If the claimant has not used Standard Form 95,
claims officers should bring its apparent demands specifically to the
claimant's attention before attempting to enforce them. The need to
do so is all the greater because neither the regulations nor the stat-
ute clearly connects the validity of a claim to its documentation.
2. Judicial Response and Interpretation
Substantiation requirement problems generally arise when a
claimant refuses or otherwise fails to provide some or all of the in-
formation requested by the claims officer, who then denies the claim
either on the merits or for the more specific reason that no valid
claim was fied. The issue invariably resurfaces when the claimant
subsequently brings suit. At this juncture, the government usually
moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the ground that no prior claim was presented to the
agency 261 or, if two years have elapsed since the claim accrued,
258. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1984).
259. See supra notes 238, 242 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the tension
between Standard Form 95 and the regulations taken as a whole, see Note, supra note 254, at
1654 n.68. The regulations of specific agencies may echo the theme that compliance with
informational requests is essential to the claim's validity. Postal Service regulations state:
"In order to exhaust the administrative remedy provided, a claimant shall submit substantial
evidence to prove the extent of any losses incurred and any injury sustained so as to provide
the Postal Service with sufficient evidence of it to properly evaluate the claim." 39 C.F.R.
§ 912.8 (1983).
260. The regulations provide that "a claim shall be deemed to have been presented when
a [federal agency receives. . . an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of
an incident." 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1984) (emphasis added).
261. E.g., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1981). Alternately, the
objection may be framed in terms of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Crow v.
United States, 631 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1980).
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seeks dismissal with prejudice.2 6 2 In doing so, the government will
remind the court that satisfaction of the prior claim requirement is
a condition of the sovereign's consent to be sued and cannot be
waived.263 Because it is jurisdictional, the defect also may be raised
by the government at any time and by the court sua sponte.2 4
Although the issue of whether an FTCA complaint should be dis-
missed because of the claimant's failure to substantiate the claim at
the agency level has arisen in a wide variety of factual settings, it
has elicited essentially two different judicial responses.
Swift v. United States265 is illustrative of the judicial view that
claimants must provide the requesting agency with sufficient infor-
mation so that it may evaluate and settle their claims, and that non-
compliance subjects a subsequent FTCA suit to dismissal for failure
of a valid administrative claim.2 66 In Swift, the claimant filed a two
million dollar personal injury, wrongful death, and loss of consor-
tium claim with the United States Forest Service on a Standard
Form 95.267 The claimant ignored the agency's repeated requests
for documentation, eventually arguing that because six months had
passed since the original filing, the claim should be deemed denied
and ripe for suit.268 The district court dismissed the complaint2 69
because the six-month review period was never triggered due to the
claimant's failure to satisfy the agency's request.270 In effect, the
claimant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the
court of jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed the decision on ap-
262. Cooper v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 116, 117-18 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Robinson v.
United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
263. Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1971).
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The cases have so held. Augustine v. United States, 704
F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604, 605 (N.D.N.Y. 1978);
Perkins v. United States, 76 F.R.D. 593, 595 (W.D. Okla. 1976); United Missouri Bank
South v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 571, 575 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
265. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980).
266. Manis v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 828, 829-30 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Founding
Church of Scientology v. Director, FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748, 757-58 (D.D.C. 1978); Cummings
v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Mont. 1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
United States, 446 F. Supp. 191, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Rothman v. United States, 434 F.
Supp. 13, 16-17 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Mudlo v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Robinson v.
United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
267. 614 F.2d at 813.
268. Id. at 813-14.
269. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, however, because it
interpreted the agency warning as suspending the statute of limitations. Id. at 815 n.3. If the
court had not done so, the statute of limitations would have run and the claim would have
been barred.
270. Id. at 814.
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peal. The court emphasized that Justice Department and agency
regulations authorize the agencies to require the documentation
they need in order to settle a claim.27 1 As long as a claimant fails to
provide that information, both agency and court may properly con-
sider the claim as not having been filed.272 Swift properly draws a
close connection between the agency's having adequate information
about a claim and its ability to evaluate and possibly settle that
claim.2 73 Not surprisingly, agency claims officers welcomed the
Swift decision, less for its doctrinal correctness than for its practical
contribution to their capacity to settle claims.
A widely-recognized difficulty with the court's logic in Swift is
that the Justice Department promulgated the pertinent regulations
under section 2672 of the Act, the provision that confers substantive
settlement authority on the agencies, rather than section 2675(a),
which actually makes the filing of an administrative claim a prereq-
uisite to suit.274 The substantiation provisions thus assist agencies
in deciding whether to settle a claim administratively, but do not
necessarily determine whether the claim meets the exhaustion re-
quirement. In fact, Congress probably gave the Attorney General
rulemaking authority to begin with only for the purpose of organiz-
ing agency settlement activity, and not for controlling access to the
courts. To put the matter differently, claimants who fail to docu-
ment their claims may not win an agency-level settlement, but do
not necessarily lose their right to sue.275
The other main response of the courts to the substantiation
problem requires the claimant for jurisdictional prerequisite pur-
poses to provide the agency only with sufficient information to en-
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. The same considerations have led courts to require that administrative claims be
reasonably intelligible and precise. Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 842 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
274. See Note, Federal Tort Claims Act Administrative Claim Prerequisite, 1983 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 173, 188 (1983); Note, supra note 218, at 520; Comment, supra note 220, at 164. But
see Note, supra note 254, at 1642. The Justice Department probably meant to address the
difficulty referred to in the text when it amended its regulations to tie the definition of a claim
to the existence of judicial as well as agency authority to satisfy a demand in tort. See supra
note 221 and accompanying text. However, the regulation that has been amended (§ 14.2)
deals with the definition of a claim, not substantiation of a claim, a matter dealt with in a
separate regulation (§ 14.4).
275. Many agencies simply would have denied the claim on the merits rather than ques-
tion its legal sufficiency. Even so, the government might be expected in subsequent litigation
to deny that a valid claim had ever been filed. As an example, see Rothman v. United States,
434 F. Supp. 13, 15 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See also infra note 319 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Justice Department strategy on this issue).
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able it to investigate the claim.276 This approach is known as the
minimal notice standard.277  In the case of Adams v. United
States,278 the parents of a brain-damaged child filed an administra-
tive claim based on the alleged medical malpractice of an Air Force
physician in prenatal care and delivery.2 79 After partial compliance
with an Air Force request for medical reports and expense
records,20 and after the lapse of more than six months, the claim-
ants brought suit. The district court dismissed the action on juris-
dictional grounds because of the claimants' failure to comply with
all of the government's requests for substantiation.281
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that
Congress intended the section 2675(a) notice requirement "to be
construed in light of the notice traditionally given to a municipality
by a plaintiff who was allegedly injured by a municipality's negli-
gence," '282 that is, notice of the approximate nature and circum-
stances of the injury, plus a statement of damages.2 83 As a result,
the court held that section 2675(a) imposes only two requirements
upon claimants. They must first provide written notice of the claim
so that the agency can investigate. They must also give the claim a
276. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th Cir. 1983); Avery v. United States,
680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982) (calling only for "notice of the manner and general circum-
stances of injury and the harm suffered, and a sum certain representing damages"); Tucker v.
USPS, 676 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1982); Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289, af'd on
reh'g, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980); Reynoso v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 978, 979 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1981); see also
Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 273 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a)
applicable to defining claim under section 2675, but rejecting any "regulatory checklist" of
jurisdictional prerequisites).
277. Note, supra note 274, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J., at 180.
278. 615 F.2d 284, afl'd on reh'g, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).
279. Id. at 285.
280. The exchange between claimants and agency was more complex than in the Swift
case. Claimants had filed a Standard Form 95 with a sum certain, but did not furnish some of
the requested supporting documentation and failed to provide information regarding future
expenses. The claimants apparently felt that the Air Force already possessed or had access to
much of the information demanded. There also appeared to be some misunderstanding as to
what the claims officer actually wanted by way of substantiation. The district court consid-
ered these nuances irrelevant, and ruled that claimants, in order to perfect their claim, were
bound to inform the agency that they had no unreported medical expenses and were required
to provide an estimate of future medical expenses. However, claimants in other circuits
adopting the Adams view have not contended that the agency already had the information
sought.
281. 615 F.2d at 286.
282. Id. at 289.
283. The District of Columbia Code provision, cited with favor by the House Committee
on the Judiciary, requires a document containing a claim for money damages and stating "the
approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage." D.C. CODE
ENCYCLOPEDIA §§ 1-923, 12-309 (West 1966).
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specific dollar value.2 84 Having done this, but still not having
achieved a settlement, a claimant is entitled to bring an action
under the FTCA in district court.285
A variation of Adams has surfaced more recently in the Sixth
Circuit opinion in Douglas v. United States.286 In Douglas, the
claimant failed to satisfy the agency's request for medical reports
and insurance records, and for that reason had his claim denied at
the agency level. The appellate court ultimately held that a claim-
ant satisfies section 2675 by placing a value on the claim and giving
the agency sufficient written notice of the circumstances so that it
may conduct an investigation. However, it emphasized that the
claimant in fact had provided sufficient information to permit calcu-
lation of a reasonable settlement figure.2 8 7 The issue of whether
Douglas adds an additional step to the Adams standard is not
clear.288 But it would be an unfortunate development if Douglas
does modify the Adams standard in this way. Although no stan-
dard for gauging the adequacy of a claim can be perfectly objective,
a standard geared to the agency's ability to arrive at a settlement
value will unnecessarily lead to differences of opinion as to its appli-
284. 615 F.2d at 289-90. The Adams court noted that the substantiation requirements
apply to section 2672, but not section 2675, emphasizing the independence of the two sec-
tions. Thus a claimant who satisfies the requirements of section 2675 may maintain a subse-
quent action, even though the agency lacked sufficient information to settle the claim under
section 2672. "Equating these two very different sets of requirements leads to the erroneous
conclusion that claimants must settle with the relevant federal agency, if the agency so
desires, and must provide that agency with any and all information requested in order to
preserve their right to sue." Id. at 290 (emphasis in original). See also Avery v. United
States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982) (section 2675(c) not intended to allow agency to
insist on proof of claim to its satisfaction before claimant becomes entitled to bring court
action); Tucker v. USPS, 676 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1982) (compliance with section 2675
alone sufficient to allow maintenance of subsequent court action).
285. A major problem with Adams is that the court may have placed undue reliance on
the references in legislative history to the simple notice of claim provisions in existing state
and municipal claims statutes. Those references were not made for the purpose of defining
the contours of a valid claim, but instead to justify introducing the prior claim requirement
into the FTCA. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 3-4 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1532, 89th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in Note, supra note 254, at 1648-49).
286. 658 F.2d 445, 447-49 (6th Cir. 1981).
287. The court also based its decision on estoppel, and argued that the agency's earlier
indication that the claim contained enough information barred it from thereafter contesting
its sufficiency. Id. at 449.
288. 658 F.2d at 448-49. In reaching its decision, the court attempted to reconcile Adams
with Swift on the grounds that Swift and two earlier cases, Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F.
Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), and Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal.
1977), involved allegations so conclusory that investigation and disposition of the claim was
actually impossible.
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cation.2 89 The Adams standard by comparison offers greater cer-
tainty. Once a claimant provides a complete Standard Form 95 or
its equivalent, with a description of the incident and of the injury
sustained, the agency presumably can conduct an investigation.
All in all, Adams corresponds best with the probable intent of
the FTCA. Neither the text nor the legislative history of the Act
implies that Congress meant to grant agencies the power to compel
information from unwilling claimants that Swift allows. More
likely, Congress thought that the inherent advantages of agency-
level settlement-namely, immediate payment and avoidance of the
expenses and inconvenience of litigation290-- provided sufficient in-
centives to cooperate. As before the 1966 reform, less cooperative
claimants presumably will litigate, provided, however, they have
previously filed with the agency a claim meeting the minimal notice
standard.291
3. Policy Considerations
Most discussions of the substantiation problem properly assume
that any sound solution will treat claimants fairly and at the same
time promote administrative settlement of tort claims. Congress
has never clearly stated what procedural fairness to government tort
claimants requires. In fact, the allusions to fairness in the legislative
history of the FTCA amendments do not relate to those amend-
ments as such, but to the overall 1966 legislative package on gov-
ernment litigation. The four bills in the package were reported to
"have the common purpose of providing for more fair and equitable
treatment of private individuals and claimants when they deal with
the Government or are involved in litigation with their Govern-
ment. '2 92 The other three bills in the package293 manifest an intent
to place citizens on a more equal footing with the government in the
litigation and prelitigation context. This concern is less pronounced
in the FTCA amendments where claimants and government alike
289. See Comment, supra note 220, at 168-69.
290. See generally 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, § 285 (discussing advantages of adminis-
trative settlement of government tort claims).
291. See, e.g., Reynoso v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 978, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
292. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515-16.
293. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-505, 80 Stat. 304 (1966) (providing agencies
with increased authority to compromise claims against private persons); Act of July 18, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308 (1966) (imposing statute of limitation on the government's
contract and tort claims); Act of July 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, 80 Stat. 308 (1966)
(allowing costs to private persons who successfully sue the government).
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were thought to benefit from the opportunity to dispose of claims
without the delay, expense and inconvenience of litigation.294 Still,
if agencies may unilaterally determine what is needed to settle a
claim, and thereby effectively decide whether or not a claimant may
proceed to court, they gain a clear upper hand in the administrative
process. To the extent that they learn the factual and legal details
of the claimant's case they also gain advantage in subsequent
litigation.
A second policy consideration which bears on the substantiation
problem is of course the desirability of settling tort claims at the
agency level. As several courts have found,295 agencies need ade-
quate supporting material before they can evaluate a claim for set-
tlement purposes and guard against claim inflation.296 Experience
with settlement of private tort claims supports this view.297 The
more evidence and information an agency has, the surer it can be
that settlement at a given level is the correct course of action. Fur-
thermore, an agency may not be able to act at all within the six-
month period unless it receives the material it needs fairly soon. In
any event, the agencies should not alone bear the burdens of investi-
gating tort claims; 298 they should at least be able to call on claim-
ants to produce the essential information already in their hands or
294. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2517 ("[Mjeritorious [claims] can be settled more quickly without the need for
filing suit and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation."); see also Hearings on Im-
provement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation Before Subcomm.
No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966). ("[A claimant]
could [settle] without the bother and cost of litigation."). In urging passage of the bill, the
Justice Department opined that simple administrative claims might be settled early without
the claimant requiring counsel. Id. at 13. See, eg., Locke v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185,
187 (D. Hawaii 1972) (husband acting on own behalf and that of decedent's estate).
295. Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 16 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Kornbluth v. Sa-
vannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Accord Trail, Federal Tort Claims Act:
Filing an Administrative Claim: A Two-Step Approach: Presentation and Substantiation, 27
JAG 421, 426 (1973).
296. Note, supra note 254, at 1656.
297. Id. at 1650 n.48, and authorities cited therein. See generally H. BAER & A.
BRODER, How To PREPARE AND NEGoTIATE CLAIMS FOR SE'ILEMENT 83 (1967) (open
exchange of information creates mutual confidence and atmosphere for successful settle-
ments); P. HERMANN, BErrER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH LEVERAGE 160 (1965) (greatest
roadblock to settlement is failure of opponents to exchange information).
Virtually all agency claims attorneys agree. One specifically would like to see Standard
Form 95 amended to require the claimant to also spell out his or her theory of liability.
Nesvet Interview, supra note 23. At least one claims attorney urges that the regulations and
preferably the statute be amended to clarify the obligations of claimants to supply relevant
information and to negotiate in good faith. Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
298. See Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1980) (claimant must pro-
vide minimal notice of circumstances of accident so agency may investigate claim). However,
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readily available to them. The claimant who defies these considera-
tions and prefers to wait six months before divulging in court the
nature and extent of injury does not evoke a great deal of sympathy.
Finally, the dimensions of the problem need to be kept in per-
spective. In a case that is truly susceptible to administrative settle-
ment, the rational claimant normally complies with reasonable
agency requests for substantiation. Even partial disclosure may
provide an adequate basis for settlement. More importantly, many
cases of noncompliance are not realistic candidates for agency-level
resolution anyway. In those cases, noncompliance does not actually
frustrate settlement.
4. Proposed Solutions
There are essentially two solutions that would produce fair and
sound results.299 Under the first solution, based on Adams, agencies
may request any information they consider useful, but they may
only regard a claim as invalid if it lacks a sum certain or sufficient
content to enable them to conduct an investigation. While relying
on the benefits of early settlement as an incentive to claimants to be
forthcoming in substantiation of their claims, the minimal notice
standard will admittedly deprive the agencies on occasion of useful
information and even cause some claims to go unsettled at the ad-
ministrative level. The prospect of the recalcitrant claimant does
not, however, warrant giving agencies routine authority to decide
whether claimants have been sufficiently forthcoming to have
earned their day in court. Beyond a certain point, the appropriate
sanction for a claimant's lack of cooperation is simply the enhanced
likelihood of an agency denial on the merits,3" the cost and incon-
neither did Congress intend for claimants to bear wholly the burden of investigation. Id. at
290 n.9.
299. The First Circuit's decision in Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980),
represents yet a third possible approach. See supra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
However, such a solution is not desirable, for it allows the agencies, at least initially, to
prevent tort litigation by finding unilaterally that claimants have not provided the documen-
tation necessary to settle the case. The judicial supervision required to ensure that agencies
do not abuse this power would itself frustrate the purpose of lessening judicial involvement in
the resolution of government tort claims. See Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th
Cir. 1982). Moreover, anticipation of eventual judicial mediation might induce agencies to
pose informational demands that are exaggerated and cause claimants to resist even those
that are not.
300. Writing shortly after enactment of the 1966 amendments, the Chief of the Justice
Department Torts Branch predicted that claimants who were not forthcoming with informa-
tion necessary for the sound evaluation of their claim would be met with a denial. Laughlin,
supra note 128, at 38.
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venience of litigation, and the risk of adverse inferences in the judi-
cial forum.
The Adams approach does not require claims officers to alter
radically the way in which they deal with claimants. For them to
distinguish at an early stage between information necessary to es-
tablish a sufficient claim and additional information useful in inves-
tigating and evaluating the claim is neither practical nor productive.
Certainly, nothing should be done that would convey the suspicion
that claimants may be less than fully forthcoming in substantiating
their claim. Only if and when the exchange reveals a pattern of
serious noncooperation should the claims officer make it clear that
continued nonproduction of designated information will compro-
mise the validity of the claim under the minimal notice standard.30 1
The courts tend to be supportive where agencies diligently request
specific information and clearly communicate the consequences of
nonproduction. °2
A second solution to the substantiation problem would entail a
reconceptualization of the tort claim process. As the process exists
now, claimants do not always fully disclose all available information
to agencies because of the perception that disclosure may prejudice
them in any ensuing FTCA litigation. As a result of the prior ad-
ministrative claim, the government commonly enters litigation with
301. Several agencies, including NASA and the VA, have developed a series of form let-
ters to be sent at given successive intervals to claimants who fail to supply requested informa-
tion which is deemed essential to the sufficiency of the claim. 4 NASA-AMEs UNIVERSITY
CONSORTIUM FOR ASTROLAW RESEARCH, FEDERAL MANAGEMENT LAw PRACTICE MAN-
UAL (TORT MATTERS) pt. I (Aug. 1, 1982). In the VA, these letters may culminate in a form
claim denial letter that recites non-production as the reason for denial, that cites Swift or its
local progeny, and that scrupulously avoids addressing the merits of the claim. Vet. Admin.
Reg. No. M-02-1 pt. 18, § 18.06(a) (1981).
Not all agencies proceed in similar fashion. The Department of Agriculture reports no
standardized follow-up procedure and does not even issue a denial letter of any sort where a
claimant has failed to cooperate.
See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(3) (1984) ("Where exchanges with
a claimant reveal an insufficiency of information submitted in support of the claim, agency
claims officers should promptly and clearly advise the claimant whether the continued non-
production of designated information will, in the officer's view, warrant dismissal of the claim
as invalid because of incomplete documentation.").
302. See, eg., Avril v. United States, 461 F.2d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1972) (lack of sum
certain uncorrected by the claimant though called to his attention by the agency); Bialowas v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1048-50 (3d Cir. 1971) (failure of claimant to provide specific
damage amounts even though requested to do so); Cummings v. United States, 449 F. Supp.
40, 41 (D. Mont. 1978) (no evidence of injury furnished in response to Air Force requests);
Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381, 382-83 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (requested prop-
erty damage estimates and medical bills not supplied).
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an unusually complete sense of the claim's legal and factual weak-
nesses. Frequently, it has revealed little about its own defense.
This observation raises the question whether agency claims han-
dling should be made less an adversarial prelude to litigation and
more an autonomous dispute resolution process in the hands of im-
partial claims officers.303 The more claimants accept administrative
settlement as the proper vehicle for resolving their claims against
the government, rather than a procedural barrier to litigation, the
less they will view prior disclosure as unfairly prejudicial to their
case. At present, the true character of the FTCA remains unclear,
notwithstanding the 1966 reforms. Administrative settlement may
be the principal dispute resolution mechanism, but the prospect of
FTCA litigation is never very far away.304 The pervasive ambiguity
of the process, and of the agency claims officer who manages it,
explains why the substantiation problem has been so difficult to
resolve.
The second option therefore presupposes that claim and defense
alike will be made primarily in administrative channels, with parity
in access to information, suitable sanctions for noncooperation by
either side,30 5 and the promise of impartiality on the claims officer's
part. In this setting, the agency clearly can demand full disclosure
of all pertinent information as a condition of validity of the claim,
though it would be bound to make equally broad disclosure to the
claimant. Establishing parity of this sort would blunt the unfairness
argument and probably contribute to more informed settlement ne-
gotiations at an early stage. In doing so, it would also fundamen-
tally reconstruct the administrative tort claim process.
5. Limits on Agency Access to Information
As long as litigation remains an alternative means of resolving
303. Compare ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7 (1984) (preamble), with
Willard Letter, supra note 180 (describing the agency-level process as "an annex of and pre-
liminary to litigation").
304. Willard Letter, supra note 80. For a persuasive argument that Congress would not
have wanted documentation requests to prejudice a claimant's interests in court, see Note,
supra note 254, at 1653 n.66. Congress recognized that not all tort claims could be resolved
administratively and deliberately preserved claimant's option to file suit after six months. S.
REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 5-6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2519.
305. One commentator suggests that if, subsequent to filing a timely Standard Form 95, a
claimant fails within a reasonable time to honor an agency's unambiguous requests for infor-
mation discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the running of the statute of
limitations should resume. Note, supra note 254, at 1656-57. The sanction for unexcused
nondisclosure would then be a time bar to suit.
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government tort claims, certain limits on agency access to informa-
tion may be appropriate. According to one critic, the Attorney
General's regulations are unfair because they "permit an agency to
demand information that it could not obtain if the parties were con-
ducting discovery." '"36 Certainly, any solution to the substantiation
problem would allow the agencies to demand some information as a
condition of validity of the claim-information that may be of the
sort privileged in discovery. Moreover, the catch-all language of
the regulations 0 7 reads broadly enough to encompass privileged
material.
In principle, the agencies should be free to request privileged
material in their investigation of claims. The situation becomes
problematic only if a claimant's failure to furnish information re-
quested, even if privileged, renders the claim invalid as an adminis-
trative claim. This issue is unlikely to arise under the Adams
minimal notice standard, because agencies will rarely find that they
are unable to investigate a claim due to the absence of privileged
information. Moreover, under the Adams view, the Attorney Gen-
eral's regulations indicate only what the agencies may request, not
what they may demand on pain of deeming a claim invalid. Finally,
since discovery privileges are generally waivable, agencies should
not be barred or discouraged from seeking any relevant information
that the claimant may be willing to produce and whose production
may bring a swifter and better informed settlement.3 0 8
Ultimately, agencies engaged in the administrative claim process
should respect the privileges from discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Congress did not address the is-
sue in enacting the 1966 amendments, it recognized that some tort
claims would defy administrative settlement and it preserved the
claimant's option to sue. Congress even chose not to extend the six-
month waiting period, a move that might have increased marginally
the rate of prelitigation settlement.30 9 Against that background, it
seems unlikely that Congress would have required claimants in the
mandatory administrative process to disclose privileged informa-
tion. Besides prejudicing the claimant at trial, such a policy would
306. Id. at 1654.
307. "Any. . .evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the responsi-
bility of the United States. . .or the damages claimed." Id.
308. The agencies should also promote open and mutual exchange by releasing informa-
tion they have in their possession which relates to the pending claim. See infra notes 484-90
and accompanying text.
309. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 8, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515, 2519.
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give the agencies an unfair advantage in settlement, for, even armed
with the Freedom of Information Act, a claimant is in no position
to exact privileged information from the agency.
Application of privilege standards in a settlement scenario may
prove problematic, particularly in the case of privileges that are
qualified rather than absolute. Moreover, the agencies are not au-
thorized to resolve the ensuing disputes, and chronic resort to the
courts for their resolution would be damaging to the autonomy of
the administrative process. On the other hand, claimants and
claimants' attorneys do not appear to invoke privileges in refusing
agency requests for information or in justifying their refusal in
court. Those disputes that do arise can probably be resolved with-
out specific machinery for that purpose. Either settlement will be
reached notwithstanding the disagreement, or the claim will be de-
nied or deemed insufficient. In the latter two circumstances, a
claimant intent on pursuing matters will soon be in court, where
any specific question of privilege in administrative settlement pro-
ceedings most likely will be overtaken by a parallel question of dis-
covery in litigation.
F. Eligibility for Relief
The sum certain and substantiation requirements do not fully
account for the disputes over the validity of federal tort claims.
Although the FTCA leaves the term "claimant" undefined, the Jus-
tice Department has promulgated regulations controlling who may
file administrative claims. Those regulations identify the proper
claimants for claims of injury to or loss of property,310 personal in-
jury,31 1 death,312 and losses wholly compensated by a subrogated
insurer.313 The agencies, however, do not agree on the extent to
which compliance with these regulations is necessary before a claim
may be heard. Even the courts are divided. Some waive what they
take to be "technical defects" and allow the claim to be heard on its
merits, 314 but others do not.315 According to the leading study of
310. 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(a) (1983). See also id. § 14.3(e).
311. Id. § 14.3(b). See also id. § 14.3(e).
312. Id. § 14.3(c).
313. Id. § 14.3(d).
314. Locke v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Hawaii 1972) (government should
not be allowed to stand on technicalities on evidence of representative capacity where the
rights of children are involved and inequities would otherwise result). E.g., Forest v. United
States, 539 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D. Mont. 1982); Young v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 736, 741
(S.D. Ga. 1974).
315. Triplett v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 118, 119 (D. Nev. 1980) (claim invalid, in the
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litigation under the administrative claim provisions of the FTCA, a
number of otherwise meritorious claims have run permanently afoul
of the statute of limitations because a technically ineligible person
presented them.316
When faced with a "technical defect," the agencies should not
ignore the Attorney General's requirements, but neither should
they respond to violations with undue harshness. The appropriate
response in most cases would be to treat an otherwise valid and
timely claim as having been duly filed, on condition that the claim-
ant correct the deficiency within a specified reasonable length of
time.3 17 Since the proper benchmark is fair and sound administra-
tive practice, the Justice Department regulations also should be
amended to adopt a principle of substantial compliance with the
formal requirements of a valid claim. In other words, the Attorney
General should direct the agencies not to rely on sheer technical
deficiencies in otherwise valid, intelligible, and responsibly filed ad-
ministrative claims, where they are not prejudiced as a result.318
absence of any unusual or extenuating circumstances, for lack of evidence of attorney author-
ity); Gunstream v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 366, 368 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (claim filed by
plaintiff's parents held defective for failure to show parents' representative capacity).
316. Zillman, supra note 158, at 977.
317. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7 (A)(1)(a) (1984). For example,
most claims officers who implement the Attorney General's requirement of a written power
of attorney are content with delayed submission, which usually occurs sometime before the
onset of negotiations. Bodolay Interview, supra note 144. Some claims officers never call for
a written power of attorney at all. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. If a power of attorney is
not furnished and later becomes an issue in litigation, the courts may be willing to inquire
whether there was actual authority to represent another. House v. Mine Safety Appliances
Co., 573 F.2d 609, 617-18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). The Ninth Circuit,
reaffirming its basic approach to the FTCA administrative claim requirement in Avery v.
United States, 680 F.2d 608 (1982), recently held that the issue of whether a valid power of
attorney is supplied has nothing to do with satisfaction of the jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit. Warren v. Department of Interior, 724 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane). Accord
Graves v. United States Coast Guard, 692 F.2d 71, 74-75 (9th Cir. 1982). The prudent attor-
ney will append a power to the initial Standard Form 95 since the courts are not always
forgiving, even when the government can show no prejudice. See Triplett v. United States,
501 F. Supp. 118 (D. Nev. 1980).
318. For example, when a person files a claim for personal injuries without mentioning a
spousal claim for loss of consortium, the agencies and courts properly regard the latter as
outside the ambit of the claim. Eg., Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir.
1983); Heaton v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 589, 590-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally
Silverman, supra note 110, at 50. However, where a loss of consortium claim was filed, but as
part of the physically injured party's claim rather than the spouse's, the prejudice to the
agency and the disrespect for the administrative claim mechanism under the FTCA are mini-
mal. Unfortunately, the agencies and courts have not always acknowledged the difference.
Walker v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 38, 42 (M.D. Fla. 1978). As a growing body of case law
holds, rigid attitudes toward the filing of a claim on behalf of family members, particularly
spouses and minor children, may work an unfair and indefensible hardship. E.g., Nelson v.
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Given the Attorney General's overall responsibility for tort claims
mariagement at the agency level, policing of the agencies should not
be left to episodic and uneven intervention by the courts.
Unfortunately, the Justice Department sees its primary respon-
sibility under the FTCA as defending the government in the adver-
sarial setting of tort litigation. This view is not conducive to
persuading agency attorneys to operate more by the spirit than the
letter of the law in their dealings with claimants at the administra-
tive level. Even more revealing than the lack of procedural magna-
nimity toward claimants in the Justice Department regulations is
the Department's litigation policy of raising as a jurisdictional de-
fense technical defects in an administrative claim that the agency
never brought to the claimant's attention and that did not prevent
the agency from addressing the claim and issuing a final denial let-
ter on the merits.319
G. The Settlement Process
Once a claim is validly filed, responsibility for investigating and
evaluating it passes to the agency. 320 Few would say that the agen-
cies may "unilaterally. . .shift the burden of investigation to pri-
vate claimants while retaining only the responsibility of evaluating
the information supplied. 3 2' Nevertheless, the agencies have al-
most sole discretion under both the statute and Justice Department
regulations to determine how best to discharge this burden.
Congress clearly meant to assure the agencies of six months
within which to assess and possibly negotiate settlement of a claim
without the threat of court action. However, Congress did not in-
tend that the passage of six months without final agency action
United States, 541 F. Supp. 816, 817 (M.D.N.C. 1982); Forest v. United States, 539 F. Supp.
171, 174 (D. Mont. 1982). But see Jackson v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C.
1982); Pringle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 289, 291-92 (D.S.C. 1976). See ACUS Recom-
mendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(1)(a) (1984).
319. This practice is becoming less well-received by the courts. See, e.g., Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 516 (6th Cir. 1974); Hunter v. United States,
417 F. Supp. 272, 274 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Young v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.
Ga. 1974). A Torts Branch monograph on the administrative claim procedures of the FTCA,
prepared for the guidance of the agencies and United States attorneys, acknowledges the new
trend and provides that "the defense [of a defective administrative claim] should be asserted
only when it can be demonstrated that the lack of the requested information completely frus-
trated the agency's good faith efforts to achieve an administrative settlement." DEPART-
MENT OF JusTicE, TORTS BRANCH MONOGRAPH, Vol. C, ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS 17-18
(March 1983).
320. Corboy, supra note 110, at 636; Zillman, supra note 158, at 969.
321. Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 290 n.9, affdon reh'g, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.
1980).
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should necessarily trigger litigation. The statute provides only that
such failure gives a claimant the "option" to consider the claim as
having been finally denied and consequently to sue, and that this
option may be exercised "any time thereafter." '322 The claimant
may elect not to sue without in any way prejudicing the right to do
so at a later date. In this way, the act encourages, or at least avoids
discouraging, the continuation of negotiations beyond six
months, 323 or until a final denial is issued.
An area of uncertainty with potential for dispute in the settle-
ment context is the question of whether the government or claimant
is the offeror or offeree. There are indications that the government
fancies itself the offeree. First, the sum certain required is in effect
an opening offer. Further, Justice Department regulations allow
amendment of a valid claim only "prior to final agency action," 32 4
implying that the government has the power of final acceptance.
Where, as in the case of settlement in excess of $25,000, the ap-
proval of the Attorney General or his designee is necessary, the
Torts Branch invariably insists that agencies receive the prior un-
conditional assent of the claimant to a proposed settlement before
committing either themselves or the government. 325 On the other
hand, the statutory provision that recites the preclusive effects of
settlement states that "acceptance by the claimant of any such
award, compromise or settlement shall be final and conclusive on
the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim
against the United States. 326
It can be important to know which party has the final power of
acceptance. The claimant may regret the amount of settlement af-
ter agreement appears to have been reached; the claimant may even
regret it sooner, but fail to act quickly enough in amending the
claim. Most courts faced with this scenario have barred suit for any
larger amount,32 7 intending thereby to protect the integrity of the
322. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (Supp. 1983).
323. An example of protracted negotiations is Douglas v. Untied States, 658 F.2d 445
(6th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff allegedly injured his ankle when a plank in the dock of the Detroit
naval armory collapsed beneath him. Six years of communications between Douglas' attor-
ney and the Navy ensued before the latter denied the claim for failure to provide the docu-
mentation requested. Only then did litigation take place. Id.
324. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(c) (1984).
325. See infra notes 644-47 and accompanying text.
326. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
327. Ferreira v. United States, 389 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir. 1968); Wexler v. Newman, 311
F. Supp. 906, 907-08 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Schlingman v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.
Cal. 1963). Cf. Wright v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Del. 1977) (claim increase
barred where settlement check negotiated). In Ferreira, the claimant was injured when his
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settlement process and to prevent claimants from obtaining an un-
fair advantage in subsequent litigation."'
However, an unusual set of circumstances led the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in the case of Odin v. United
States32 9 to proceed in a different direction. In Odin, the claimant,
while unrepresented, filed an administrative claim for $791, reflect-
ing the precise amount of medical bills incurred to that date in con-
nection with the aftereffects of a swine flu immunization. 330 The
claimant subsequently retained an attorney whose communications
with the government over the course of the year strongly suggested
that the claimant's injuries substantially exceeded that sum. 331
Nevertheless, the then-Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) notified the claimant that her $791 claim, never as such
amended, was granted in full.33 2 The claimant through her attorney
returned the $791 payment voucher unsigned, and included an
amended administrative claim for one million dollars, which ex-
plained that the smaller figure had been based on a misunderstand-
ing of the claim form and reflected only medical bills at the date of
filing.333 The Torts Branch of the Justice Department, acting for
HEW, notified the claimant that it would disregard the amendment
on the ground that the agency's acceptance of the initial claim ter-
minated that claim and precluded the claimant both from amending
it and from seeking a higher sum in court. 3 34 This view was sus-
tained by the district court, but disavowed on appeal. The Court of
Appeals held that the "final agency action," which admittedly bars
subsequent amendment of a claim, does not take place until the
agency procures the claimant's "acceptance" of the agency's "offer"
tractor hit a hole left on his land by employees of the Bureau of Reclamation. A claim for
$93.50 was allowed by the agency ten months after filing, without the claimant having taken
steps to withdraw it. The claimant refused payment and sued for $75,000 on the basis of
serious complications which had arisen and were allegedly unforeseeable at the time of filing.
The suit was nonetheless barred on the grounds that it would be overly burdensome to re-
quire the agencies to process claims to an award which, although for the full amount claimed,
could still be rejected by the claimant. Ferreira, 389 F.2d at 194.
328. A different situation may obtain where the increase represents loss or injury arising
from the same incident but suffered by a different claimant. Such may be the case of settle-
ment by a parent for medical expenses resulting from injury to a child, followed by a timely
claim on the child's behalf for his or her own pain and suffering. E.g., Stokes v. United
States, 444 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1971).
329. 656 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
330. Id. at 799.
331. Id. at 800.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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to settle.335 The claimant, said the court, has the power of accept-
ance, 336 and acceptance, following uniform agency practice, occurs
when the claimant signs and returns the payment voucher as an
expression of acceptance.337
Although apt in its denunciation of the government's attitude to
a claimant's "one false step, ' 338 and though not unfair in result
under the particular circumstances of the case,33 9 Odin is not
wholly convincing on the narrow legal issue presented. It is far
from clear that Congress, in making acceptance of a settlement "fi-
nal and conclusive" on the claimant, intended legally to vest the
power of acceptance in the claimant as opposed to the agency.
Moreover, the court's somewhat disingenuous assumption that uni-
lateral action by the claimant can constitute "final agency action"
ignores the Attorney General's legitimate concern that claimants
not enjoy unfair leverage in subsequent litigation from an agency's
prior assent to settlement.34
335. Id. at 804.
336. The court relied on the language of the Act's release provision. See supra note 326
and accompanying text. It also relied on the suggestion in legislative history that the 1966
amendments "would provide the agencies with the authority to make settlement offers which
could result in settlement in a large percentage of tort claims cases." S. REP. No. 1327, supra
note 103, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2518.
337. The voucher form, Standard Form 1145, is captioned "ACCEPTANCE BY
CLAIMANT(S)" and provides a signature line for claimants to signify "acceptance" and to
acknowledge its effect as a release in the terms of the statute.
338. Odin, 656 F.2d at 806. Judge MacKinnon said:
[The court] refuses to countenance the creation of arbitrary barriers to claims for
full compensation for government inflicted injuries. . . .There is absolutely noth-
ing in the statute or its legislative history to indicate that Congress, in requiring
claimants to seek relief initially from the agency that harmed them, intended to set
up a labyrinth of procedural rules and niceties in which one false step would deprive
injured citizens of the relief Congress intended to grant them.
Id.
339. The Odin court expressed confidence that the claimant, under the facts of that case,
had not abused the settlement process. Id. at 806 n.30.
340. True, the Act specifically declares an agency's disposition of a claim not to be com-
petent evidence at trial on the question of liability or amount of damages. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(c) (Supp. 1983). Whether this evidentiary bar is very effective in practice is highly
questionable.
The provision originally was designed for multiple claimant situations, to remove the dis-
incentive on the part of an agency to admit liability and settle a claim through administrative
channels when a related claim had been brought by another claimant directly to court, as was
possible until 1967. 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, § 319.03 at 17-35, § 322.05 at 17-59. The
provision is still useful to the government today where one claimant seeks to use the adminis-
trative settlement of another claimant's related claim as evidence of liability for damages in
his or her own litigation. However, it also applies to the single claimant situation where the
claimant seeks to introduce in-court statements against interest, including settlement offers or
the allowance of a lesser sum, made by the government during the administrative claim
phase. Id. § 322.05 at 17-5.
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The question of which party enjoys the final power of accept-
ance of administrative settlements in tort is not well illuminated
either by the statute or its legislative history, but for cases turning
on this issue a clear answer is highly desirable. The Odin court
rightly focused upon a fixed and visible event, namely the return of
a signed voucher form. The event that was chosen, however, occurs
late in the proceedings and serves mostly to trigger payment proce-
dures on a claim the parties consider already settled. Further, upon
receiving the voucher, the claimant has an indeterminate amount of
time in which to sign and submit it. Most claimants evidently do so
with dispatch, but the framework established by the Odin case in-
vites speculation.
Actually, the party to settlement negotiations having the great-
est reason to fear unfair speculation is the government. If the gov-
ernment withdraws from negotiations at the last moment, the
claimant normally will not have compromised his or her litigation
posture; settlement positions taken by the government, however,
may haunt it in subsequent FTCA litigation. At some point in the
settlement process, therefore, the claimant should be called upon
for an irrevocable expression of assent to the terms of settlement.
Practically speaking, such is already the case for settlements of
more than $25,000. The Justice Department will not entertain ap-
proving settlements at this level until satisfied that the government
already has the claimant's assent.
Disputes of the Odin variety are infrequent. Agencies should
simply be alert to the fact that claimants have the opportunity to
indulge in second thoughts and retract informal acceptances of
agency settlement offers. If Odin produces a pattern of abuse, Con-
gress should act to curb it. On the other hand, the position of the
Torts Branch in Odin also should be rejected. Where an agency has
evidence that a claimant's gross underestimation of a claim is inno-
cent and not an abuse of the settlement process, and where it has
not yet received from the claimant a signed voucher, the agency
cannot possibly believe that it lacks authority to reopen matters.
The agency possesses this authority and should be prepared to exer-
cise it with reasonable discretion.
H. The Final Agency Denial
An agency's final written denial of a claim under the FTCA trig-
gers a six-month statute of limitations on suit in federal district
court, running from the date that the notice of final denial is
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mailed.341 After this time, suit is "forever barred."342 The meaning
of a final denial has occasioned little dispute. Obviously, an express
repudiation of liability on the claim qualifies. The claimant's rejec-
tion of an agency's final settlement offer for less than the full
amount sought also operates as a final denial.343 The problem with
the latter situation is that the timing of a final agency denial then
turns on an expression of intent by the claimant. The least determi-
nate situation of all is the open-ended exchange of counteroffers in
which either party might at any time bring negotiations to a close.
One reason the potential for misunderstanding and confusion
concerning the final denial has not materialized is that the FTCA
requires agencies to issue final denials in the form of certified or
registered mail. Justice Department regulations additionally re-
quire an express warning to dissatisfied claimants that they must
bring suit, if at all, within six months of the date of mailing.3" Un-
til claimants receive such a communication, they can safely assume
that their claim has not been finally denied and that the statute of
limitations has not yet begun to run.3 45 In sum, the final denial
mechanism appears to be in good working order, and the occasional
misunderstanding so idiosyncratic as to warrant no general reform.
Only a few adjustments in the ground rules seem advisable.
First, the statutory and regulatory provisions that suit be
brought within six months from the date the final notice of denial is
mailed invites needless confusion and possible injustice. Several
days may elapse between the mailing and arrival of the notice, and
make the difference between a timely and untimely complaint.346
341. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982).
342. Id. Carr v. Veterans Admin., 522 F.2d 1355, 1357 (5th Cir. 1975).
The courts have clearly and properly barred suit after a period of six months following the
mailing of a final denial, even when less than two years have elapsed since accrual of the
claim. Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Childers v. United
States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 0971); Claremont Aircraft,
Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1970); Myszkowski v. United States, 553 F.
Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Heimila v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 350, 351 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
343. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 3-4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws
2518.
344. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (1984).
345. The courts have rarely faced this issue. However, they have uniformly enforced the
regulatory requirements against agencies that have failed to observe them. Sterner v. United
States, 462 F.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126, 1129
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Interboro Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1243, 1245
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
346. See, eg., Carr v. Veterans Admin., 522 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1975). In Carr, plaintiff's
administrative tort claim was finally denied by a mailing of February 5, 1973, and arrived on
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Congress should provide that the six-month limitation period runs
from the date of arrival of the communication. This revision would
guard against unfair surprise to claimants,3 47 without substantially
burdening the United States; the existing requirement that final de-
nials be sent by registered or certified mail already guarantees a
dated record of receipt. The present system-postponing the effec-
tiveness of a claim until it reaches the agency, but giving effect to a
denial the moment it is mailed-unfairly resolves ambiguities to the
claimant's disadvantage.348
Second, the Attorney General's regulations do not require the
agencies to provide a reason for their denial of a claim. At most,
they suggest that the giving of a reason is not forbidden.3 49 The
regulations should impose such a requirement, 350 though the level
of specificity in the reasons given must be left to the sound discre-
tion of the officer in charge. As a matter of fairness, a claimant who
has perfected a valid administrative tort claim is entitled to some
explanation for its denial. And it has yet to be shown that the costs
of stating reasons outweigh its obvious benefits.
The notion that a statement of reasons would unfairly tip the
government's hand in the event of litigation is not credible. If the
government has a sound and convincing reason for denying a claim,
communicating it to the claimant may help prevent litigation. If
the reason is debatable, it will not remain secret for long. Any an-
swer to an FTCA complaint reveals as much by way of defense as a
reasoned denial letter and usually a great deal more. Since a fair
and adequate letter of explanation need not disclose anything elabo-
rate about the agency's factual or legal analysis of the claim, it does
not compromise the government's litigation interests. In any event,
the Justice Department's attempt to free agencies from providing a
reason for denial may be improper under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act which mandates a "brief statement of the grounds for de-
February 9. Plaintiff brought suit on the claim on July 27, but service of process did not
occur until August 7. The action was dismissed as time-barred based on the date of mailing
rule, though it still would have been timely under a date of receipt rule. Id. at 1357.
347. See id. The court in Carr conceded that "it might be more equitable if the short
period of limitations. . . commenced with receipt by the claimant of notice of the adminis-
trative agency's denial." Id.
348. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
349. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (1984). "The notification of final denial may include a statement
of the reasons for the denial and shall include a statement that, if the claimant is dissatisfied
with the agency action, he may file suit. . . not later than 6 months after the date of mailing
of the notification." Id. (emphasis added).
350. ACUS Recommendations, I C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(5)(a) (1984).
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nial" in connection with any written application or request.
I. Reconsideration of a Claim
Justice Department regulations invite a claimant who has re-
ceived a final denial letter to "file a written request with the agency
for reconsideration. '352 The claimant may exercise this option any
time before filing suit and before expiration of the statute of limita-
tions. By regulation, the request gives the agency six months from
the date of the filing of the request to take final action, and bars the
claimant from suing until such action or until expiration of the six
months, whichever comes first. 35 1 Most indications are that a new
six-month statute of limitations on filing suit begins to run at that
time.35
4
Reconsideration still may operate as a trap for the unwary. In
one case,3 55 a claimant who received a notice of final denial sought
to amend the claim to present new evidence, and was told he could
351. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1982).
352. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) (1984). Presumably, reconsideration may be sought only once.
Silverman, supra note 110, at 54.
If, following a final denial by one agency, the claimant files a claim arising out of the same
incident with a second agency, the latter may consider the claim before it a request for recon-
sideration. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(4) (1984). Only if the second agency chooses to do so, and so
advises the claimant, will the statute of limitations on suit be tolled. Id.
The Administrative Conference recommends that denial letters inform claimants of their
right to request a reconsideration and of the six-month waiting period such a request implies.
ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(6)(a) (1984).
353. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) (1984).
354. In spite of the apparent clarity of the current regulations, one commentator seems to
believe that a request for reconsideration does not necessarily prolong the initial statute of
limitations. He further urges that the statute or regulations be amended to codify what he
construes as the current approach, namely, that a request for reconsideration has no effect
unless and until the agency expressly notifies the claimant in writing that it has agreed to
reconsider the claim. Zillman, supra note 158. Only the Army reports following that ap-
proach. Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
This proposal is undesirable. If a reconsideration request is filed toward the end of the
six-month period following the denial letter, little time will have passed when suit must be
brought in federal district court on the same claim. This process would short-circuit the
reconsideration that has taken place. Moreover, such a suit is premature if the agency does
agree to reconsider the claim because it is entitled to six months without suit in order to do
SO.
Claims officers themselves, who generally do not resolve doubtful questions of procedure
to their disadvantage, do not behave as if they must expressly agree to reconsider a claim in
order for a reconsideration request to take effect. The commentator may have been influ-
enced by pre-1966 case law. At that time the courts conceded that a claimant, led to believe
that the denial of his or her claim was being reconsidered, enjoys an extended statute of
limitations. Trepina v. Wood, 227 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Mont. 1964); Stever-Wolkford, Inc.
v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 166, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
355. Woirhaye v. United States, 609 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
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do so. He conveyed his request within six months following the
original denial, but did not actually furnish the new evidence until
two weeks after that period had passed. The agency disregarded the
request on the ground that it was no longer timely.356 The disap-
pointed claimant then filed suit, only to learn that his claim was
now also too late for judicial consideration.3 7 The court reasoned
that the statute of limitations is tolled only when the agency leads
the claimant to believe it is reconsidering the claim, not when it
simply says it would reconsider it.358
In another case, 359 the claimant, upon receiving a notice of de-
nial, made two further inquiries, the first of which led him to think
the claim might be reconsidered. He later learned that this was not
the case, and brought suit seven-and-a-half months after the first
exchange and less than a month after the second. The court dis-
missed the action as untimely360 and held that the agency's "cour-
tesy" in supplying oral and written explanations did not "erase" the
previous final denial.361
These results point up the ambiguity surrounding the reconsid-
eration process and depict a real potential for misleading an honest
and reasonably diligent claimant. The regulations themselves are
not flawed. They fairly state that a request for reconsideration gives
an agency six months to act and bars the claimant from suit during
that period, unless the agency acts sooner upon the request. The
regulations also incorporate by reference the rules governing final
denial letters. Thus, final agency action on a request for reconsider-
ation must be in writing, must be sent by certified or registered mail,
and must contain notice of the right to sue within six months from
the date of mailing.362 Absent such a communication, the claimant
has the option of bringing suit any time thereafter.
The lingering problem is to know whether a given communica-
tion by the claimant constitutes a sufficient request for reconsidera-
tion. For example, does the submission of new evidence, or a
statement of intent to submit new evidence, constitute a request?
Does a written request for clarification or elaboration constitute a
request? Obviously not all written communications from a claimant
356. Id. at 1304-05.
357. Id. at 1305.
358. Id.
359. Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970).
360. Id. at 896-97.
361. Id. at 898.
362. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a), (b) (1984). For a different view, see supra note 354.
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following a final denial amount to requests for reconsideration. A
claimant may not even want formal reconsideration if that entails a
six-month bar to litigation. The claimant may simply have a ques-
tion or a comment. Ultimately, claims officers should place the
most reasonable interpretation possible on any such communica-
tion, and promptly indicate whether or not they interpret it as a
request for reconsideration.363 If they do take it as a request, con-
firmation to that effect might obviate the filing of a premature suit
and the need for proceedings to have it dismissed. 3 If they do not,
they should remind the claimant that the statute of limitations has
been running since the denial letter was sent.365
Though this process may strike some claims officers as excessive
handholding, many claimants do need guidance. This is because
the regulations do not alert them to the risk that, in awaiting a re-
sponse to some communication, they may find that the limitations
period has lapsed. Even a claimant who appreciates the risk may
need guidance. The claimant who reopens matters, yet by way of
precaution still files suit within six months of the original denial
letter, has not given the agency the six months which the regula-
tions reserve for reconsideration of the claim. The suit is premature
and subject to dismissal. On the other hand, waiting a full six
months means allowing the original statute of limitations to expire.
Even if the agency responds within six months, the original limita-
tions period may by then have lapsed. In short, when the Justice
Department extended claimants an invitation to seek reconsidera-
tion, it carefully protected the government's interest by securing the
agencies a period of time in which to act while suspending the
claimant's right to sue. But the Department has not put claimants
similarly at ease, even though doing so might spare the courts from
having to decide after the fact what claimants under differing sets of
363. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(6)(b) (1984).
364. See, eg., Trepina v. Wood, 227 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Mont. 1964).
365. At the United States Army Claims Service, where a request for reconsideration does
not, without more, trigger an extension of the limitations period, claims attorneys invariably
provide just such a warning in their response should they decline to reconsider the request.
Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
A request for reconsideration based specifically on new evidence which does not accom-
pany the request, as in the first case cited in the text, may require more explanation. The
claimant in that case might have been spared difficulty if the agency had clearly given either
of the following two reasonable warnings: (a) that a request for reconsideration specifically
premised on the furnishing of new evidence is not effective for any purpose until the new
evidence is in fact furnished, or (b) that the request for reconsideration is provisionally effec-
tive, but conditional on the new evidence being supplied by a deadline set no earlier than the
end of the period in which reconsideration might have been sought initially.
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circumstances may or may not reasonably have been led by the
agencies to believe.366
The temporary bar to litigation affords agencies a limited oppor-
tunity to conduct a reconsideration without discovering that the
claimant after all has gone to court. Most reconsiderations, how-
ever, do not require a full six months. Where denial on reconsidera-
tion is all but a foregone conclusion, agencies should act
expeditiously to prevent claimants from being kept out of court.
Suppose, however, that a claimant asks to withdraw a request for
reconsideration before the end of six months. The regulations im-
ply that a claimant may not demand withdrawal of a request for
reconsideration. There is no reason, however, why a claimant may
not request withdrawal, particularly since reconsideration was en-
tirely optional in the first place. Agencies should routinely honor
such requests, provided they have not yet expended significant re-
sources on the reconsideration process.3 67 The agencies alone
should be allowed to make that determination, but should be re-
quired to make it fairly and objectively.
J. The Aftermath
Following a final denial, and possibly a fruitless request for re-
consideration, the disappointed claimant's remaining option is liti-
gation. In fact, not all disappointed claimants exercise the option,
and for this the administrative process itself is partly responsible.
That process succeeds not only when it yields a fair settlement of a
meritorious claim, but also when it dissuades a claimant from press-
ing a nonmeritorious one. In both situations it avoids needless liti-
gation. In other cases claimants abandon their claim without
abandoning a belief in its merits. This category of foregone litiga-
tion cannot easily be described as needless. Still, where claimants
choose not to litigate because they have had the satisfaction of being
heard, have realistically assessed their claim's strengths and weak-
nesses, and have weighed the costs of litigation more intelligently
than would otherwise have been possible, the administrative claim
procedure likewise serves a useful purpose.
366. See supra notes 355-61 and accompanying text.
367. Prior to the 1966 amendments, a claimant could withdraw a claim optionally filed
with the agency on fifteen days written notice. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The most convenient rule would be to allow claimants six months from the time of the
withdrawal of a request for reconsideration in which to bring suit, as was the case before the
1966 amendments. Theoretically, a claimant could file a reconsideration request for the sole
purpose of prolonging the normal limitations period, but this seems extremely improbable.
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Tort claims that result in litigation are not inherently incapable
of settlement. In fact, one commentator estimates that sixty to sev-
enty-five percent of them are settled prior to judgment.36 The fact
that this percentage approaches the eighty percent level that
prompted congressional enactment of the 1966 amendments36 9 is
not cause for concern. Litigated cases now represent a very small
portion of all claims filed, namely those claims that were neither
settled nor abandoned during the administrative process. More-
over, many postlitigation settlements do not constitute a concession
of liability, but reflect the Justice Department's rational decision to
conserve scarce litigation resources for cases that are more signifi-
cant. Agency370 and Justice Department371 officials alike agree that
the Department may properly compromise litigation over a claim
that an agency could not in good conscience settle.
Legislative history suggests that Congress never expected the
agencies to achieve a final disposition of all the claims they re-
ceive,372 and probably did not anticipate even as high a rate of final
disposition as they actually have achieved.373 In fact, the authors of
the Senate Report on the 1966 amendments thought it "obvious"
that action on difficult tort claims could not be completed in the six
months allotted to the agencies, but were content that "the great
bulk" of claims would probably be ripe for decision within that
time."37 Even so, the authors deliberately chose not to require
claimants to wait any longer than six months before seeking a judi-
cial remedy. Of course, not all FTCA litigation comes from impa-
tient claimants. Some litigants are met with prompt and outright
agency denials that may or may not be warranted; others reject
early offers in the belief that litigation, whether through compro-
mise settlement or judgment, will afford them better results; still
others simply want their day in court. The fact remains, however,
that in no category of litigation-and the FTCA is still ultimately a
judicial remedy-do the disputants always reach agreement before
going to court. The fact that approximately five to ten percent of all
368. 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, at 15-9. The current Torts Branch Director estimates
the figure for post-litigation settlement at 80%. Interview with Jeffrey AxeIrad (May 25,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Second Axelrad Interview].
369. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
370. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
371. Second Axelrad Interview, supra note 368.
372. See supra notes 133, 304.
373. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
374. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2518-20.
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tort claims brought to the agencies finally end up in court37 5 is
neither surprising nor disappointing.
Once litigation is brought under the FTCA, the agencies lose
their authority to settle a claim. Only the Attorney General or his
designee may "arbitrate, compromise or settle" it.376 But the agen-
cies do not cease to play a role. They prepare a formal litigation
report for the benefit of the United States Attorney on the case.
The agencies also conduct further investigations, help identify and
locate witnesses, and are consulted throughout on factual and legal
issues and, when appropriate, on litigation and settlement strategy
or the advisability of appealing an adverse judgment.377 Agency
counsel may participate actively in the defense, though they rarely
prepare pleadings or make court appearances. Almost invariably,
agency personnel will figure among the witnesses, and the discovery
process will implicate agency records. Where the claim alleges a
regulatory tort, or where large sums of money or critical issues are
at stake, the interest of the agencies in the litigation remains very
much alive. But the administrative process as such will have come
to a close.
IV. AGENCY PRACTICE
Though the preceding sections of this Article emphasize the le-
gally problematic aspects of the claims process, the overwhelming
majority of tort claims pass through administrative channels with-
out raising any significant procedural difficulties. The fact remains,
however, that neither the FTCA nor the Justice Department's regu-
lations provide answers to important procedural issues. Indeed,
both sources are conspicuously silent on how agencies should go
about conducting the basic tasks of investigating and determining
claims. Certainly, the Justice Department has taken a strikingly
narrow view of its rulemaking authority. Its regulations impose on
claimants certain requirements of form and content for a valid and
sufficient claim, and detail the cooperation that agency claims of-
ficers may ask of claimants in connection with different kinds of
375. See supra note 144.
376. 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (Supp. 1983).
377. In most agencies, the same attorneys will be involved in the litigation as were in-
volved in the administrative claim. In the Army, however, whatever responsibility the
agency bears in litigation will be carried by the litigators in the Torts Branch of the Army
JAG rather than by the Claims Division attorneys who saw the claim through its earlier
phases.
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claims.37 8 They further direct claimants how to amend a claim37 9
and seek reconsideration.380
By contrast, however, Justice Department regulations do not
significantly channel the procedural discretion of the agencies. In
fact, they essentially tell an agency only when to submit a proposed
settlement to review by a legal officer or the Justice Department,381
how to convey a final denial notice,3 82 and how to process a claim
for payment after it has been settled.383 Thus, the agencies remain
largely free to select their procedures for investigating and initially
determining claims384 and may issue or not issue operational regula-
tions as they see fit.38
5
Still, the relative autonomy of the agencies in organizing their
claims activities has not prevented them from adopting basically the
same procedural approach. From a rich universe of conceivable
models, they have all adopted one that is primarily investigatory in
character, differing among themselves only in details of operation.
The term "investigatory" denotes the following type of procedure.
The agency out of whose activities a claim arises takes charge of
assembling what will be the factual basis of the determination.
While the appropriate operating division of the agency may be
asked to execute certain basic investigative work, responsibility for
assembling the record, so to speak, ultimately rests with the claims
division of the agency's Office of General Counsel or its equivalent,
the same body that eventually passes upon the merits of the claim.
Neither in its investigatory nor its evaluative functions does the
agency conduct anything remotely approaching a judicial-style
hearing. There is no formal record, no cross-examination or con-
378. 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2-.4 (1984).
379. Id. § 14.2(c).
380. Id. § 14.9(b).
381. Id. §§ 14.5-.7. An agency referral to the Justice Department:
shall be directed to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of
Justice, in writing and shall contain: (a) A short and concise statement of the facts
and of the reasons for the referral or request, (b) copies of relevant portions of the
agency's claim file, and (c) a statement of the recommendations or views of the
agency.
Id. § 14.7.
382. Id. § 14.9(a).
383. Id. § 14.10(a).
384. Section 14.8 of the Justice Department regulations, entitled "Investigation and Ex-
amination," simply authorizes an agency to enlist the cooperation of another agency in con-
ducting its investigations.
385. Id. § 14.11. "Each agency is authorized to issue regulations and establish proce-
dures consistent with the regulations in this part." Whether Congress expected the Justice
Department to impose greater procedural guidance on the agencies is a matter of conjecture.
See supra text accompanying notes 118-21. In fact, the Department has not done so.
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frontation of witnesses, no rules of evidence, and no special discov-
ery devices-the elements normally associated with a formal
hearing.
But the absence of procedural trappings is not all-important, for
it also is possible to find those trappings in nonadversarial settings.
More critical is the fact that the ultimate decisionmaker, though
removed from the events giving rise to the claim, is not entirely
neutral. Decisionmaking authority at the agency level is not vested
in an independent claims commission, a body of administrative law
judges, or some other unit with substantial institutional indepen-
dence from the agencies out of whose activities the claims arise.
Administrative tort claims in a very real sense are decided by the
lawyers for one of the parties. The prevalence in this context of an
agency-centered investigatory model of operation is not surprising.
In fact, the filing of an administrative claim often does not even
signify a "dispute" between the parties. Some sort of "incident"
will have occurred, but whether that incident may fairly be de-
scribed as a dispute will not yet be known. Thus, the model is es-
sentially nonadversarial.
A. A Sense of Numbers
Before presenting a composite chronological sketch of the
agency-level settlement practices that put procedural flesh on the
statutory and regulatory skeleton, the general distribution of tort
claims among the various agencies should be mentioned. Certainly
no federal agency, however distinctive its affirmative mission, is
without an incidence of such claims. Each agency has addressed
the relevant substantive and procedural questions and established
the necessary machinery. Some agencies, particularly those with
large numbers and recurring patterns of tort claims, have developed
detailed FTCA regulations supplementing those of the Justice De-
partment; they may also use these regulations in exercising
whatever meritorious or other auxiliary claims authority they pos-
sess. Other agencies have essentially reenacted the Justice Depart-
ment regulations, in some cases verbatim.386
386. For FTCA regulations of the particular agencies referred to in this Article, see 7
C.F.R. § 1.51 (1984) (Agriculture Department); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1261.300-.315 (1984) (NASA);
22 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.17 (1984) (State Department); 32 C.F.R. §§ 536.1-.171 (1984) (Army),
§§ 842.0-.181 (1984) (Air Force); 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.600-.610 (1984) (Veterans Administra-
tion); 39 C.F.R. §§ 912.1-.14 (1984) (Postal Service); 43 C.F.R. §§ 22.1-.5 (1984) (Interior
Department). Adjacent sections of the regulations of the military services, the Veterans Ad-
ministration and the State Department address the complex array of ancillary claims settle-
ment authority- such as the Military, Foreign and National Guard Claims Acts, and the
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Although universal, tort claims strike some agencies more fre-
quently than others. The statistics available when the FTCA was
amended in 1966 showed that the incidence of tort claims was
highly concentrated in a small number of agencies, typically those
with extensive direct dealings with the public or those using a large
number of motor vehicles. More than four-fifths of tort suits pend-
ing against the government at the end of October 1965 arose from
the activities of five agencies: the Defense Department, the then-
Post Office, the then-Federal Aviation Agency, the Department of
Interior, and the Veterans Administration. 38 7 This pattern appar-
ently has continued.388  The admittedly skewed sample of settle-
ments in excess of $25,000 approved by the Justice Department in
calendar year 1982 shows the same marked concentration.8 9 All
but ten of 155 such claims arose from the activities of the same five
agencies.39 °
A comparison of numbers of incoming claims is more reflective
of the relative burdens on the agencies. For fiscal year 1982, the
Veterans Administration received a total of 936 malpractice and
statutes that authorize payment of tort claims arising abroad--conferred on those agencies.
Unless incorporated by reference, the Justice Department regulations issued pursuant to the
F1CA have no bearing on these provisions. In fact, most of the agencies busiest with claims
of various sorts have produced an impressive battery of internal agency memoranda, hand-
books, manuals and the like that detail substantive and, to a much greater extent, procedural
aspects of the various claims programs. See, eg., Air Force Reg. No. 112-I, Claims and Tort
Litigation (July 1, 1983); Army Reg. No. 27-20, Legal Services: Claims (Sept. 1970); United
States Postal Service, Administrative Support Manual, pt. 250 (Oct. 15, 1982); Vet. Admin.
Reg., supra note 301.
Regulations on the FTCA and on ancillary claims statutes may differ in their particulars.
Non-FTCA State Department claims, for example, may require a formal sworn statement
and greater particularity than the simple written statement required under the FTCA. 22
C.F.R. § 31.4(b) (1984). The Veterans Administration calls for claims to be filed in dupli-
cate. 38 C.F.R. § 14.514(a) (1984).
387. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 103, quoting from H.R. REp. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966), and reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2519.
388. The General Accounting Office is in the process of devising a system for recording
by agency the volume as well as the dollar value of payments out of the judgment fund on
administrative tort claims in each fiscal year. That information is not now systematically
available. Telephone Interview with Sharon Green, Chief of Claims Adjudication, Claims
Group, Accounting and Financial Management Div., GAO (Feb. 21, 1984).
389. Memorandum from Lawrence Klinger to Jeffrey Axelrad, "Administrative Claims
Survey: Calendar Year 1982" (Mar. 21, 1983) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Klinger Memo].
390. Id. The Army alone accounted for over half of the dollar value of such claims. The
pattern for 1983 was similar. Of the 120 claims approved by the Justice Department, all but
nine were generated by the named agencies. Memorandum from Lawrence Klinger to Jeffrey
Axelrad, "Administrative Claims for 1983" (Jan. 4, 1984) (on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review).
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1660 nonmalpractice claims,3 91 and the Air Force a total of 1727
claims.392 These totals pale by comparison with the reported 9323
tort claims processed administratively by the Postal Service in cal-
endar year 1982.193 Annual claims totals range downwards to an
estimated 1500 for the Department of Interior,394 500 for the Agri-
culture Department, 39 5 100 for the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion,396 and fifty claims or fewer each in the State Department 397
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration.398
B. A Sense of Organization
The volume of an agency's tort claims bears on that agency's
choice of management techniques. A few examples should suffice to
indicate the possibilities. In the State Department, a single Assis-
tant Legal Adviser handles all of the agency's tort claims with the
aid of one attorney-adviser and one secretary; the work does not
consume all or even most of his time.399  The small number of
claims makes centralization entirely practicable. All final determi-
nations are made by the Deputy Legal Adviser on the Assistant
Legal Adviser's recommendation in the form of a self-contained
memorandum; it is possible that the Deputy Legal Adviser will
never examine the claims file. Only foreign claims may be finally
settled outside the Office, and even then only in an amount up to
$1000. The foreign missions are reluctant to issue a final denial;
391. CENTRAL OFFICE ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE TORT CLAIM REPORT FY 1982, Oc-
tober 1, 1981-September 30, 1982; FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE TORT CLAIM
REPORT FY 1982, OCTOBER 1, 1981 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1982. In the same period, 156 mal-
practice and 877 nonmalpractice claims were settled administratively. The figures confirm
the variability of settlement rates within a single agency according to type of claim. Id. See
supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
392. STATISTICAL REVIEW, AIR FORCE CLAIMS AND TORT LITIGATION ACTIVITY, FY
1982 at 3, 7. See supra notes 137-43. The Chief of General Claims in the Army Claims
Service gives an estimate for the Army of as high as 5000. Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
393. Levin Interview, supra note 140.
394. Feeley Interview, supra note 147.
395. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
396. Kelley Interview, supra note 24.
397. Huang Interview, supra note 22.
398. Wieland Interview, supra note 152; Wieland Letter, supra note 144 (NASA statisti-
cal sheets). These figures include claims under the latter two agencies' meritorious claims
statutes. Some agencies have annual tort claims totals below ten.
399. Huang Interview, supra note 22. In calendar year 1982, only 31 tort claims came
into the Assistant Legal Adviser's office. The claims ranged in amount from a $500 claim for
property stolen from an embassy abroad to a $100 million claim for the alleged negligence of
State Department officials in failing to evacuate the claimant quickly enough from a foreign
country to receive necessary medical attention. Id.
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they prefer that such a ruling come from Washington.'
In contrast, tort claims in the Veterans Administration, though
officially handled by an Assistant General Counsel in the central
office," 1 command the full-time attention of a deputy assistant gen-
eral counsel and a staff of four attorneys. Tort claims also occupy
agency lawyers in each of the fifty-four VA regional counsel offices.
However, considering the large scale of the Veterans Administra-
tion's tort claims operation, matters are reasonably centralized. All
tort claims, wherever filed, are routed to counsel headquarters in
Washington for a superficial examination of their sufficiency. Only
after review are they forwarded for investigation to the regional
counsel office closest to where the claim arose. The regional office is
authorized to approve final settlements up to $25,000,4 2 and to is-
sue final denials on claims of any amount. Any proposed settlement
in excess of $25,000 requires approval from the General Counsel's
office on the basis of the fie assembled locally. The General Coun-
sel's office, exercising a de novo standard of review, may deny the
claim entirely, or may remand to the regional counsel with instruc-
tions to negotiate and settle the claim for a lesser amount within
their authority or, if that cannot be done, to deny the claim alto-
gether. In special cases the General Counsel may give regional
counsel the authority to negotiate and settle a claim for an amount
less than recommended but beyond its normal authority, subject to
Justice Department approval. Of course, the General Counsel may
simply endorse the regional counsel's recommendation and then
seek Justice Department approval. Any decisive action taken in
Washington, though handled by a staff attorney, requires a formal
memorandum to the Deputy Assistant General Counsel, who re-
views and revises the memorandum, and transmits it, accompanied
by a draft decision, to the Assistant General Counsel for action." 3
400. Id.
401. Kane, Schmetterling, and Bradshaw Interview, supra note 149. The Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel has other important responsibilities: educational programs, vocational rehabili-
tation, loan guaranty programs, and bankruptcy.
402. Id. The fact that regional counsel is authorized and even disposed to settle a claim
in an amount up to $25,000 does not mean it necessarily will do so. Advice of headquarters
may be sought on any factual or legal issue or on matters of valuation. One Washington-
based claims attorney reports spending a substantial portion of his tort claim activity time on
the phone with district counsel or over files referred by them. Id. See 38 C.F.R. § 14.608
(1984) (referrals from district counsel).
403. Kane, Schmetterling, and Bradshaw Interview, supra note 149. Other agencies with
a much smaller claims volume than the Veterans Administration nonetheless use a similar
moderately decentralized system. At NASA, tort claims responsibility falls to an Assistant
General Counsel for Litigation whose resources are devoted in far greater measure to other
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The Department of the Army probably carries centralization of
large-scale tort claims operations to the limit. Any claim with a
face value above $5000 must be directly handled at claims service
headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland.' ° Claims of $5000 or less
are processed by the designated claims attorney, military or civilian,
within the Judge Advocate's office of the post having geographic
responsibility for the incident.4"5 Substantive settlement authority,
exercised on the basis of the officer's investigative report with find-
ings and recommendations," vests in the Staff Judge Advocate, the
chief legal officer at the post, or by delegation in the claims officer.
The best measure of concentration in the Army Claims Service,
apart from the Army's markedly low cutoff point for local settle-
ment, is its policy on denials.4"7 No local post may deny a claim,
however small the sum sought.4 °8 The most it can do is prepare a
"Seven Paragraph Memorandum and Opinion" specifically justify-
ing its recommendation to deny.40 9 The actual decision to deny
matters, notably contracts and procurements. He and his assistant can handle the tort load
themselves because NASA regional counsel have independent settlement authority up to
$10,000 and an unlimited denial authority which, as so many other agencies report, they are
reluctant to exercise. Proposed settlements over $10,000, and referrals from regional counsel
in other cases, come to Washington for review and recommendation by the Assistant General
Counsel and formal action by the General Counsel. Quite clearly, NASA could handle its
entire yearly claims volume of roughly 50 claims directly out of Washington-much as the
State Department does-but finds it more efficient to decentralize matters among the eight
regional space centers out of whose operations its tort claims almost invariably arise. Wie-
land Interview, supra note 152.
404. 32 C.F.R. § 536.6(l)(2) (1984).
405. Id. § 536.6(k)(1). Alternatively, a post may have a separate unit claims office
headed by a claims officer who is not normally an attorney; in that event, the claim will be
supervised and handled there. Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
406. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. If a unit claims officer investigated the claim, he or
she will prepare the report; if a subordinate unit officer investigated the claim, the report will
come from the claims officer in the Judge Advocate's office.
The Army has devised a small claims procedure whereby amounts up to $750 may be
paid on a proper claim without the filing of an investigative report. Army Reg. No. 27-20,
Legal Services: Claims §§ 2-29 - 35 (Sept. 1970).
407. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. Like the Veterans Administration, the Army
Claims Service also reports steady referrals of issues and whole claims from local agency
attorneys even on matters fully within their settlement jurisdiction.
408. Id. This contrasts sharply with the usual agency practice of delegating to local
agency attorneys either (a) authority to deny claims of a face value coextensive with their
payment authority or, more often, (b) authority to deny claims up to any amount irrespective
of the monetary ceiling on their payment authority. But see 32 C.F.R. § 536.6(h)(1) (1984),
which provides: "If the claim is determined to be not meritorious, it will be disapproved
provided the command has settlement authority for claims of the type and amount involved."
409. Internal Army regulations prescribe the contents and arrangement of a Seven-Para-
graph Memorandum and Opinion:
(1) Claimant's name and address.
(2) Date and place of accident or incident.
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must come not only from Fort Meade, but specifically from the
Chief of the General Claims Division of the Army Claims Service
rather than a subordinate. 410 The rationale for this policy is as in-
teresting as it is unusual. It reflects a belief that settlement deci-
sions demand the attention of high-level authorities not only when
subordinates propose to dip deeply into the Treasury to pay a
claim-the customary rationale for delegating limited settlement
authority but unlimited denial authoritya'-but also when they
will pay nothing on a claim or a sum less than the claimant is pre-
pared to accept. In effect, the Army Claims Service has reversed
the usual presumption by giving local posts unreviewed settlement
authority up to $5000 but no denial authority whatsoever. Its con-
cern is that local claims attorneys sometimes may deny valid claims
rather than undertake the difficulties of negotiating a
compromise.41 2
When a claim has a face value of over $5000, and the Chief of
the General Claims Division does not believe local post attorneys
could settle it for less, settlement activity is entirely centered in Fort
Meade, specifically in the hands of nine full-time "action officer"
attorneys and nine full-time investigators acting in teams. Each ac-
tion officer has settlement authority, subject to both the Chief s and
the Justice Department's approval when the proposal is to pay more
than $25,000. While subordinate officers are free to settle in
amounts up to $25,000 and to negotiate alone with the Justice De-
partment for approval of larger settlements,413 no denial letter may
(3) Amount and date of filing of claim.
(4) Type of claim and brief description of accident or incident giving rise thereto.
(5) Facts.
(6) Opinions.
(7) Action.
Army Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6, § 2-12.
410. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. Subordinate attorneys will handle the matter and
as often as not reopen the investigation. But only the Chief of the General Claims Division
can issue an initial denial. The Chief estimates his rate of reversal of recommendations to
deny to be fifty percent. Interestingly, since the Army guarantees reconsideration by an at-
torney of higher rank than the initial decisionmaker, persons whose claims are finally denied
necessarily get reconsideration, albeit on the written record, by the Chief of the entire Army
Claims Service.
411. See supra note 408.
412. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. The denial policy described above is as good a
manifestation as any of a view-held with unique conviction in the Army Claims Service-
that agency-level claims attorneys owe loyalty as much to the claimant as to the Treasury.
See infra notes 582-86 and accompanying text.
413. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. However, the Chief will review the memorandum
of law and fact produced by the action officer in preparation for Justice Department approval.
32 C.F.R. § 536.6(h) (1984).
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be issued except by the Chief under the Chief's own name."'
At the other extreme is the Interior Department's uniquely de-
centralized operation. Notwithstanding the Department's heavy
claims volume,4 t5 the General Law Division of the Washington Of-
fice of the Solicitor has a single attorney-adviser devoting full time
to the administrative handling of tort claims.416 This arrangement
suffices because each of Interior's eight regions has a large regional
solicitor's office and up to four field offices with claims personnel.
Building on the investigative activities of non-attorney personnel at-
tached to each installation within the Interior Department's juris-
diction, the Regional Solicitor, the Assistant Regional Solicitor, or
more often one of the other attorneys in the regional or field of-
fice417 handles the negotiations and considers entering into final set-
tlements. They may finally settle claims up to $25,000, or deny a
claim of any amount.418 Although on paper the division of author-
ity looks similar to the Veterans Administration, a number of fac-
tors-the heavy reliance on investigative reports and
recommendations prepared at the local installation, the fact that re-
consideration also takes place regionally rather than at headquar-
ters, and the highly local character and generally lower dollar value
414. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. For a somewhat outdated but still apt narrative
account of Army tort claim procedures, see Williams, supra note 96.
Lest Army claims organization be taken as applicable to all the armed services, a word
should be said about Air Force operations. Though $7500 is the ceiling on settlements that
may be entered into by the Judge Advocate offices in the 120 Air Force bases that serve as
administrative subdivisions of the Department, 32 C.F.R. § 842.23(4) (1984), those offices
retain primary investigative authority in all cases. The entire legal as well as factual workup
of a case is coordinated there, which explains why each base has at least one standing claims
attorney-again civilian or military-and often a full-time paralegal assistant. Settlements up
to $7500 may be made by the Staff Judge Advocate, based on a Seven-Paragraph Memoran-
dum, supra note 409, prepared by the claims officer; denials may be issued only when the
claim does not exceed that amount. Action in all other cases-whether settlement or de-
nial-takes place in Washington, but largely on the basis of the existing claims file. Semeta
Interview, supra note 151; Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
415. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
416. Feeley Interview, supra note 147. The attorney-adviser reports only indirectly to the
Associate Solicitor of the General Law Division.
417. Id. The full-time headquarters attorney-adviser functions as a regional claims officer
for claims arising in the Washington area. He relies, as do the true regional offices, on investi-
gative reports prepared at the local installation out of whose operations a given claim arose,
and in nine out of ten cases follows the recommendations in those reports. Should a claim
arise within the National Capital Region of the National Park Service, one of two non-attor-
ney claims investigators attached to the National Park Service conduct the investigation. The
attorney-adviser's personal settlement authority is limited to $10,000. 43 C.F.R § 22.5
(1984). Higher awards require the approval of the Assistant Solicitor in charge of procure-
ments and patents. Feeley Interview, supra note 147.
418. 43 C.F.R. § 14.6 (1984).
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of Interior Department claims compared to Veterans Administra-
tion claims4 9 -combine to produce a uniquely decentralized tort
claims operation.42
A distinctive feature of the Justice Department's handling of
tort claims arising out of its own activities is the extent to which
substantive authority is delegated to some of the Department's com-
ponent agencies. For example, the FBI's specially created Civil Lit-
igation Unit in Washington has settlement authority on a
nationwide basis for amounts up to $5000.421 The Unit has a small
number of FBI attorneys and paralegals who work on claims alone.
The Drug Enforcement Administration and United States Mar-
shals' Service have similar centralized authority, although they can
settle claims only up to $2500.422 The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service and Bureau of Prisons also have $2500 settlement au-
thority, but exercise it on a regional and local basis, respectively.
Component agencies within the Justice Department conduct
their own investigations, usually on a local basis. The investigations
are performed either by an attorney, as in the FBI, or a non-attor-
ney, as in the Immigration and Naturalization Service or Drug En-
forcement Administration. Where the agencies cannot settle a
deserving claim within the monetary limits of their authority, the
investigative file is sent to the Torts Branch of the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Division for further investigation and negotiation, as
appropriate, and for possible settlement. In practice, claims are re-
419. Feeley Interview, supra note 147. A very substantial number of claims arise out of
the Department's management of the government's extensive landholdings, operation of
widely dispersed public facilities, and maintenance of a large police force and fleet of vehicles
to service those facilities. Id.
420. Id. The current legal division of claims authority within the Department is of rela-
tively recent origin. Until 1977, notwithstanding all the factors favoring decentralization, the
regional counsel could not settle a tort claim in an amount in excess of $3500. Pressure from
the regions for greater settlement autonomy led to the change. Id.
Another strikingly decentralized mode of operation is that of the Agriculture Depart-
ment. The General Counsel's Office normally sees no claim at all, even one arising in the
Washington area, unless its face amount exceeds $60,000. On all other matters, as one high-
ranking Washington claims officer put it, "regional counsel are on their own." Washington
will, at most, get copies of correspondence. Regional counsel conduct reconsideration of
their own decisions and in principle deal directly with the Justice Department when a pro-
posed settlement needs approval. How a claim is to be investigated is a matter between re-
gional counsel and the "tort liaison officer" (rarely a lawyer) in the local office of the
component Agriculture Department agency out of which the tort claim arose. The current
organization, like that of the Interior Department, is of recent origin. Until raised a few years
ago to $60,000-at that time the level of United States Attorneys' settlement authority-the
ceiling on regional authority was set at $10,000. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
421. 14 C.F.R. § 0.89 (1984).
422. Id. § 0.104 (App. § 5).
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ferred to the Torts Branch even though deserving and even though
well within component agency authority, if they entail close legal or
policy issues, or if the component is simply unable or unwilling to
conduct the negotiations necessary to achieve settlement. As else-
where, those who have unlimited denial authority may be quite re-
luctant to exercise it. By contrast, the Parole Commission has no
delegated settlement authority, nor do the Justice Department divi-
sions such as Civil Rights, Land and Natural Resources, Antitrust,
or the Office of Solicitor General. The tort claims to which the divi-
sions' activities give rise are handled by the Torts Branch through
the same attorneys who handle approval matters and tort litigation
generally, though much of the burden is borne by a single Torts
Branch paralegal.423
C. The Initial Stages of a Claim
The FTCA requires that a claim be presented to the federal
agency from whose activities the claim arose. 424 Regardless of
where the claim is filed in a given agency,425 it usually ends up in
the legal department, either in the Office of General Counsel or a
regional or district counsel's office, depending on the organization
of the agency and its tort claims operations. Each claim, according
to its amount or apparent complexity, is assigned to a particular
claims attorney, or, for the routine claim in a claims-heavy office, to
a paralegal.426
The first order of business is typically an examination of the
claim's facial sufficiency. When Standard Form 95 has been used,
determining whether the claim is without technical defect, recites a
sum certain, and contains the information necessary for an investi-
gation is usually easy. Most claims officers have developed for this
purpose a mental checklist of essential elements.427 If the claim is
423. Bodolay Interview, supra note 144. In more routine cases, the paralegal officer takes
charge, with the Torts Branch Director serving as a reviewing authority. Otherwise, a Torts
Branch attorney will take charge, working either alone or in conjunction with the paralegal,
subject to review by an Assistant Torts Branch Director. Id.
424. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1982).
425. Agriculture Department claims, for example, are supposed to be filed with the local
office of the component agency whose activities gave rise to the claim, not with regional
counsel. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
426. The Attorney General's regulations impliedly approve the use of paralegals, subject
to the requirement of review by an agency legal officer in the case of awards exceeding $5,000.
28 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1984).
427. See, e.g., Letter from Marian Blank Horn, Associate Solicitor, Division of General
Law, Department of the Interior, to Charles Pou, Jr., Administrative Conference of the
United States (May 21, 1984); Letter from Captain G. Lewis Michael III, Deputy Assistant
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sufficient, the claims attorney or paralegal will then conduct an in-
vestigation, evaluate the claim based on the investigation, and con-
duct negotiations with the claimant or claimant's attorney if
warranted by the prospect of settlement. If the claim is not suffi-
cient, a claimant may encounter difficulties as Justice Department
regulations do not require the agency to notify claimants of the
existence of technical defects. Theoretically, an agency officer may
sit upon a defective claim without action until the moment for a
timely cure has passed.
Until recently, the courts have not imposed on agency attorneys
any affirmative duty to point out a claimant's errors or omissions,
however innocent and fatal they may be.428 Some courts have now
placed a measure of that responsibility on the agencies. For exam-
ple, one court held that an agency should have taken the untotaled
medical bills appended to a claimant's written demand for personal
injury and property damage resulting from an automobile collision
as the equivalent of a sum certain, rather than wait three-and-a-half
months until less than thirty days remained under the statute of
limitations to send him four copies of Standard Form 95 for com-
pletion and return.429 Other courts use an estoppel concept to pre-
vent technically deficient claims from failing.430
While these judicial decisions are sound and appropriate, it
should be remembered that Congress enacted the 1966 amendments
in order to reduce, rather than enlarge, judicial intervention in gov-
ernment tort claims. Preferably, agency attorneys, with or without
Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy, to Charles Pou, Jr. (May 18, 1984); Bodo-
lay Interview supra, note 144; Kelley Interview, supra note 24.
428. Muldez v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Va. 1971) (claims attorney has
"no 'duty to speak' other than to provide the [standard] form as requested" and therefore
need not specifically advise a claimant that a sum certain is indispensable to a valid claim).
See also Mudlo v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373, 1376-78 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (suit dismissed
for insufficient documentation even though there had never been any communication to this
effect from the agency either to the claimant or his attorney).
429. Molinar v. United States, 515 F.2d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 1975).
430. E.g., Campbell v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Hawaii 1982) (govern-
ment estopped from objecting to husband's filing a claim for his wife on the ground that he
was not appointed guardian ad litem until after suit was brought, since the agency failed to
object to his representation at the time of filing); Industrial Indem. Co. v. United States, 504
F. Supp. 394, 398 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (government neglected to set reasonable time limit for
substantiating claim or to warn of consequences of not complying); Hunter v. United States,
417 F. Supp. 272, 274 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (absence of power of attorney not fatal where agency
dealt with claim on merits without ever mentioning the defect); Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 348 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D. Neb. 1972) (insurers given party status where FAA
failed to object earlier). See also Forest v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 171, 175 (D. Mont.
1982). See generally Comment, supra note 274, at 156, 162.
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encouragement from the Justice Department, will undertake inde-
pendently to notify claimants of deficiencies in their claims and even
consider helping correct those deficiencies.43' Many do so, whether
through early warning signals, the relation back of cures to the orig-
inal filing date, or use of the telephone rather than the mails when
time is of the essence, to give a few examples.432 Affirmative agency
action of this sort is also beneficial to the government, since reason-
able overtures to claimants at the agency level may save resources
that would otherwise be used in litigating procedural issues before a
judiciary that is showing ever-greater solicitude for tort claimants
against the government.433
A more far-reaching alternative would be for agencies to adopt a
standard of substantial rather than strict compliance with the At-
torney General's regulations on the filing of a claim. 4 34 It is well to
remember that Congress neither legislated stringent and particular-
431. See ACUS Recommendations 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(1)(a) (1984).
Since most agency regulations are silent on the subject of an affirmative duty, any action
taken is a matter of individual attorney preference. Regulations of the armed services, how-
ever, are an exception. While they expand upon the criminal prohibition against soliciting
claims, see supra note 181, by expressly forbidding agency personnel to "represent or aid any
claimant or potential claimant in the prosecution or support of any claim against the United
States," 32 C.F.R. §§ 536.2(a) (Army), 842.6(a) (Air Force) (1984), they carve an exception
for "the assistance [claims officers] render as an official part of their duties," id. §§ 536.2(b)
(Army), 842.6(b) (Air Force), and specifically instruct them, on request, to advise a claimant
on how to present a claim and to help prepare the claim and assemble the evidence, id. See
also id. §§ 536.29(k)(4), (6) (Army claims officer should keep claimant and attorney informed
of status of claim and familiarize them with all aspects of the procedure).
Similarly, an internal Postal Service Manual forbids assistance in the presentation of a
claim, but then goes on to provide that "when necessary, desirable and considered in the best
interest of the Postal Service, the person [who indicates a desire to file a claim] should be
assisted in preparing the form and assembling evidence." UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT MANUAL § 253.211 (Oct. 15, 1982).
432. Agency Interviews. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text. When time is
truly of the essence, the Army Claims Service has authorized claimants to bring an initial or
corrected claim to the local Army Recruting Office and to have the recruiter telephone the
Service to report that the claim was received and to confirm that it is defect-free. Rouse
Interview, supra note 141.
433. It is repeatedly suggested that, whatever the level of good faith required of claims
officers when dealing with an unrepresented claimant, little if anything is owed to the claim-
ant who has retained counsel. E.g., Hlavac v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1272, 1276-77
(N.D. Ill. 1972) ("Plaintiff had a lawyer from the outset and cannot claim that she was a
simple layman who did not understand what was required of her"); Zillman, supra note 158,
at 962. Granted, the presence of counsel on the claimant's side properly affects the govern-
ment attorneys' choice of strategies in substantive negotiations, particularly when the latter
take on a bargaining character. See infra notes 516-21 and accompanying text. But it should
have no bearing on their willingness to make modest procedural overtures at the threshold.
434. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(1)(a) (1984). See also supra
notes 314, 317-18 and accompanying text. A number of agency claims attorneys report that
the only elements of the claim they absolutely insist be in place by the time the statute of
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ized claim requirements nor specifically authorized the Attorney
General to do so. Although full compliance with each technical
requirement may help standardize agency claims operations, less
than full compliance does not make processing a claim impossible
or even very difficult.43 A recent study of the notice requirements
for government tort claims in Illinois436 persuasively concludes that
their legislative and judicial437 liberalization has permitted them to
continue serving their intended purpose without causing unwar-
ranted inconvenience or hardship to claimants. In fact, federal
claims attorneys generally do profess liberalism in monitoring com-
pliance with the formal requirements of the statute and the regula-
tions,43 but judging by the high volume of litigation over such
issues, some must not.43 9
limitations has run are an identification of the agency, the name and signature of the claimant
(or representative), and a sum certain. E.g., Huang Interview, supra note 22.
435. See, eg., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 515 (6th Cir.
1974) ("The purpose of the [1966] amendment was not to make recovery from the Govern-
ment technically more difficult. . . . [Tihe Government. . . certainly was not prevented
from attempting a compromise simply because the insurers did not join in [the victim's] ad-
ministrative claim"); Apollo v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Pa. 1978):
Since the policy behind the rule of resort to the appropriate administrative agency is
to give the agency a chance to consider the claim and to settle the claim without
litigation, it should not be necessary to have submitted a claim that is technically
perfect and in conformity with all the associated regulations so long as defects are
corrected and so long as the claim as considered contains the essential elements
necessary to permit settlement.
Id. at 138-39.
436. See Corboy, supra note 110. The Illinois legislature amended the Tort Immunity
Act in 1973 by inserting the words "in substance" before the list of information required in
the notice of claim. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 8-102 (1977). The Illinois Workmen's Com-
pensation Act specifically provides that a defect or inaccuracy in a notice of claim does not
invalidate the claim unless the employer can show undue prejudice. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 138.6(c)(2) (1977). Such a showing has been virtually impossible where the employer has
actual notice of the incident.
437. Examples cited include acceptance of a filing in the wrong forum, finding a waiver of
the notice of claim requirement where the municipality is fully insured against the claim in
question, Corboy, supra note 110, at 614, or where it fails to object, id. at 621, dispensation
from the requirement in the case of counterclaims, id. at 614-15, and claims by infants and
incompetents, id. at 623, disregard of factual errors or omissions in the notice of claim, id. at
618, allowing service by registered mail though personal service of the claim is technically
required, id. at 619, and even--somewhat questionably- accepting the filing of a complaint
in court as equivalent to the filing of a claim with the entity, id. at 624.
438. See, eg., Newman Interview, supra note 148; Semeta Interview, supra note 151; Let-
ter from Marian Blank Horn, Associate Solicitor, Division of General Law, Department of
the Interior, to Charles Pou, Jr., Administrative Conference of the United States (May 21,
1984).
439. See supra note 158. To some extent, however, Justice Department litigation strategy
rather than agency practice is responsible for injecting technical defenses into the litigation.
See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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The following case,"' on the issue of the sum certain require-
ment, illustrates an agency's failure to implement this approach.
Three months following a collision with a postal truck, a claimant
filed with the Postal Service a detailed Standard Form 95, a physi-
cian's report, and medical bills for injuries sustained in the accident.
The original supporting exhibits met all the regulatory requirements
but, because the form did not contain a sum certain, were returned
to the claimant with instructions to perfect the claim. The claimant
filed a new Standard Form 95 specifically requesting $22,000, but,
despite instructions by the Postal Service, failed to resubmit the ex-
hibits until after the statute of limitations expired. The agency con-
sidered the claim stale and refused to entertain it. The court
properly disagreed:
[T]he circumstances are that the Postal Service ultimately re-
ceived conforming copies of the Form 95 and its supporting ex-
hibits, but never at the same time.
The [1966] amendments were intended to provide a frame-
work conducive to the administrative settlement of claims, not to
provide a basis for a regulatory checklist which, when not fully
observed, permits the termination of claims regardless of their
merits . . . . The Federal Tort Claims Act requires that the
claimant give notice to permit the government to investigate the
matter in a timely fashion and to permit negotiations in an effort
to resolve the claim without litigation if the government deter-
mines there is some merit to the claim. Plaintiff's notice in 1977
was sufficient for those purposes, and he is properly now before
this court.44 '
D. Investigating the Claim
In many cases, agencies conduct routine accident investigations
apart from any actual or imminent tort claim. Virtually all agencies
have reporting procedures to be followed by any officer involved in
an accident on the job and by his or her supervisor. Generally,
these requirements are found in agency handbooks and manuals
rather than published regulations. 4 2 An example is the Postal Ser-
440. Koziol v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
441. Id. at 88, 91.
442. E.g., Army Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6, ch. 2, § I; Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra
note 386, ch. 4; Department of the Interior Departmental Manual § 451.1.8-.10 (Oct. 29,
1975). For example, an Interior Department Manual requires, irrespective of whether a tort
claim is filed, that tort claims officers conduct an investigation of any incident involving in-
jury to person or damage to or destruction of property, in addition to whatever investigations
supervisors, safety officers and auditors may be required to make. The regulations precisely
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vice, where seventy-five percent of the claims result from motor ve-
hicle accidents and another twenty percent from post office "slip-
and-falls."" 3 In the event of a motor vehicle accident, the govern-
ment driver routinely completes a contemporaneous accident report
on Standard Form 9 1,'" a supply of which usually is carried in the
vehicle glove compartment. Upon notification, a supervisor com-
pletes a Postal Service Form 1700, "Accident Investigation Work-
sheet," supplemented as appropriate by one or more witness
statements on a Standard Form 94. The supervisor then contacts
the local accident investigator stationed at each post office. The job
of that officer is to conduct a full-scale investigation, which includes
securing a driver's statement, photographs and diagrams, a first-
hand view of the wreckage or the scene, police reports, witness
statements, and an account by the victim. This information is then
forwarded for review and storage to one of the 230 Management
Sectional Centers into which the nation's post offices are grouped.
If the incident eventually gives rise to a claim, this near-contempo-
raneous record of the event will begin the basic investigative file." 5
When a claim is filed, the Management Sectional Center com-
pletes a brief Postal Service Form 2198, "Accident Report: Tort
Claim," which concludes how the claim should be handled, based
upon the completed accident investigation file as supplemented.
The agency by this time will have the benefit of the claimant's alle-
gations and proof of loss. Unless the Management Section Center is
able to settle the claim for $100 or less," 6 Form 2198 must be sent,
in the case of simple property damage claims of up to $1000, to the
Postal Data Center" 7 with geographic jurisdiction. These three
Centers, staffed by claims clerks with no formal legal education but
substantial experience in small claims adjustment," 8 are the pri-
mary apparatus within the Postal Service for evaluating small
state the matters the tort claims officers must investigate and the material the investigative
report must contain.
443. Newman Interview, supra note 148.
444. A Standard Form 92-A ("Report of Accident other than Motor Vehicle") should be
used on the appropriate occasion.
445. Id.; Levin Interview, supra note 140.
446. The Center may not deny any claim. Id.
447. The three Postal Data Centers are located in New York, Minneapolis and San Fran-
cisco. Although the centers handle approximately 75 to 80% of Postal Service claims, this
accounts for only a small percentage of Postal Service claim dollars. Id.
448. As a practical matter, few cases in this category involve difficult or subtle legal is-
sues. When legal advice is needed-for example, on the local contributory or comparative
negligence standard or on the collateral source rule-the Centers make a telephone inquiry to
Washington or, less often, to regional counsel. Id.
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claims. Though they lack investigative means, the Centers critically
examine the existing file and, utilizing telephone and mail contact
with claimants as well as referrals to the Law Department in Wash-
ington, determine the validity and worth of the claim. Any recon-
sideration of a denial will take place in Washington on the basis of
the existing record. 4 9
A claim alleging property damage in excess of $1000, or per-
sonal injury i. any amount, is directed not to a Postal Data Center
but to the Postal Inspection Service. The Service is organized in
fifteen to twenty regional offices and composed of trained nonlawyer
professional investigators.450 Again, the accident investigation file,
with Form 2198, constitutes the basis of the record. However, the
Postal Inspection Service, unlike the Data Centers, is equipped to
conduct further investigation if necessary. Although settlements of
up to $5000 may be entered into by the Postal Inspection Service,
claims in this range are commonly referred to headquarters for a
first determination, especially in a nonroutine case.451
Different kinds of claims require different investigatory
processes. The steps for investigating a motor vehicle accident are
not sufficient for the crash of a military aircraft; for the latter event,
there exist quite different investigative procedures.452 And neither
449. Id. Reconsideration of a denial by one of the Postal Data Centers is handled by a
paralegal officer in Washington with independent settlement authority up to $10,000. Action
over that amount, whether on reconsideration or as an original matter, requires a decision by
an agency attorney. The Claim Division's Supervising Attorney has maximum settlement
authority up to $25,000. By in-house custom, though not regulation, the Supervising Attor-
ney also observes a $25,000 ceiling in denying a claim. Thus, in practice, both settlements
and denials in excess of $25,000 require the attention of the Assistant General Counsel.
450. Because it is organized on a narrower regional basis than the Postal Data Centers,
the Postal Inspection Service is more inclined to direct legal questions to regional counsel
than to the Law Department in Washington. Id.
451. Id. Thus, the Law Department receives three categories of claims: reconsiderations,
proposed settlements above the authority of the Data Center or Inspection Service, and diffi-
cult cases even within that authority. It estimates the total as about 100 claims a month. For
this, the Claims Division has a staff of five lawyers and one paralegal spending only part of
their time on FTCA matters.
When a final settlement is reached at any level, it is recorded and processed for payment
on Postal Service Form 2106 rather than through usual GAO channels. See infra notes 671-
74 and accompanying text. This is because of a unique statutory provision which requires
that all Postal Service tort payments come out of revenues. Treasury, Post Office and Execu-
tive Office Appropriation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-57, tit. II, 79 Stat. 196, 200 (1965), 39
U.S.C. 409(e) (1982). For the legislative history and purpose of this statute, see H.R. REP.
No. 651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1895.
452. See Air Force Reg. 110-14, Investigations of Aircraft and Missile Accidents (July
18, 1977). The regulations describe the purpose of the investigation as "to preserve available
evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, administrative proceedings, and all
other purposes." They also prescribe specific guidelines for (1) the proper inquiries, (2) the
[Vol. 35:509
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
of these methods will meet the needs of a thorough investigation
into alleged medical malpractice.453 The investigatory principle is,
however, the same in all cases. Routine near-contemporaneous re-
ports constitute the starting point for investigating any tort claim
that may arise out of the incident. To be sure, those reports invaria-
bly require amplification after the claim is filed, if only on damages
or documentation of the alleged loss. Moreover, some tort claims
arise out of incidents whose claims potential was not anticipated.
These claims have no preexisting report file and therefore require
use to be made of the separate and prior confidential Safety Investigation Report (Air Force
Reg. No. 127-4), (3) the documentation needed, and (4) the precise sequence in which all
forms, documents and exhibits are to be arranged.
453. See, eg., Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force, Handbook
for Judge Advocates: Investigating Medical Malpractice Claims (Mar. 1983). The handbook
is a 126-page step-by-step guide with forms and appendices.
In the Veterans Administration, investigation of a medical malpractice claim by district
counsel entails at least the following steps: (1) contacting the hospital, (2) ordering a copy of
the patient's complete medical record, (3) conducting a physical examination, (4) interview-
ing the treating physician, (5) obtaining hospital and pharmaceutical records (and even
purchasing or maintenance records) where relevant, and (6) obtaining the opinion of an im-
partial medical expert on whether a deviation from accepted standards of practice occurred.
The investigation culminates in a standard two-part district counsel report-the first part
consisting of a statement of facts, the second, a brief on the applicable law-plus exhibits.
Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.07c. According to the regulation:
The investigation is not complete until the following are acquired or accomplished
and included in the report:
1. Understanding of the patient's medical history as understood by the physician.
2. Determination as to whether the medical history had any bearing on the course
of treatment and how much it was taken into consideration by the treatment team.
3. Understanding of the significance of the symptoms presented by the patient and
of the clinical, laboratory, and x-ray findings.
4. Understanding of the diagnosis and how it was reached.
5. Understanding of the treatment regimen or procedures, alternative methods of
treatment available, the reason for selection of the treatment followed, including
information as to the perils and hazards of alternatives. Where error in diagnosis is
claimed, facts must be elicited to show how the diagnosis was determined.
6. The reasons for untoward results from treatment must be determined. Did the
patient contribute to the poor result by failure to cooperate during treatment? Are
there sound medical reasons for the results other than those claimed by the patient?
7. Where untoward results from diagnostic or surgical procedures occurred, were
they of such a nature that they actually would not occur but for error?
8. If a serious drug reaction is claimed, the frequency or rarity of its occurrence
must be determined. Were other less-dangerous drugs indicated? Was the patient
warned of the risk? Did the patient history show prior reactions?
9. Relevant medical opinions must be documented by medical literature. Copies
of the relevant medical literature should be obtained and attached to the report.
10. If failure to obtain consent is the issue, the most recent Federal cases on the
subject as well as the relevant State cases must be studied before the investigation is
completed. The facts concerning the information furnished the patient concerning
the risks, consequences and complications must be developed, including the medical
reasons for withholding or minimizing such risks or consequences.
In summary, the attorney must know and report the medical facts, favorable or
unfavorable, to fulfill his or her responsibility.
Id. § 18.07c(3)(t).
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investigation from the top.454
The larger agencies, especially those whose activities cause the
bulk of federal tort claims, have their own trained staff investigators
and internal networks for securing the assistance of skilled profes-
sional advice when needed. 5  Agencies that are not as well-
equipped have express authority from the Attorney General to seek
assistance from other agencies, including the performance of physi-
cal examinations. 6  Whatever the situation, one of the claims of-
ficer's greatest challenges is deciding how to delegate investigative
responsibility in a given case and ensure that it is carried out in a
timely and professional manner. Even in agencies that concentrate
the adjudicative function in one attorney's office in the nation's cap-
454. Different investigative techniques are prescribed for different kinds of claims. Eg.,
Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386 §§ 4-19 to 4-32 (July 1, 1983) (describing steps and
documents required for claims such as crop loss, soil damage and sonic booms). Following a
list of items needed for all claims, an Army claims manual singles out for detailed and spe-
cialized treatment traffic cases, mail cases, explosion cases and overflight claims. Army Reg.
No. 27-20, supra note 6, § 2-8.
455. Medical malpractice is a good example. In the Veterans Administration, upon en-
countering disagreement on the applicable standard of medical care or on whether the injury
claimed resulted from substandard medical care, the district counsel is directed to request an
opinion from the VA Medical District Director with geographic jurisdiction (except when the
Director is found in the facility where the incident occurred). The Medical District Director
in turn is charged with obtaining reviews from all relevant medical specialists within or with-
out the VA. If medical issues remain outstanding, this file is forwarded to the Office of Gen-
eral Counsel for referral to the VA's Special Assistant for Professional Services. Vet. Admin.
Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, at 18.07c(3)(e).
The Air Force has a somewhat different system for medical malpractice claims. At each
Air Force Medical Center, a Judge Advocate is assigned to the position of Medical Legal
Officer or Law Consultant. The Medical Legal Officer provides medical-legal advice to any
Air Force claims officer investigating an actual or potential malpractice claim at bases within
the jurisdiction, and is available for consultation at any stage. When the investigative file is
complete, the claims officer routinely sends it to the Medical Legal Officer with a cover letter
containing a summary of the facts and legal issues involved. The latter in turn refers the file
to the Medical Center's professional staff for expert review and an opinion on the adequacy of
treatment. Upon this basis, the Medical Legal Officer prepares a nonbinding but persuasive
medical-legal opinion with recommendations for the claims officer. Office of the Judge Advo-
cate General, U.S. Air Force, Handbook for Judge Advocates: Investigating Medical Mal-
practice Claims, supra note 453, at § 2.
Evidently the Army follows a similar routine. However, the practice at the Army Gen-
eral Claims Division at Fort Meade is never to select a military or other government doctor
for the examination of a claimant or for the review of a medical file. See Rouse Interview,
supra note 141.
456. 28 C.F.R. § 14.8 (1984). Technically, an agency before which a claim is pending
also enjoys statutory authority to apply to a federal district court for a subpoena ordering
witnesses to appear for deposition or respond to interrogatories on the subject of the claim. 5
U.S.C. § 304 (1982). The agency is also entitled to the services of a Justice Department
attorney, not only in conducting the examination of a witness but also in investigating the
underlying claim. 28 U.S.C. § 514 (1982). However, this privilege is seldom exercised. 2 L.
JAYSON, supra note 84, at 17-73 (1984).
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ital-indeed especially in those agencies-the primary investigative
authority normally has to be lodged elsewhere.457 In other agen-
cies, however, the vital task of coordination itself is dispersed.
The Agriculture Department is illustrative. A claim is usually
filed with the local office of the relevant component agency, nor-
mnally one of the Department's multitude of bureaus. It is then sent
to the designated "tort liaison officer" of the component agency,
who in all but two instances sits in Washington, unless that agency
has chosen to establish liaison facilities at the state or regional level.
The tort liaison officer is seldom a lawyer and often has other pri-
mary staff responsibilities. He or she orchestrates the investigation
from start to finish, though much of that investigation takes place at
the distant program office where the claim was originally filed. Au-
thority for the final investigative report and recommendation may
not be clearly assigned;458 it may rest with the tort liaison officer,
the local program investigator, or someone at the state or regional
level. When the report is complete, the matter is referred to agency
attorneys for disposition: to the General Counsel's Office for claims
over $60,000, and to regional counsel for all others. If the attorneys
determine that the investigation is incomplete, instructions filter
back down the investigative channels.
459
The next responsibility of the officer handling the claim is to
request detailed information from the claimant to the extent
needed. In every case, the officer will want to know the circum-
stances surrounding the incident if they have not satisfactorily
457. In the State Department, for example, basic factual investigations may be carried
out in the relevant bureau or other functional unit within the Department's regional office.
Huang Interview, supra note 22.
458. Each agency is generally directed to produce "a narrative report" for agency counsel
containing:
1. A background description of the program involved, referencing statutory au-
thority and applicable regulations,
2. A complete description of the events in question including references to docu-
ments included and a response to every allegation made in the claim,
3. Agency analysis of who was at fault for losses or damages alleged in the claim,
referencing the opinion of technical experts, either non-involved agency personnel
or outside consultants, where necessary,
4. Any policy reasons arguing for or against settlement,
5. An analysis of damages claimed by claimants unless waived by [agency coun-
sel], and
6. Any possible USDA claims against claimant whether or not they arose out of
this incident.
Office of General Counsel, Memorandum to Heads of Department Agencies 3 (Oct. 5, 1981).
459. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23. The particular problems of the Agriculture De-
partment in coordinating the investigation and preparation of claims for adjudication are
specifically addressed in the Office of General Counsel. Memorandum to Heads of Depart-
ment Agencies, supra note 458. Id.
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emerged from a prior investigative report, and to obtain full docu-
mentation of the alleged loss. Early access to such information may
shed light on determinative threshold questions, such as whether
the alleged tortfeasor was acting within the scope of government
employment at the time of the incident, whether his or her actions
proximately caused the injuries claimed, and whether the claim is
timely. A clearly negative conclusion on any one of these will obvi-
ate further investigation, especially on the matter of damages. In
cases less easily disposed of, the information gathered may reveal
the identity of witnesses and open up avenues of factual and legal
inquiry.
E. Patterns of Correspondence
The extent and character of correspondence between the claims
officer and the claimant is primarily a matter of style. An initial
request for documentation may be followed by repeated demands
for outstanding information as well as new requests as other issues
or doubts arise. No generalization about the number or rhythm of
these exchanges is possible. The two principal modes of communi-
cation are telephone and personal letter, used in different propor-
tions according to taste. Each claims officer has a preferred form
letter for recurring kinds of correspondence, often inspired by a
model found in the attorneys' manuals of high claims volume agen-
cies.4 6 ° One agency, more particularly one of the eight regional in-
stallations in NASA's decentralized claims operations, has devised
a standardized set of nonletter forms to elicit information from
claimants beyond that specifically requested in Standard Form
95.461 The set includes 432 standard interrogatories covering virtu-
ally every issue in any conceivable kind of claim, with particular
460. E.g., Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, § 18 (Aug. 1, 1981).
461. 4 NASA-AMEs UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR ASTROLAW RESEARCH, FEDERAL
MANAGEMENT LAW PRACTICE MANUAL 1 (Aug. 1, 1982). The installation, NASA-Ames
Research Center, does not have a volume of tort claims that itself would warrant the obvious
effort expended in compiling this careful and impressive set of forms. Claims for fiscal years
1980 through 1983 totalled fifteen. See Wieland Letter, supra note 144. The collection re-
sulted from a collaborative effort between the Ames Research Center and the Hastings Col-
lege of Law.
The manual containing the sample interrogatories also contains a useful step-by-step pro-
cedural checklist, with specific time limit indications, for processing claims under the FTCA
and the NASA meritorious claims statute. Other items include a skeletal Small Claims Set-
tlement Form for settlements not in excess of $5000, which obviates the need for a narrative
report with formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. There are also standard letters for
a variety of purposes including reminders to claimants to supply outstanding information.
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emphasis on the substantiation of damages.4 62
Closely related to the written character of the claims process is
the physical separation of the parties. Among the criticisms lodged
against the 1966 FTCA amendments was the alleged geographic
distancing of claimants and their attorneys from those government
officers having settlement authority.463 Under the amendments, the
"head of each Federal agency or his designee," usually a Washing-
ton-based claims attorney, replaced the local United States Attor-
ney as the government's negotiating representative. At the same
time, many claims lack sufficient value to justify the long-distance
travel needed to bring claimants face to face with agency represent-
atives. On the other hand, a recent trend toward decentralization in
agency claims management may have been meant precisely to
bridge this gap.4" Claims officers and claimants alike take moder-
ate advantage of the greater opportunities for direct contact that
local and regional negotiations provide.465
Of course, Washington-based claims officers may travel to meet
with claimants if they desire. Some almost never do;466 a few find it
productive enough to do so regularly;467 most, however, choose to
462. Included are interrogatories addressed to the employer of the alleged tortfeasor.
Though set in classic sworn statement format, the model interrogatories expressly state at the
outset that the questions "are not to be construed as those filed with an Adverse Party" and
"need not be answered under oath." However, they specifically purport to be continuations
of Standard Form 95 which states civil and criminal penalties for presenting fraudulent
claims and for making false statements.
463. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. For contemporaneous criticism of the
amendments, see I. GOTrLIEB, supra note 123, at 26-33; Corboy, supra note 158; Jayson,
supra note 111, at 19.
The distance factor was not the major criticism. Critics worried that claimants would be
tempted, to their detriment, to negotiate without the benefit of counsel in a deceptively
nonadversarial setting. Corboy, supra note 158, at 71. These critics also rightly predicted
that the agencies would call upon claimants to divulge all the particulars of their claims
without sharing comparable wisdom about the government's own case. Id. at 78. Above all,
they voiced misgivings about lodging the government's settlement authority in the agency
alleged to be responsible for the injury.
464. Local claims handling also brings agency adjudicators more closely in touch both
with the factual circumstances of a case and the applicable substantive law. On the other
hand, it may result in less skill and professionalism in the government's negotiation and possi-
bly a reduced settlement rate. See supra note 147, and Feeley Interview cited therein.
Veterans Administration attorneys strongly emphasize the direct contact factor as a con-
sideration in that agency's somewhat decentralized practice. Kane, Schmetterring and Brad-
shaw Interviews, supra note 149. See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text.
465. Feeley Interview, supra note 147; Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
466. An example is the Agriculture Department's supervising attorney for tort claims.
Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
467. The Chief of the Army's General Claims Division exemplifies this approach. Rouse
Interview, supra note 141.
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travel only when the size of a claim, the prospect of settlement, and
the utility of a firsthand look clearly justify the strain on agency
resources.468 Claimants likewise have the option of going to Wash-
ington or having their lawyer do so, or of retaining Washington
counsel. Neither of these, however, is the rule.469 In sum, the vast
majority of claims continue to be handled through written corre-
spondence and telephone conversations. Agency claims attorneys
believe that claimants neither feel nor are prejudiced by this, and
report virtually no complaints. Certainly, no published critique of
FTCA claim practices emphasizes the issue.47° While the absence
of an organized FTCA plaintiffs' bar makes it difficult to test this
impression, the loss of local United States Attorneys as negotiating
partners is probably offset by the advantages to claimants of dealing
with government officers who are relatively free of an adversarial
mentality.
F. The Investigatory Model
As the account to this point suggests, tort claims are presented
and investigated in the federal agencies according to an investiga-
tory model that is nonetheless marked by a good deal of give and
take. The informality of agency claims adjudication has rarely been
challenged either as a matter of law or policy. This, like much else
concerning tort claims handling by the agencies, may be explained
by the prospect of a judicial remedy under the FTCA. Thus, while
the administrative process can only be described as a hearing in the
loosest sense of the term, and while the decisionmaker is not en-
tirely impartial, claimants may after six months move out of admin-
istrative channels and into a neutral judicial forum where they will
not be prejudiced by what has previously occurred.471 A lawsuit
under the FTCA proceeds on the basis of a trial de novo and full
application of the Federal Rules. There is also no presumption in
favor of the correctness of the prior agency determination.472
The implicit invitation to proceed without counsel is an impor-
tant aspect of the procedural informality at the agency level. Critics
of the 1966 amendments saw this as a trap for the unwary, imagin-
468. Levin Interview, supra note 140.
469. Id.
470. See 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, at 17-20.
471. In most cases, however, claimants will already have presented much of their evi-
dence to the agency. In addition, the sum stated in the administrative claim will be a pre-
sumptive ceiling on the damages recoverable in court. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1982).
472. Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Administrative Claims, 20 BAYLOR L. REV.
336, 342 (1968).
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ing a variety of risks, from a claimant's ill-advised statements
against interest to acceptance of a patently inadequate sum in settle-
ment of a valid claim.473 While these fears are not groundless, the
claimant's temptation to proceed without counsel is alleviated by
the prevalence of contingent fee representation474 and statutory ceil-
ings on attorneys' fees.475 In addition, simply having the option of
proceeding unrepresented is seen as a distinct advantage by most
claimants.
If the combination of administrative and judicial remedies under
the FTCA meets the requirements both of due process and public
policy, the meritorious claims statutes present a different situation.
Since Congress expressly created an administrative remedy, it can
be argued that the process governing that remedy must not be pro-
cedurally arbitrary or unfair. Yet, agencies with meritorious claims
authority almost invariably conduct themselves along the same in-
vestigatorial lines as agencies do under the FTCA,4 76 and their deci-
sions are not apparently subject to review.
Gerritson v. Vance477 is a rare challenge to the fairness of the
investigatory model in the tort claims context. In addition to dis-
puting the merits of the State Department's denial of her claim for
personal injury arising abroad, the plaintiff contended that the
agency's manner of handling such claims offended fundamental no-
tions of due process. The challenge rested on allegations that the
State Department failed to afford her an oral hearing and allowed
473. Jayson, supra note 111, at 38.
474. On the prevalence of contingent fees, see Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
475. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
476. Interview with S. Neil Hosenball, General Counsel, NASA in Washington D.C.
(June 29, 1983); Purdon Interview, supra note 236; Kelley Interview, supra note 24. Few of
the ancillary or meritorious claim statutes (see supra notes 20A, 20B) identify the kind of
administrative procedure to be followed. In fact, the agencies generally have no reason to
suppose that a written investigatory procedure would meet with congressional disfavor. One
possible exception is the recent Panama Canal Act of 1979, 22 U.S.C. § 3771-78 (1982), 93
Stat. 484-87 (1979). This Act contemplates actual hearings. A Board of Local Inspectors
conducts mandatory investigations of any incident giving rise to a vessel claim prior to a
vessel's departure from the canal. Id. §§ 3777-78. The Board is also empowered to summon
witnesses, administer oaths and require the production of documents. Id. § 3778(b).
Confusion is apt to arise under the Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1982), which
provides for the settlement of claims brought by residents of foreign countries for losses re-
sulting from the acts of American military service personnel abroad. The Act and the service
regulations provide for determinations to be made by Foreign Claims Commissions located at
military bases abroad. In every foreign country where the United States has a military pres-
ence, each of the military services has in fact established commissions composed of Judge
Advocates stationed at bases in that country. However, these commissions proceed in an
entirely investigatory manner, without hearings as such. Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
477. 488 F. Supp. 267 (D. Mass. 1980).
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an impermissible fusion of the investigative and adjudicatory func-
tions. Without addressing the threshold question of whether a stat-
ute such as the State Department's implicates a protected liberty or
property interest, the court found that due process simply does not
require an oral hearing in every sort of agency determination.478 It
concluded that the agency had afforded the claimant all the process
that was due when it invited the claimant to submit memoranda of
law, statements and affidavits of witnesses, medical reports and
bills, and other proofs of loss for agency consideration, and when it
gave the claimant an opportunity to respond to its initial denial of
her claim by a petition for reconsideration.479 As for plaintiff's
challenge to the fusion of investigative and adjudicatory functions
in the same office, the court had ample authority for the proposition
that an adjudicatory procedure is not unfair simply because the per-
son who gathers the evidence also rules upon it.480 Conceivably, a
court might insist on a higher procedural standard when faced with
a true statutory entitlement; 48 ' but meritorious claims statutes are
usually viewed as giving agencies very wide discretion and enabling
them to act as if out of grace.4 82
Of course, an investigatory model may pass constitutional mus-
ter without necessarily embodying sound procedural policy. How-
ever, even from a policy perspective, meritorious claims statutes are
very poor candidates for procedural formalities. Aside from the
fact that formal hearings simply are not the exclusive avenue to
truth, meritorious claims statutes require neither proof of fault nor
478. Id. at 269, relying on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970). Cf United
Fruit Co. v. United States, 33 F.2d 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1929) (in processing claims an agency
may proceed in the manner it deems most appropriate).
479. Gerritson, 488 F. Supp. at 270. The opinion reflects the analytic framework set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976); it underscores the substantial adminis-
trative burden oral hearings would place on the agency, especially if held abroad, and ex-
presses judicial skepticism that such hearings would appreciably improve the accuracy of the
determinations.
480. Gerritson, 488 F. Supp. at 269, citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-54 (1975);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
481. See Davis v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 1086, 1091-92 (D. Kan. 1976) (Federal
Prison Industries Act entitles federal prison inmates to compensation for work-related inju-
ries and triggers a due process right to an evidentiary hearing); Saladino v. Federal Prison
Indus., 404 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (D. Conn. 1975).
482. The Comptroller General recently ruled that even the Military Personnel and Civil-
ian Employees' Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3721 (1983), a logical candidate for higher proce-
dural standards, does not rise to the level of a statutory entitlement. 62 Comp. Gen. 641
(1983). The Comptroller General acknowledged that the agencies must exercise their discre-
tion either by the issuance of regulations or by case-by-case adjudication. In reaching that
conclusion, however, he also emphasized that the statutory language "may" implies discre-
tion and therefore "does not create a legal entitlement." Id. at 643.
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the application of well-defined statutory or regulatory standards. In
short, they do not demand what evidentiary or adversarial hearings
best offer.
Tort claims by contrast present a much stronger case for the use
of quasi-judicial procedures, but as long as the FTCA continues to
afford claimants relatively prompt access to the courts on a de novo
basis, the administrative phase of the process is properly kept sim-
ple. Moreover, compensation of government tort victims, however
important a purpose, is not the principal mission of the agencies.4 83
It is even secondary for most agency legal departments, since, apart
from the small if growing category of regulatory torts, tort claims
remain an essentially random and unintended byproduct of agency
operations. Their own claim on agency resources must be kept
within bounds.
G. Claimant Access to Information
An investigatory model does not necessarily imply secrecy in the
gathering of information. Although denied an opportunity to con-
front witnesses or conduct cross-examination or oral argument,
claimants presumably would find it useful to know what the govern-
ment knows on the subject of their claims. However, demands for
access to information in agency claim files are reportedly infre-
quent.484 Disclosure by the government thus remains an issue with
tremendous potential but little actual friction in the administrative
tort claims process.
A probable explanation is that, unlike many other areas of ad-
ministrative law, tort claims generally do not position the agencies
against well-organized regulated interests accustomed to con-
fronting the government. More often than not, tort claimants' con-
tacts with the government are those of an average member of the
public--episodic and nonregulatory. Claimants also are likely to be
483. This is not to say that the compensation of government tort victims could not be
made the principal mission of a specialized agency, much as workmen's compensation for
federal employees has been made the principal mission of the Labor Department's Office of
Worker's Compensation Programs. Some state agencies follow this model when handling
government tort claims. At the federal level, however, that would require a fundamental
redesign of the existing system.
484. See, ag., Newman Interview, supra note 148; Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
Reportedly, private parties are more likely to seek access to general agency files for the pur-
pose of determining whether they have a tort claim that is worth bringing than for the pur-
pose of documenting a tort claim already filed. In that event, the Freedom of Information
Act will be the usual vehicle and agency attorneys assigned to FOIA rather than FTCA
matters-assuming they are not one and the same-will receive and process the request.
Nesvet Interview, supra note 23; Kelley Interview, supra note 24.
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unrepresented. Finally, unlike the regulatory process which tends
to postpone any early or searching judicial review, the tort claim
process can move swiftly into a full judicial phase, with all the op-
portunities for information disclosure which that implies. Still,
even if claimants do not ordinarily make informational demands on
the agencies, claims attorneys can usefully think about how open
the process generally ought to be and about the proper framework
for responding to a demand if and when one should arise.
1. Prevailing Attitudes to Claimant Access
No well-defined policy on information disclosure appears to ex-
ist within individual agencies, much less across agency lines. 85
This absence of policy is a good reflection of the basically unstruc-
tured nature of the administrative as compared to the judicial phase
of the tort claim process. It is also in striking contrast to the Justice
Department's position that compliance by claimants with an
agency's demands for information is the precondition of a valid
claim.4 86 In any event, claimant access to information, like much
else in the process, has become a matter of individual style among
claims officers.
There is a surprisingly broad range of attitudes on the question
of whether and to what extent to make agency-held information
available to a claimant. A number of claims attorneys disclose no
information at their disposal, except as a tactical measure calculated
to elicit further information from claimants or to persuade claim-
ants to lower their demands.487 At the other extreme, at least one
attorney conducts business on an open file basis and encourages
claimants to do so too. He does not routinely transmit available
information to a claimant without request, but does issue a standing
invitation to inspect the claim file as it develops.488 Most common
485. There is one exception. The Justice Department regulations provide that in personal
injury cases claimants may be required to submit to a physical examination by an agency
physician. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(b)(1) (1984). If claimants agree to provide their own physician's
report to the agency, as is almost invariably the case, they are then entitled to the agency
physician's report. Obviously, this right of access is only a byproduct of a claimant's duty of
disclosure to the agency.
486. See supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
487. See, e.g., Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
488. Rouse Interview, supra note 141. However, it appears that no agency allows claim-
ants to take the formal deposition of agency personnel prior to litigation. E.g., Vet. Admin.
Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.04c(3) ("Claimant's attorney is not to be permitted to
interiew VA physicians before or during the administrative phase of a tort claim. After suit is
filed, VA physicians are not to discuss a case against the Government except under the super-
vision and guidance of Department of Justice attorneys."). One experienced claims attorney
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is an intermediate approach according to which the claims attorney
volunteers little if anything specific, but discloses particular infor-
mation on request if no valid ground exists for withholding it.489 In
effect, claimants on request may have documentary material they
are entitled to have under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).4 9
0
2. A Freedom of Information Act Framework
Using the Freedom of Information Act as the standard for de-
termining the extent of claimant access to agency documents on a
pending claim is sensible, regardless of whether claimants expressly
invoke the FOIA when making their request. As a matter of law,
the FOIA is as available to the claimant in agency settlement pro-
ceedings as it is to anyone else.49 1 The very short time frame for
disclosure under the FOIA492 also makes it a practical vehicle for
use in a six-month settlement period. More important, use of FOIA
standards should afford claimants ample access to information
without causing the government substantial prejudice in subsequent
litigation, while simultaneously promoting the disposition of claims
would allow the practice as part of a much broader sharing of information between claimant
and agency. Letter from Joseph H. Rouse, Chief, General Claims Division, U.S. Army
Claims Service to George Bermann at 3-4 (undated).
489. Letter from Sarah Hertz, supra note 233 at 3; Newman Interview, supra note 148;
Feeley Interview, supra note 147. Thus claims files are generally not open. Eg., Air Force
Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386, § 12-17b ("claim [fliles . . . are the property of the Air
Force. Do not give them to the claimant or his agent for review or reproduction; portions of
files are releasable."). Cf. 32 C.F.R. § 842.6(b)(3) (1983) (Air Force) ("On request, the claim-
ant may be furnished information or evidence obtained during the course of a claims investi-
gation except when barred by law or regulation.").
490. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977). For an apparent endorsement of this standard, see 32 C.F.R.
§ 536.2 (1983) (Army).
Alternatively, disclosure may be viewed as subject to the standards applicable to civil
discovery. E.g., Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.04c(1) ("Where a claim
under the provisions of the [FTCA] has been filed or. . . can reasonably be anticipated, no
information, documents, reports, etc., will be released except [for]. . . release of information
which would be available under discovery proceedings, were the matter in litigation.").
The rationales for nondisclosure of specific information under the FOIA or the civil dis-
covery analogy include the attorney-client privilege, the work product privilege, and the
government's deliberative privilege, particularly where disclosure would reveal an analysis of
the claim's merit or recommendations to a superior officer.
491. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975); Hoover v. Depart-
ment of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1137 (5th Cir. 1980); Columbia Packing Co. v. Department
of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599,
602 (5th Cir. 1977); Brockway v. Department of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1192 n.7 (8th Cir.
1975).
492. Action on a FOIA request or appeal must be taken within ten or twenty working
days, respectively, of its receipt. Only under a narrow set of "unusual circumstances" is an
extension of up to ten days permitted. Id. § 522(a)(6)(A), (B).
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at the agency level. Claims may end up in litigation simply because
claimants feel they lack sufficient information to weigh intelligently
the strength of their case for settlement purposes prior to suit.
4 93
Claimants also may not be forthcoming in substantiating their
claims because they do not believe the government is willing to dis-
close information detrimental to its position.494 This too lessens the
chances of agency-level settlement. In sum, the prospect of fuller
disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than under
agency claims practice may lead claimants and the government
alike into otherwise avoidable litigation.
Central to understanding how the FOIA works in the tort
claims context is the statutory exclusion of "inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency." 495 Since Exemption Five, as it is known, has been con-
strued to "exempt those documents, and only those documents,
normally privileged in the civil discovery context, ' 4 9 6 its application
should in principle leave claimants in as good a position, as far as
access to information is concerned, as if they had invoked discovery
in litigation.4 9 7 It should also afford a claimant as much as one
might want or need to know in order to conduct intelligent settle-
ment negotiations with the government. At the same time, the
FOIA should not shortchange the government, for it shields from
mandatory disclosure virtually anything the government would be
privileged to withhold in litigation.
In fact, full disclosure under the FOIA is less generous to claim-
ants than discovery in litigation, for the FOIA neither compels
agencies to assemble information nor to prepare documents not al-
ready in existence.4 9 8 The unrecorded identity of witnesses, ac-
counts of an incident not reduced to writing, and other
493. Laughlin, Federal Tort Claims Act Amendments. A New Charter for Injured Citi-
zens, 2 TRIAL 18 (1966). Mr. Laughlin was Chief of the Torts Section of the Justice Depart-
ment at the time of the 1966 amendments and also their chief proponent.
494. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
495. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1977).
496. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 353 (1979); Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. at 149. Accord Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S.
168, 184 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450
F.2d 698, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
497. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86.
498. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 161-62; Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982); DiViaio v. Kelley, 571 F.2d 538, 542 (10th Cir. 1978).
See also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 186 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980).
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undocumented information all lie beyond its reach. Yet the claim-
ant will have disclosed precisely this kind of information to the
agency as part of the claims process. Standard Form 95 demands
much information not previously prepared or assembled, and claim-
ants cannot answer the charge of an incomplete claim by stating
that their files contain no documents on the missing item. This is
not meant to suggest that the FOIA is an inadequate tool for infor-
mation disclosure in the claims context; as a practical matter,
agency attorneys are unlikely to leave accident reports, witness
statements, and the like in unwritten form. Rather, it demonstrates
that a square application of the FOIA does not give tort claimants
an unfair advantage.
Both legal and policy considerations point decisively in favor of
using the FOIA as the minimum standard of disclosure in the tort
claims setting. Although the government might resist moving full-
scale disclosure of nonprivileged information into the administra-
tive phase of the FTCA, the FOIA hardly leaves the agencies any
other principled choice. Where a claimant, with or without specific
reference to the FOIA,499 seeks access to the claim file, or to other
information relating to a pending claim, agency claims attorneys
should look to the FOIA for guidance. They should disclose infor-
mation whenever the FOIA would mandate it, and they should con-
sider disclosure even when the FOIA would not, if it appears that
disclosure would advance the tort settlement process.-50 Unfortu-
nately, a few agency claims attorneys continue to regard the FOIA
as somehow alien to their own tort claim operations. 0 1
499. Agencies have no sound reason to insist that a claimant specifically invoke the FOIA
in support of an otherwise intelligible request for access to identifiable agency documents.
500. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(4) (1984). Some agency
guidelines expressly invite claims attorneys to divulge exempt portions of a claimant's file
with the consent of the General Counsel. Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386, § 12-
17b(3); Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.04c(l). The Army more emphat-
ically endorses limited voluntary disclosure.
Information within a category which is normally exempt from mandatory disclo-
sure may also be released to a claimant or his attorney by the authority having
jurisdiction over the request. . . if no ligitimate [sic] purpose exists for withholding
it from him. In determining whether such a legitimate purpose exists, the authority
should take into consideration whether the claimant or his attorney has released to
the Army similar documents in his possession or obtainable by him alone.
Army Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6, § 1-6b(2). A unique feature of Army Claims Service
disclosure policy, echoing its peculiar denial policy (supra notes 407-12 and accompanying
text), is the rule that only the Chief has authority to refuse a claimant's request for informa-
tion. Id.
501. Letter from Captain G. Lewis Michael III, supra note 427, at 2. For the view that
disclosure legislation is pertinent to agency policy on claimant access to information, see
ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(4) (1984).
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3. Understanding the FOIA in the Tort Claim Setting
To concede that the FOIA defines disclosure policy in the tort
claim context only begins the analysis. There remains the problem
of understanding how the relevant exemptions relate specifically to
the kinds of information routinely involved in tort claims against
the government. Unfortunately, even some claims attorneys who
acknowledge that the FOIA applies in principle to the tort claim
context have only a rudimentary and intuitive sense of what its ex-
emptions legitimately entitle them to withhold. The incidence of
claimant requests for access to claim files admittedly has not been
great. But there is every reason to believe that claimants are begin-
ning to press for access to agency-held information as never
before."' Since agency handling of tort claims is a process of con-
tinuous information exchange, agency attorneys should have at
least a basic familiarity with FOIA standards and the balance be-
tween legitimate private and governmental interests they are sup-
posed to reflect.
Given its supervisory authority over both FTCA and FOIA
practices, the Justice Department is uniquely situated to provide the
agencies with guidance on how the FOIA specifically relates to tort
claim inquiries. Its position cannot simply be that agency attorneys
should divulge as little as possible and, at all costs, avoid disclosures
that might tend to embarrass the Justice Department in eventual
litigation. The Justice Department instead should specifically in-
form the agencies how key exemptions, such as Exemption Five,
have been construed by the courts in cases involving tort or analo-
gous claims, at least with respect to recurring kinds of documents.
Its responsibilities are not only to safeguard the government's litiga-
tion interests, but also to guide the agencies themselves in properly
implementing the FOIA and the FTCA at the agency level. Inevi-
tably, the agencies themselves will have to handle the more subtle
business of deciding when more liberal disclosure than the FOIA
mandates might be productive of agency-level settlement.
An obviously important issue under Exemption Five is the gov-
ernment's qualified executive privilege to protect its deliberative
processes.c 3 Most courts have held that the exemption protects
"internal communications consisting of advice, recommendations,
502. Kane, Schmetterling and Bradshaw Interview, supra note 149.
503. Jupiter Painting Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 597 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (noting that a document must be deliberative as well as predecisional to be privi-
leged). See generally SHEPARD'S/MCGRAW HILL CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES, ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 226-27 (1982).
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opinions, and other material reflecting deliberative or policymaking
processes, but not purely factual or investigatory reports.""°  Many
courts take the view that this interpretation confines the exemption
to predecisional materials. 0 5 But case law suggests that the outer
bounds of the privilege are elusive. Courts are increasingly fond of
disparaging the distinction between factual and policy informa-
tion. 06 Occasionally, they shield from disclosure even purely fac-
tual memoranda when they conclude that not doing so would
distinctly impede the free flow of information essential to the delib-
erative process itself5107 There is at least agreement that the FOIA
requires agencies to divulge nonexempt portions of otherwise ex-
empt documents where such portions are reasonably severable,50 8
and claims attorneys cannot consider themselves exempt from con-
scientious and good faith efforts of this sort. This cursory account
504. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Accord Mink, 410 U.S. at 89
(1973); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972). Not all
predecisional materials are necessarily shielded from discovery. "Mo come within the privi-
lege and thus within Exemption Five, the document must be a direct part of the deliberative
process in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters."
Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
505. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1975). But cf. Vaughn v.
Rosen, 523 F.2d at 1143-44.
506. E.g., Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
507. Brockway v. Department of Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1194 (8th Cir. 1975):
[W]e do not mean to imply that we are rejecting the general fact-deliberation crite-
rion established in the decisions of other courts. Rather, we hold that on the nar-
row facts presented here, specifically involving statements by witnesses to Air Force
safety investigators upon assurances of confidentiality, common sense. . . indicates
disclosure of these statements would defeat rather than further the purposes of the
FOIA ....
Id. Accord Cooper v. Department of Navy, 558 F.2d 274, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1977) (safety and
accident prevention report containing information obtained on promise of confidentiality not
subject to mandatory disclosure; factual report made for possible legal or administrative ac-
tion presumptively subject to disclosure), modified on other grounds, 594 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.
1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department
of Army, 441 F. Supp. 1308, 1314 (D.D.C. 1977) (factual testimony held exempt from disclo-
sure because disclosure would hamper investigation); Rabbitt v. Department of Air Force,
401 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (while factual material ususally must be dis-
closed, sometimes factual material so relates to the deliberative processes that it should be
exempt from disclosure) and cases cited at n.35; cf. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (factual financial data exempt from disclosure
under financial information exemption where there is an overriding need for confidentiality).
508. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982); Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 346
(1979); Mink, 410 U.S. at 91; Mead Data Cent., Inc, 566 F.2d at 256 ("[F]actual material
must be disclosed but advisory material,. . . may be withheld."); Deering Milliken, Inc. v.
Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1138 (4th Cir. 1977). Disclosure of factual matter is exempted where
"inextricably intertwined" with protected material. Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 821, 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Kreindler v. Department of Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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of a single privilege incorporated in but one of the statutory exemp-
tions shows the value to claims attorneys in the different agencies of
having some benchmarks for compliance with the FOIA.50 9
A good illustration of the potential impact of the FOIA on the
tort claim process is the case of United States v. Weber Aircraft Cor-
poration51 While not arising under the FTCA, the case involved
access to precisely the kind of document that figures prominently in
that setting. The case arose from an accident allegedly caused by
the failure of certain military parachute equipment. An Air Force
captain sued the designer and manufacturer of the equipment for
personal injury damages. After the suit was filed, the defendants
requested copies of all Air Force investigative reports on the inci-
dent. The Air Force released the complete record of its collateral
investigation conducted to preserve evidence for use in any subse-
quent actions or proceedings, 11 as well as factual portions of a sec-
ond Mishap Report, a document produced solely for the purpose of
taking corrective action in the interest of accident prevention. It
withheld under Exemption Five the balance of the Mishap Report,
consisting mostly of a medical report and statements by the acci-
dent victim and a colleague. 12
The agency's action, though invalidated by the court of appeals
on the ground that the government's executive privilege does not
extend to purely factual material, was sustained by the Supreme
Court.5"' The Court held, contrary to the ruling below, that the
privileges in civil discovery incorporated by analogy in Exemption
Five are not limited to those expressly identified by Congress in the
legislative history of the Act. Specifically, the Court ruled that be-
cause statements made to air crash safety investigators upon express
promises of confidentiality have been held to be entirely privileged
in pretrial discovery,514 they also are within the scope of Exemption
Five. This privilege, however, is limited to statements made under a
promise of confidentiality. Though the distinction between factual
and deliberative material is no longer applicable to such state-
509. The need is probably even stronger with respect to the attorney work product privi-
lege likewise incorporated in Exemption Five. See infra notes 530, 540-41, and cases cited
therein. One court described application of that privilege in an FOIA context as "a task that
would challenge the fabled Procrustes." Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. Supp. 498, 505 (D.D.C. 1977).
510. 465 U.S. 792 (1984), rev'g 638 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
511. See supra note 452.
512. The medical report contained findings and recommendations of the "life sciences
member" of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.
513. 465 U.S. 792 (1984), rev'g 638 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
514. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
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ments, 5  it has not lost its more general significance among princi-
ples governing agency disclosure of information.
4. Some Preliminary Thoughts on Exemption Five
A detailed analysis of the application of Exemption Five or any
other exemption to the claims process is not appropriate here.
However, since claims attorneys may be apt to exaggerate the extent
to which the exemption cloaks the materials they gather in the
course of investigating a tort claim, a few preliminary observations
are in order. First, when applying executive privilege, the courts
tend to be influenced by their estimate of the extent to which a given
disclosure might adversely affect the government's competitive posi-
tion in an ongoing proceeding, particularly when that proceeding is
in the nature of a bargaining transaction.5 16 The best non-tort ex-
amples to arise in FOIA litigation are requests for information dur-
ing negotiations over the compulsory purchase of land, 17 or during
bargaining over a contract purchase price between the government
and the lessee of surplus government-owned property. 518  The
courts have stated that full government disclosure in such cases is at
variance with the competitive arm's length character of the underly-
ing transaction. 19 Many claims officers seem to view the tort claim
process just this way. 20
Claims officers and claimants doubtless engage in many situa-
tions that can only be described as bargaining, each starting from
exaggerated, if barely tenable, negotiation postures with the intent
of meeting on some middle ground. On the other hand, tort claims
of a routine character involve little if any real negotiation, especially
when the claimant is unrepresented. Put simply, not all tort claim-
ants are bargainers and not all tort settlements are the product of a
515. 465 U.S. at 800 n.17.
516. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 358 (1979); Hoover v. Depart-
ment of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir. 1980). The Hoover opinion rests both on the
executive privilege protecting an agency's decisionmaking process and on the qualified privi-
lege for the report of an expert witness. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (1972).
517. Hoover, 611 F.2d 1132.
518. Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Administrator, Gen. Serv. Admin., 444 F. Supp.
945 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
519. Both Hoover, 611 F.2d 1132, and Martin Marietta, 444 F. Supp. 945, involved FOIA
requests for disclosure of appraisal reports during pending negotiations. Disclosure was de-
nied in both cases. The courts distinguished cases in which appraisals were sought and ob-
tained after the transaction had been fully consummated. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v.
FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F.
Supp. 1176, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
520. See infra notes 587-91 and accompanying text.
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bargain. More importantly, a direct analogy between agency tort
claims adjudication and the rather stark bargaining processes that
characterize the government's commercial transactions5 2' simply
does violence to Congress' purpose in enacting and amending the
FTCA. Congress intended to afford adequate compensation for
valid tort claims, not to construct a bargaining or negotiating pro-
cess out of which a fair result might be assumed to emerge. As long
as the agency claims process retains its pervasive ambiguity, it prob-
ably will demonstrate strong elements, depending on the case, both
of an objective-entitlement and an adversarial-bargaining model.
The scope of executive privilege under Exemption Five is just one
area where this tension is apparent. Under these circumstances, the
exemption cannot be expected to apply with uniformity throughout
the agency claims process.
The second preliminary observation on Exemption Five in the
claims context relates to the absolute attorney-client privilege incor-
porated into that exemption. More than one claims officer has ex-
pressed the view that, as the agency's attorney, he or she is bound
not to disclose any confidential information. Other officers, without
articulating it so clearly, act on the same view. 522 They are correct
in supposing that agencies can constitute clients, and agency law-
yers their attorneys, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.52
3
But this does not mean that every communication between agency
and agency attorney is privileged. At least one court has recognized
that protecting every statement made by agency personnel to one of
the agency's attorneys in a government that is "top-heavy with law-
yers''24 would do considerable harm to the FOIA. Claims attor-
521. "There is little doubt that the appraiser's opinion on value would most likely set the
ceiling price offered by a purchaser, thereby effectively preventing the agency from obtaining
through arms-length bargaining a more favorable price-one presumably obtainable by a pri-
vate seller negotiating competitively with a prospective purchaser." Martin Marietta, 444 F.
Supp. at 950. Accord Government Land Bank v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 671 F.2d 663, 665 (1st
Cir. 1982) ("Exemption 5 protects the government when it enters the marketplace as an
ordinary commercial buyer or seller . . . . [The] FOIA should not be used to allow the
government's customers to pick the taxpayer's pockets.").
The Supreme Court in Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 443 U.S. at 359-60, stressed the partic-
ular emphasis in the legislative history of Exemption Five on "confidential commercial infor-
mation," and concluded that the exemption "incorporates a qualified privilege for
confidential commercial information . . . to the extent that this information is generated by
the Government itself in the process leading up to awarding a contract."
522. See, e.g., Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
523. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Mead Data Cent., Inc., 566 F.2d at 252-53; Thil Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch.,
57 F.R.D. 133, 138 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
524. Jupiter Painting Contracting Co., Inc. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 598 (E.D.
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neys need to be reminded that the attorney-client privilege extends
only to those disclosures necessary for the client to obtain informed
legal advice or legal services, and even then only to disclosures that
but for the privilege would not otherwise be made. 2 ' Significantly,
the information that a tort claimant is most likely to seek at the
agency level has been assembled by an agency lawyer not primarily
to render legal services or advice, but to discharge the obligation to
investigate properly filed administrative tort claims. Moreover, the
information, as such, consists of disclosures that would otherwise be
made. In short, interposing the attorney-client privilege as a gen-
eral obstacle to disclosure in this particular setting is unwarranted.
Similarly, agency attorneys should not routinely assume that the
factual information they assemble in considering an administrative
tort claim falls within the privilege for facts known and opinions
held by experts not expected to testify which have been acquired or
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial.526 Arguably,
every administrative claim fied under the FTCA is in anticipation
of litigation, especially since the agencies may only settle claims
which fall within the FTCA's waiver of immunity to suit 27 and a
prior claim is now a prerequisite to suit. Even though this view has
a wide following among both agency and Torts Branch attorneys,528
Pa. 1980) (deliberately construing the privilege narrowly in the governmental context); cf
Kent Corp., 530 F.2d at 623 (not everything the government's "uncountable and ever-growing
number of attorneys" put on paper can possibly constitute work product). Clearly, in order
to assert the privilege successfully, an agency lawyer must have acted at the time in the
capacity of provider of legal advice, rather than administrator or policymaker. Coastal Corp.
v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 521 (D. Del. 1980); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp.
913, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
525. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). The privilege is not limited to communi-
cations made in the context of litigation or even a specific dispute, but must relate to a situa-
tion where an attorney's counsel is sought on a legal matter. Coastal States Gas Corp., 617
F.2d at 862. The court in Coastal States found the privilege did not extend to the communi-
cation of "neutral, objective analyses of agency regulations." Id. at 863.
526. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (1972). Air Force disclosure regulations expressly ex-
empt such material. Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386, § 12-17b(3) ("While portions
of the claim files are releasable, the following are exempt . . . (b) Lawyer's notes of inter-
views, (c) Expert's statements obtained in the investigation.").
527. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. The FTCA essentially represents a
waiver of sovereign immunity to suit, and the agencies' administrative settlement authority
under it remains acutely dependant upon the government's exposure to liability in litigation.
28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. 1983). See Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 16 (waiver of immunity rather
than opportunity for administrative settlement is "the heart of the bill"). By coupling the
language of settlement to the language of liability, the statute strongly suggests that the only
claims amenable to administrative settlement are those to which the United States surren-
dered its sovereign immunity to suit. See also Willard Letter, supra note 180.
528. See, eg., Kelley Interview, supra note 24; Axelrad Interview, supra note 144; Letter
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it is of questionable validity. The handling of tort claims has be-
come a conventional responsibility of agency counsel and a highly
professionalized and standardized operation. 29 Though it has not
evolved into a distinct and alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism, it does keep all but a small percentage of administrative
claims out of litigation. Thus, while the argument for treating an
agency's investigation of tort claims as not done in anticipation of
litigation is not as strong as the argument for so treating its investi-
gation of claims to a statutory entitlement, it still has considerable
merit. The expert witness privilege therefore provides agency
claims attorneys no more valid a refuge from the duty of factual
disclosure under the FOIA than does the attorney-client privilege.
The qualified attorney work product privilege dominates think-
ing about the limits of mandatory disclosure to tort claimants. 30
This privilege likewise has contributed to a casual assumption that
the contents of files on pending tort claims are off limits to claim-
ants. Some claims officers believe that a claim file may be withheld
in its entirety under the work product privilege on the theory that
every agency tort claim proceeding represents potential if not immi-
nent litigation, that the fie would not be prepared if not for that
prospect, and that disclosure would expose the government's case in
any litigation that might occur.5 31 This sweeping resort to the work
from Captain G. Lewis Michael III, supra note 427 at p.2. One attorney put it this way:
"The only time factual material in a tort claim file is not gathered in anticipation of litigation
is when a statute or regulation specifically requires that an investigation and report be made
irrespective of whether a tort claim is filed." Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
529. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
530. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). In order to obtain through discovery material properly
characterized as attorney work product, the requester must show substantial need for the
material in preparing his or her case and an inability, without undue hardship, to obtain the
substantial equivalent by other means. The courts are divided over whether such work prod-
uct as constitutes "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attor-
ney" is absolutely or qualifiedly privileged. SHEPARD'S/MCGRAW HILL CIVIL ACTIONS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, supra note
503, at 248-49, and cases cited therein. On the work product privilege generally, see Upjohn
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981) (strong showing of necessity and unavailability
by other means required to compel discovery of work product based on oral statements);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 159-60 (1975) (NLRB Advice and Appeals
memoranda fall within Exemption Five's protection of attorney work product); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-14 (1947) (discussing general policy against invading attorney's
course of preparation); Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 774-76 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (work product privilege applies only to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation);
Note, Discovery of Government Attorney Work Product under the FOIA, 71 Ky. L.J. 919, 926-
31 (1983).
531. Kelley Interview, supra note 24; Letter from Captain G. Lewis Michael III, supra
note 427. Under this view, no distinction is drawn between routine accident investigations
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product concept is not justified.532
It is doubtful that the information assembled by an agency at-
torney in consideration of a claim filed under the FTCA fairly can
be characterized as assembled in anticipation of litigation, as the
work product privilege would require.5 33  While it is true that
agency tort claims generally meet the test of an "articulable claim
likely to lead to litigation, '5 34 it is a gross exaggeration to view
agency handling of tort claims as a simple prelitigation exercise.535
Agency claims officers and claimants alike look upon agency-level
consideration of tort claims as a genuine administrative task man-
dated by Congress and characterized by an increasingly well-de-
that an agency is bound to perform, whether or not claims are ever filed, and investigations
performed only for the purpose of considering actual claims.
Several agency regulations essentially codify this viewpoint. E.g., Vet. Admin. Reg. No.
M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.04(c)(2) ("It is not contemplated that any investigative reports,
reports of untoward incidents, or investigative reports prepared by or for [counsel] will be
released since these are considered work products not subject to disclosure. While they may
be prepared for various reasons and uses, they are considered as an essential element of the
defense of a malpractice claim or suit."). Other agency regulations prefer to leave the notion
of what is prepared in anticipation of litigation open-ended. E.g., Air Force Reg. No. 112-1,
supra note 386, § 12-17b(3) ("[Tihe following are exempt. . .(a) Legal memoranda contain-
ing opinions, conclusions, and recommendations on disposition of the claim; (b) Lawyer's
notes of interviews; (c) Expert's statements obtained in the investigation; (d) Other statements
or materials assembled in contemplation of litigation.").
Agencies have specifically advised claims attorneys to gather witness statements and other
factual material into an attorney memorandum which can be withheld en bloc as attorney
work product. The Air Force manual for judge advocates investigating medical malpractice
claims, for example, suggests use of the following somewhat self-serving introductory legend:
This memorandum has been prepared by an Air Force Judge Advocate while inves-
tigating a claim or potential claim for damages against the United States. The attor-
ney's impressions and observations summarized herein were obtained in
anticipation of future litigation involving the same incident, and this memorandum
would not have been prepared in the normal course of Air Force business activities
but for the possibility that litigation might ensue.
Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force, Handbook for Judge Advo-
cates: Investigating Medical Malpractice Claims, supra note 453, § 3.41.
532. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(4) (1984).
533. CoastalStates Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 864-65; Jordan, 591 F.2d at 775; Coastal Corp.,
86 F.R.D. at 522; Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150-51 (D. Del. 1977).
According to the court in Coastal States, "to argue that every audit is potentially the subject
of litigation is to go too far." 617 F.2d at 864.
534. Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 865. See also Kent Corp., 530 F.2d at 623
(NLRB regional office reports on possible unfair labor practices constitute work product,
even though drawn up before knowing whether charges have substance, because office's basic
function is to litigate and it investigates on the assumption that any charge might ripen into
litigation). But cf Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1146 (Vance, J. dissenting) (appraisal report in com-
pulsory purchase of property not prepared in anticipation of litigation but for ordinary busi-
ness transaction).
535. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. But see Willard Letter, supra note 180
(describing the agency-level claims process as "an annex of and preliminary to litigation.").
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fined administrative procedure separate from its litigation
* 536origins.
While no case squarely addresses the application of the work
product privilege to tort claims investigations, analogous cases sup-
port the conclusion that the privilege is so limited. For example,
the plaintiff in a tax refund suit sought access to relevant documents
that had been prepared by IRS officials at various points in the ad-
ministrative settlement procedure established for such claims. In
resisting discovery, the government emphasized that although there
are several stages in the administrative process at which refund
claims may be settled, a certain number of disputes inevitably go to
court. The possibility of litigation over any one tax refund claim,
the government argued, means that documents prepared by the IRS
in the course of handling all such claims are documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation. While conceding that the documents in
question had references to mental impressions and legal theories of
the government's case, the court rejected the notion that they had
been prepared in anticipation of litigation.137 The court's findings
concerning the IRS documents are equally applicable to reports as-
sembled by agency tort claims attorneys under the FTCA. They are
routinely prepared for every claim presented to the agency well
before any lawsuit is filed; they are not prepared by or at the direc-
tion of the attorney who will actually try the case should it go to
trial; they purport to be factual and objective in content; they do not
necessarily define the legal strategy of the government in eventual
litigation; and they do not result exclusively from the government's
own investigative efforts, but at least in part from material provided
by the claimant.5 38 The court stated:
Generally, it is this court's belief that IRS appellate conferee re-
ports and IRS field agent reports are not prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial. Presumably they are prepared in the
assessment and review process and, if they be held to be in antici-
pation of litigation, it is hard to see what would not be. Litiga-
tion cannot be anticipated in every such case when relatively few
result in litigation. 539
536. The drafters of the Federal Rules did not anticipate that work product would cover
materials "assembled in the ordinary course of business or pursuant to public requirements
unrelated to litigation or for other nonlitigation purposes." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advi-
sory committee note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1969).
537. Abel Inv. Co. v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 485 (D. Neb. 1971).
538. Id. at 489.
539. Id., quoting Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317, 320-21 (S.D. Ill. 1971) (em-
phasis added) (IRS appellate conferee reports and field agent reports not prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation merely because they contain mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
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Finally, even if one were to take the view that tort claims are
investigated at the agency level in anticipation of litigation, a nar-
row definition of work product still would allow the agencies to ac-
commodate most requests for information. Rule 26(b), to which
the courts look in applying Exemption Five, strongly suggests that
the privilege protects the confidentiality of "the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of [the] attorney." 5" More
specifically, the Supreme Court, in definitively recognizing a place
for work product in Exemption Five, stated that "[w]hatever the
outer boundaries of the attorney's work-product rule are, the rule
clearly applies to memoranda . . . which set forth the attorney's
theory of the case and his litigation strategy." '541
To be sure, claimants who seek access to their claim file during
the agency phase of the FTCA would be interested to know the
claims attorney's "theories and perspectives"542 on the claim, or
legal strategy in the event of litigation; but their immediate objective
is access to factual information about the circumstances of the inci-
dent, the issue of negligence, or the extent of loss. They are above
all claimants, and at best only potential litigants. What they pre-
sumably seek is a fair administrative settlement in consideration of
their claim, not some putative advantage in litigation that may or
may not take place.
H. A Preliminary Evaluation of the Claim
A claims officer must at some time come to a preliminary judg-
legal theories of the claim); see also United States v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 33
F.RD. 513, 515 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
540. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Technically, work product covers any document or tangi-
ble thing prepared by the attorney in anticipation of litigation or trial, not simply materials
setting forth the attorney's theory of the case or litigation strategy; but the privilege as to this
broader category of materials is only qualified, not absolute. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 400;
Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 798 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975). So-
called "opinion" work product as opposed to "ordinary" work product has been described as
"the primary focus of the doctrine." Note, supra note 530, at 928.
541. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 154. Some courts have implied that factual mate-
rial may not normally be withheld under Exemption Five of the FOIA, even where work
product privilege is claimed and might be sustained in a civil discovery setting. Deering Milli-
ken, Ina, 548 F.2d at 1137-38; Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. Supp. 498, 505 (D.D.C. 1977). But see
Mervin, 591 F.2d at 825 (textual material not severable from memoranda containing subjec-
tive attorney work product). According to one recently formulated view, factual work prod-
uct should be shielded from view under the FOIA, whatever the case may be in civil
discovery, only when its disclosure would tend to reveal protected opinion work product.
Note, supra note 530, at 929-30.
542. Kent Corp., 530 F.2d at 623.
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ment about the merit and value of a claim. As far as federal tort
claims are concerned, agency claims officers use as a touchstone the
probable liability of the United States were the claim to be litigated
under the FTCA. This requires the officer to consider a range of
largely substantive questions, such as whether the elements of a tort
cause of action under the applicable state law are present; 543
whether the claimed loss resulted from the conduct at issue;
whether there was contributory or comparative negligence, assump-
tion of risk, a valid release, or some other state law defense; whether
the employee responsible for the injury was acting within the scope
of employment; 5" and whether any of the FTCA exemptions may
be applicable.545 A host of narrower and more technical issues also
may arise.
546
If a claim is in principle compensable, the claims officer must
determine which elements of damage are recoverable and evaluate
the amount of the loss. Such determinations are made in accord-
ance with state law and local damage standards, unless bills or writ-
ten estimates will suffice for these purposes.54 7 The claims officer
then generally reduces the damage estimate by some factor to ac-
count for any uncertainty about the claim's validity in fact or in
law. In this respect, the evaluation differs from a judge's. After
overcoming factual or legal doubts to find for the plaintiff, a judge
may award full value; a claims officer rarely does so. In addition,
virtually all informed sources agree that the agencies are more con-
servative than the courts in evaluating the same claims.548 In any
event, unless an agency has an ancillary or meritorious claims stat-
543. Potential state law issues would include, by way of illustration, application of the
law of dangerous instrumentalities, res ipsa loquitur, and recreational use statutes.
544. On this issue the report of the employee's supervisor naturally plays a crucial role.
545. The dominant practice among claims officers is to assert any and all of the exemp-
tions even if the argument for applying them is only "colorable." Huang Interview, supra
note 22. At Justice Department seminars on the FTCA, United States Attorneys and agency
claims officers are instructed to raise every tenable defense. Axelrad Interview, supra note
144. This apparently means that officers should normally deny a claim on the basis of any
available exemption even if they are not persuaded that the exemption is applicable, provided
a court could plausibly hold that it is. One claims officer, pressed to state a formula, ac-
knowledged that he would invoke an exemption if there were a 30 to 40% chance of being
sustained in court. Huang Interview, supra note 22.
546. E.g., the local collateral source rule, rights of representation under state law, and
wrongful death limitations.
547. For example, the only step required in certain simple cases may be to add up medi-
cal bills or pick the lower of two car repair estimates.
548. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 20, at 2-1 to -14. In contrast to courts, agencies may also
feel free to discount valid claims to reflect the time and expense claimants save by not having
to litigate. They also may be more reluctant to spend government money.
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ute conferring broader settlement authority, the claims officer's as-
sessment of FTCA litigation exposure is the agency's starting point
in determining its willingness to settle. 49 One result of the analysis
is that agencies do not settle cases purely in consideration of their
nuisance value.550
Some claims fall outside this analytic framework. Neither the
agency nor the Justice Department may want to submit a claim
raising a novel point of law to the usual prediction-of-judicial-out-
come approach. This is especially true if the claim alleges a regula-
tory or program-related tort. Settlement of such claims may
involve important policy questions central to the mission of the
agency. The agency must decide whether to resist settlement in the
interest of securing an early judicial decision on the issue or to pro-
mote settlement in hopes that a subsequent claim will present the
issue in a more favorable light. Factors the agency will consider
include the circumstances leading up to the claim, the strength or
weakness of the claimant's case, the qualities of the available judi-
cial forum, and the extent to which the agency's program-related
interests are implicated. At the same time, if the legal and policy
reasons for resisting payment are powerful, settlement may be re-
jected as a matter of law or principle or in consideration of agency
morale.5 51 This will especially be the case among claims officers
who, while admitting that decisions to settle are not binding prece-
dent, strongly prefer to treat like cases alike. Finally, agencies may
choose to deny a claim as a means of testing an earlier judicial rul-
ing they believe to be wrong. In many of these situations, the Jus-
tice Department will have a voice. 52 All in all, though tort
claimants tend to focus only on the dollar value of their claim, the
549. Most agencies have not put the claim evaluation process in writing. By way of ex-
ception, current Air Force regulations allude to the factors that should determine the
agency's willingness to compromise a claim filed against it. 32 C.F.R. § 842.86(a) (1984).
550. This attitude toward nuisance value claims is usually justified by reference to legisla-
tive intent under the FTCA. Semeta Interview, supra note 151. One officer also mentioned
the possibility of personal liability should the GAO disallow the settlement. Huang Inter-
view, supra note 22. Personal liability is imposed by statute if such a disallowance occurs
because a payment is prohibited by law or does not represent a legal obligation under the
fund involved. See 31 U.S.C. § 3528 (1982).
As to whether there might be exceptions to the policy against administrative settlement of
nuisance value claims, one officer supposes that a claim arising out of an incident acutely
embarrassing to the agency might for that reason alone be paid. Bradshaw Interview, supra
note 149. Colleagues of his acknowledge a further exception for entirely meritless claims that
the government, because of poor recordkeeping, likely cannot defeat in court. Kane and
Schmetterling Interview, supra note 149.
551. E.g., Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
552. See infra notes 661-63 and accompanying text.
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government is likely to take a broader perspective influenced by
larger litigation and program-related strategies.
If the outcome of a tort claim depends upon local law, the
agency attorney has several sources of guidance. Experienced
claims adjudicators are their own best sources, especially in high-
volume agencies with typical, recurring claims. They understanda-
bly develop an intuition for isolating an appropriate damage esti-
mate.553 This is especially true of officers adjudicating claims on a
local or regional level, for their cases arise from just a handful of
jurisdictions. Other sources include the local U.S. Attorney,554 the
local tort bar, and conventional library resources. Particularly
helpful on valuation matters are the manifold publications showing
judgments and value ranges for particular injuries by geographic
area. Although these publications are viewed skeptically by claims
officers,555 they are widely relied upon as aids to judgment. 5 6
Washington-based claims attorneys have access to the same sources
as local claims attorneys. But they also have their own network,
including the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and the
Torts Branch of the Justice Department, the acknowledged expert
on the law of the FTCA.
Meritorious claims statutes present a quite different picture.
Such statutes, as noted,557 give certain agencies limited authority to
settle and sometimes pay claims that are not compensable under the
FTCA. These agencies vary widely not only in the standards gov-
553. E.g., Wieland Interview, supra note 152.
554. Id.
555. E.g., Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
556. The agencies are aware of the difficulties of valuation, particularly in personal injury
and death claims. A Veterans Administration claims manual states:
In personal injury claims, actual expenses for medical care, loss of wages, earn-
ings or profits, if allowable, and other allowable out-of-pocket costs proximately
resulting from the injury may be determined readily. Difficulties frequently arise,
however, in arriving at the value of a claim where loss of future earning power, loss
of consortium, procreative loss, cosmetic defects, pain and suffering, and other ele-
ments which cannot be assessed by resort to a formula are involved. In death
claims, such factors as loss of parental guidance and other intangibles may present
problems. Knowledge of amounts allowed by the courts in similar situations and of
amounts awarded as compromises in cases which did not proceed to judgment is
essential if negotiations are expected to result in a fair and equitable settlement for
both parties.
Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.12(e). Dissatisfied with the commercial
valuation guides, one agency claims officer has urged the Justice Department to compile for
the agencies a district-by-district guide to judgment values, or to publish summary reports of
settlements and verdicts by type of claim. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
557. See supra note 20B and accompanying text.
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erning their exercise of meritorious claims authority, but also in the
extent to which they have articulated those standards.
At one extreme are agencies that have little familiarity with the
meritorious claims statutes at their disposal; not surprisingly, stan-
dards for exercising the discretion those statutes confer simply do
not exist. An example is the United States Postal Service. The Pos-
tal Service has a sweeping meritorious claims statute,558 but the
Law Department rarely uses it,559 finding sufficient elasticity in the
FTCA to reach virtually any appealing case. In a rare instance, the
meritorious claims statute was used to compensate a good Samari-
tan injured while attempting to rescue the driver of a burning postal
vehicle.5 "6  This example represents a narrow class of cases in which
a private party suffers personal injury or property damage while fur-
thering the interests of the Postal Service.561  By contrast, the
agency has consciously avoided using the statute as the basis for a
sweeping assumption of no-fault liability.562 The apparent reticence
of the Postal Service can be explained by the difficulty of establish-
ing standards that would confine no-fault liability to exceptional,
non-recurring situations or otherwise keep it within reasonable
bounds.563 In short, while the Law Department is confident that
the meritorious claims statute should not be used to circumvent spe-
cific FTCA limitations on tort recovery,"' it lacks a strong convic-
tion of how in fact it should be used.
Other agencies more readily deploy their meritorious claims au-
thority for no-fault purposes. The FBI, for example, invokes its
558. The Postal Service has authority to settle claims for property damage or personal
injury or death resulting from the operations of the Postal Service where there is "a proper
charge against the United States" which is not cognizable under the FrCA. 39 U.S.C.
§ 2603 (1982).
559. Newman Interview, supra note 148.
560. Id.
561. Another case in which the Postal Service considered using its meritorious claims
authority involved a mail carrier who destroyed a pool cue he was delivering when he used it
to drive off an attacking dog. The claim, however, was not pressed. Id.
562. For example, the Postal Service would not use the statute to pay a claim for injury
or damage caused by a postal driver suffering a heart attack at the wheel. Id. Interestingly, a
study of Post Office claims adjudication conducted 30 years ago observed a similar tendency
to use the FTCA wherever possible, rather than the agency's meritorious claims statute.
Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1325, 1359 (1954).
563. The Postal Service apparently made an effort a decade or so ago to draft a set of
narrow no-fault standards for use of the meritorious claims statute, but was unsuccessful.
Newman Interview, supra note 148.
564. Id.
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meritorious claims statute5 65 about a dozen times a year to settle
claims not amenable to settlement under the FTCA.5 6 6 In these
cases, the agency generally has caused property damage through
nonnegligent investigatory conduct.567 In principle, the FBI re-
quires only a showing of proximate cause for recovery in these cir-
cumstances, and it applies the scope of employment concept
loosely. 68 But although the FBI puts its meritorious claims statute
to no-fault uses, it still will not circumvent any specific limitations
of the FTCA. Like the Postal Service, it interprets the FTCA as the
comprehensive definition of the federal government's liability in
tort.
5 6 9
Another agency that makes periodic use of its meritorious
claims statute57° is the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA).5 7 ' Like the FBI, it has issued no substantive stan-
dards, but that does not mean that its exercise of authority is either
unguided or unprincipled. The agency's meritorious claims statute,
known internally as the Space Act, has been used as a basis for
payment a total of ten times over the last few fiscal years.572 Most
of the cases fit squarely within the General Counsel's understanding
of Congress's central purpose in enacting the Space Act: providing
compensation when, through the fault of no one in particular, haz-
ardous or unusual space program operations inflict injury on iso-
lated individuals.573 In recurring situations such as sonic booms or
overpressure in connection with rocket firings, NASA does not in-
565. The Attorney General is authorized to settle claims for property damage or personal
injury or death arising out of the actions of the Director, Assistant Director, Inspector or
Special Agent of the FBI. 31 U.S.C. § 3724 (1982).
566. Kelley Interview, supra note 24.
567. Id. For example, one case involved removal of an innocent person's car door for use
as evidence. Another involved drilling a hole in a safe to get to its contents. Still another
involved permanent damage to a tabletop as a result of fingerprint dusting. Id.
568. Id.
569. The Chief of the FBI Civil Litigation Unit reports that he has never considered
using the statute to settle a tort claim falling within an FTCA exemption or otherwise not
cognizable under the Act. Significantly, the Civil Litigation Unit commonly describes the
statute as applying "without regard to negligence." Id.
570. The Space Act authorizes NASA to settle and pay claims of $25,000 or less for
property damage, personal injury or death arising out of NASA activities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2473(b)(13) (1982).
571. Hosenball Interview, supra note 476; Wieland Interview, supra note 152.
572. Wieland Letter, supra note 144. The incidence of use is less sparing than it may
appear, for in the same period settlements under the FTCA only numbered approximately 50.
Id.
573. The cases tend to be unusual, such as the disappearance of a painting on loan to a
NASA facility, or destruction of a shrimper's nets by concrete capsules dropped from a
spacecraft.
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sist on proof of causation, but it requires a showing from NASA
records that the damage could have resulted from its activities as,
for example, when space vehicles were traveling at a speed and loca-
tion to suggest they might have caused the incident. 4 No showing
of fault is required, and the concept of scope of employment is gen-
erally ignored.575 On the other hand, the Space Act statute of limi-
tations is strictly applied. The NASA and FBI examples
demonstrate that agencies can use meritorious claims authority in a
principled manner while proceeding on a case-by-case basis.
Still, when the volume of claims warrants it, agencies should
consider developing written standards for the exercise of discretion
under meritorious claims statutes. The military departments have
done this with regard to their authority under the Military and For-
eign Claims Acts.5 6 The services have a common understanding of
what Congress meant by its reference to noncombat activities:
those that are peculiar to the military and its operations.5 7 The
services further share the view that the scope of employment con-
cept should not stand in the way of recovery in otherwise appealing
cases involving such activities.578 On the other hand, their decision
574. Hosenball Interview, supra note 476; Wieland Interview, supra note 152.
575. Weiland Letter, supra note 144.
576. Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386, at ch. 7; 32 C.F.R. §§ 842.40-.67 (1984);
Army Reg. No. 27-20, supra note 6, at ch. 3. For an earlier study of substantive standards
and procedures under the forerunner of the Military Claims Act, see Gellhorn & Lauer, supra
note 562, at 1350-58.
577. See, eg., 32 C.F.R. § 536.14(e) (1984) (Army). The regulations provide as illustra-
tions "practice firing of missiles and weapons, training and field exercises, and maneuvers,
including, in connection therewith, the operation of aircraft, and vehicles, and use and occu-
pancy of real estate, and movement of combat or other vehicles designed especially for mili-
tary use." Id. The Navy regulations add naval exhibitions, operations of anti-aircraft
equipment, sonic booms, the explosion of ammunition and most general of all, "use of instru-
mentalities having latent mechanical defects not traceable to negligent acts or omissions." Id.
§ 750.55(b). The Air Force regulations simply state that noncombat activities are
"[a]ctivities, other than combat, war or armed conflict, that are particularly military in char-
acter and have little parallel in the civilian community." Id. § 842.41(c).
For support for the view that relief under the Military Claims Act is not contingent on a
showing of fault, see Ward v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 369, 374-75 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd
on other gounds, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973); Lundeen v. Dept. of Labor and Indus., 78
Wash. 2d 66, 469 P.2d 886 (1970).
The services also agree that the scope of employment branch of the Military Claims Act
should be limited to claims involving wrongful acts and that all the FTCA exemptions except
the one barring foreign claims should be applicable.
578. See, eg., id. § 842.42(b) (claims payable under Military Claims Act include those
arising from noncombat activities of the Air Force regardless of whether they arose out of
negligent or wrongful acts of employees acting within the scope of employment);
§ 842.63(c)(1-2) (scope of employment immaterial under Foreign Claims Act except in nar-
row circumstances). Presumably, all that is necessary for noncombat activity to come within
the scope of the Act is a causal relationship to the injury.
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to limit settlement authority under the Military Claims Act by
adopting broadly the FTCA exemptions579 is questionable,
although doubtless one way of channeling their discretion. All in
all, the military departments have assigned each of the claims stat-
utes at their disposal a more or less distinct purpose and made of
them a more or less coherent whole. 8°
The failure of certain agencies to use or rationalize their use of
meritorious claims authority is not wholly their fault. Congress has
done a mixed job of revealing why some agencies have meritorious
claims authority and others do not, or for what specific purposes if
any those having that authority were given it. It is difficult to know
which of the many limitations on FTCA coverage Congress ex-
pected or hoped an agency would disregard in wielding its meritori-
ous claims authority. Conceivably, Congress only meant very
generally to enable the agency to do the right and good thing. In
the case of meritorious claims statutes that predated the FTCA but
were retained by the savings clause,8 ' it is even doubtful that Con-
gress knew what it was saving those statutes for or that it would
have enacted them at all had the FTCA preceded them. Their un-
certain origins and uneven fortunes suggest that the meritorious
claims statutes warrant serious legislative reexamination.
I. Agency Settlement Philosophy: An Open Question
Agency settlement philosophies reflect a basic ambiguity in the
nature of the FTCA. One way of looking at the administrative
claim process is to view claimants as having an entitlement to an
579. E.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 536.15 (a)-(n) (1984) (Army). See supra note 532. The services
do show certain differences. Air Force regulations do not include the FTCA's discretionary
function exemption. Id § 842.50 (1984). Army regulations do, but only allow the Chief of
the Claims Service to invoke it. Id. § 536.15(b). The regulations contain other self-imposed
limitations, based upon either the existence of adequate alternative remedies or certain catch-
all policy considerations. Examples of adequate alternative remedies would include claims
compensable under FICA or other worker's compensation statutes, taking claims, flood
damage claims, and claims in contract or copyright or patent infringement. See, eg., 32
C.F.R. § 536.15(n)-(s), (w), (z) (1984) (Army). Independent policy considerations explain the
exclusion of recovery for contributory negligence, id. § 536.15(u); claims based solely on
compassion, id. § 536.15 (y); and claims not in the best interest of the United States, contrary
to public policy, or filed by inhabitants of unfriendly foreign countries, id. § 536.15(c).
580. It is a measure of this coherence that claims officers at the military departments
routinely examine a claim specifically filed under the FTCA or one of the ancillary statutes to
see if it should be considered under some other statute as well. Purdon Interview, supra note
236; Rouse Interview, supra note 141; Semeta Interview, supra note 151. This also appears to
be the case in the FBI and NASA. Kelley Interview, supra note 24; Wieland Interview, supra
note 152.
581. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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unliquidated sum of money, subject to their proving each of the ele-
ments of a compensable claim. In fact, tort claims are rarely viewed
this way, regardless of their strength and merit. This is not because
the elements of a valid tort claim are especially numerous or com-
plex, but because they are often indeterminate and subjective. At a
minimum, establishing such a claim entails a showing of wrongful-
ness and proximate cause, consideration of some poorly-understood
statutory exemptions, speculation over injuries claimed, and highly
uncertain damage determinations. Moreover, any number of differ-
ent assertions may be made in the guise of a tort claim. Finally, an
essential difference between tort claims and entitlements proper is
the fact that no agency at the federal level has primary responsibil-
ity for handling the former or views doing so as its primary mission;
by contrast, entitlement programs constitute the very business of
the agencies that administer them, perhaps even their reason for
being.
Nevertheless, claims attorneys may justifiably take fair compen-
sation for government torts to be an affirmative agency obligation
and view themselves as the providers of inchoate entitlements. If
so, they would tend to approach the job in a spirit of strict imparti-
ality and commitment to achieving the result that in fact and law is
objectively correct. In fact, despite the issue of fault and the pres-
ence of the other more or less indeterminate elements mentioned
earlier, claims officers have no greater reason at the outset to as-
sume an adversarial relationship with claimants than they would
with social security, workmen's compensation, veterans' benefits, or
food stamp applicants at the initial application stage. Since Con-
gress intended deserving tort claimants to recover from the govern-
ment through the agencies rather than the courts, the parties share
an interest in the fair determination and valuation of claims.
Although claims officers rarely would describe the FTCA as
conferring an entitlement,582 they occasionally refer to what a tort
claimant, much like an applicant for statutory benefits, is
"owed." '583 A former chief of the Army Claims Division described
agency claims determinations as "in every sense a judicial act," per-
formed in light of the evidence, the Act, and the law of the relevant
582. Consistent with this attitude is the uniform policy among claims officers of never
awarding tort claimants a greater sum of money than claimed. Semeta Interview, supra note
151; Feeley Interview, supra note 147.
583. Bradshaw Interview, supra note 149; Huang Interview, supra note 22. Officers at
several of the agencies referred to their having "dual" obligations. Purdon Interview, supra
note 236; Rouse Interview, supra note 141; Semeta Interview, supra note 151.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction. 84 Some commentators argue that the government has
a continuing duty to deal fairly and objectively with claims even
after they have gone to litigation. The premise of this argument is
that government should always temper its pursuit of advantage with
a firm commitment to justice.5 85 But, regardless of what may be
expected from lawyers defending the government in tort litigation,
agency claims attorneys can be expected to act fairly and objectively
when considering a Standard Form 95 in the nonadversarial setting
of an agency-level claim.586
There is, of course, a competing vision of the government claims
attorney, yielding a different approach to settlement. It is embodied
in the following account of a typical municipal claims attorney:
In a way, the city attorney to whose desk comes a claim against
his city is in the same position as the lawyer who represents the
claimant. Both represent adversaries in a legal battle and the law
theoretically provides a system by which the decision will go in
favor of the combatant with the law on his side. The lawyer with
a public body for his client can, with good logic, say that his job
consists of using all legally proper means of preventing recovery
by the claimant-initial rejection of every claim, the use of all
legitimate methods of delay and obstruction, and a defense of
action to the bitter end. Relaxation of the rules of battle needs to
be made only where it would cost the city more to go on fighting
584. Williams, The $2500 Limitation on Administrative Settlements under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 1960 INS. L.J. 669, 672 (1960).
585. Generally. . . the settlement of government cases is governed by consideration
of principle and reasonableness, rather than convenience and money . . . . The
thought is that the Government. . .took its position out of principle, and not for
the purpose of later bargaining. Government lawyers are enforcing the law and not
merely seeking judgments for their client.
D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, supra note 1, at 26.
This is not apparently how the Justice Department conducts its tort litigation business.
The Torts Branch Director views the Department as bound, like any private lawyer vigor-
ously representing a client, to advance every tenable argument in support of the cause, to
exploit any weakness in the claimant's case, and to part with the fewest dollars possible.
Second Axelrad Interview, supra note 368. See also Axelrad Letter, supra note 152, at 1
("Primarily, the administrative process is an annex to the litigative process."). See infra note
593.
586. See 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, at 17-18; Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at 4 ("Gov-
ernment officials have a special responsibility. . . to ascertain facts and provide a fair redress
of grievances. . . in a manner that transcends private sector adversarial relationships."). See
also ACUS Recommendations, I C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(5)(b) (1984).
The stated attitude of the General Accounting Office is that it has a responsibility, when-
ever passing on the merits of a monetary claim, to make whatever factual and legal findings
are necessary to determine the validity of the claim and the amount, if any, due. It disclaims
authority to bargain or compromise. "[A] claim determined to be valid should be paid in full.
Likewise, public funds should not be used to pay any part of a claim determined not to be
valid." GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note I, at 11-6.
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than to compromise. 587
This description casts the government attorney in the mold of pri-
vate counsel in relentless pursuit of a client's personal advantage.
In practice, it is an exaggeration; but it also contains some truth.
One agency attorney describes tort claimants as "entirely on their
own." '588 Another roundly disavows any obligation to the claim-
ant. 89 Still a third confesses that defeating tort claims at the ad-
ministrative level is a way of "keeping professional score," at least
when the claimant has representation.5 90 For his part, the Torts
Branch Director squarely posits an adversarial model for the ad-
ministrative tort claims process.591
However, there is something misleading about the hired-hand
theory of the agency claims attorney, whatever its merits in describ-
ing other areas of government law practice. Subject only to review
by a superior officer within the same department and to possible
Justice Department approval, claims attorneys themselves decide
government tort claims. Except in the most unusual circumstances,
no one outside the legal department-neither top agency policy-
makers nor personnel in the division whose activities gave rise to
the claim-considers a claim as a legal matter. From a practical
point of view, claims attorneys are attorney and client, determining
the government's bidding at the same time that they perform it.
Claims attorneys in an agency's legal department thus constitute
the agency's policymakers for tort claim settlements.
Along with the usual professional responsibilities of legal repre-
sentatives, claims attorneys therefore have the ethical responsibili-
ties of private persons who become enmeshed in legal difficulties
and must stake out defensible positions. Like civil-suit defendants,
they can acknowledge liability when it is fairly established and im-
mediately pay a fair estimate of loss. Similarly, they can overlook
certain purely technical defenses that would appropriately be in-
voked in litigation.5 92 Alternately, they can adopt a less generous
587. French, Research in Public Tort Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 234 (1942).
588. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23. According to this attorney, the only reason not to
make "ludicrously low" settlement offers to claimants is that doing so may insult them to
such an extent as to bring negotiations to an end. Id.
589. Feeley Interview, supra note 147.
590. Newman Interview, supra note 148.
591. Axelrad Letter, supra note 152, at 2; Second Axelrad Interview, supra note 368. See
also Willard Letter, supra note 10 (citing "the true adversarial nature of the tort claim ad-
ministrative process").
592. The statute of limitations cannot as such properly be overlooked. See supra notes
124-25 and accompanying text. Congress almost certainly did not mean by the FTCA to
authorize the administrative settlement of either time-barred or exempt claims. Most likely,
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posture and do what most in fact do: offer to pay no more than a
discounted probable judgment value. Finally, they can choose to
fight the claim with any available argument and means, so as to pay
as little as possible.59 3 The difference between claims attorneys and
civil defendants is that instead of directing or authorizing counsel to
pursue that approach, claims attorneys pursue it themselves.
Clearly, then, even the relatively well-defined legal environment of
the FTCA offers a wide range of ethical positions.
Most claims officers in the federal agencies draw on both mod-
els. Virtually all recognize an obligation to examine a claim fairly
and give claimants what they are due.5 94 As one affirmed, "I stand
ready to pay a valid claim."5 95 On the other hand, claims officers
emphasize the inchoate character of most tort claims, insisting that
claimants and claimants' attorneys tend to exaggerate the strength
and value of their claims and behave in an adversarial manner even
Congress thought that claims more than two years old should as a policy matter be consid-
ered stale for all purposes. In any event, by attaching a limitations period on federal tort
claim suits, and then closely tying agency settlement authority to the cognizability of those
claims, Congress impliedly subjected settlement to the same time bar. See, eg., Augustine v.
United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).
To this end, the Torts Branch has instructed government attorneys as follows:
In FTCA cases, the statute of limitations ... is a jurisdictional requirement.
Therefore, it cannot be waived. . . . Regardless of how meritorious the plaintiff's
substantive claim might be, the statute must be raised if it is applicable.
TORTS BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE, MONOGRAPH E, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 30-
31 (1983).
Conceivably, Congress could authorize the agencies to adjust an otherwise time-barred
tort claim when they find that the age of the claim, though barring suit, has not deprived
them of sufficient probative information to act upon it intelligently. This would require very
specific statutory language. But cf. Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670, 670-71 (4th Cir.
1973) (court finds it "incredibl[e]" that the government would interpose a statute of limita-
tions defense while conceding legal liability for causing the near-total deafness of a nine-year-
old child through medical malpractice in an Air Force hospital).
593. The Torts Branch Director uses the example of the grossly obese claimant who is
legitimately offered a good deal less on a valid claim than any other claimant in identical
circumstances. The argument is that a judge or jury might be influenced by the claimant's
obesity and that the government has a right to take advantage of that fact. Similarly, in the
hypothetical situation in which the government attorney knows that claimant's counsel, be-
cause of personal financial distress, is offering quick agency-level settlement at half the true
value of the client's clearly valid claim, the Torts Branch Director would advise that the offer
be accepted. Second Axelrad Interview, supra note 368.
On the other hand, the Director reports having returned a settlement as inadequate be-
cause it reflected a reduction in value based on spurious assertions of a statute of limitations
defense. Not to do so, it was explained, would be to countenance deception by government
personnel. Id.
594. See generally Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at 1-2; Horn Letter, supra note 438, at 1.
595. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
[Vol. 35:509
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
during the administrative process. 596 Claims officers are also con-
scious, at least in prospective settlements of no more than $25,000,
of being the only barrier between the claimant and the United States
Treasury.5 97 The dominant attitude, subject to subtle and impor-
tant variations, is best described as highly skeptical objectivity.
The problem of placing a dollar value on a payable claim illus-
trates the attitudes of most claims attorneys. The decision whether
a claim should be paid at all, as mentioned, involves a prediction of
judicial outcome. Thus, an agency may be willing to settle a factu-
ally or legally uncertain claim, but, unless valuation requires noth-
ing more than totaling medical or car repair bills or the like, will
probably exact a stiff price for doing so.51 s In this respect, again,
tort claims may be distinguished from true statutory entitlements.
Decisionmakers award entitlements despite substantial doubts if the
case for doing so outweighs the case for not doing so. They are
without authority to reduce the payment.
In assessing their generosity, claims officers usually deny any
affinity to insurance company claims adjusters who, one of them
alleges, "settle as cheaply as they can get away with. ' 5 9 9 Most of-
ficers aim to settle a payable claim at the lower end of a broad zone
of reasonable compensation. 6" They do not drive settlement figures
below what is conscionable under the circumstances, but neither do
they seek out the generous end of the spectrum, nor even the dead
center.60' The former head of the Torts Branch and a leading au-
thority on the FTCA explains:
Unlike many lawyers representing private defendants, the gov-
ernment lawyers are not as much concerned with settling a case
at the very lowest possible sum as they are with effecting substan-
596. See, eg., Conway Letter, supra note 152, at 1; Sklute Letter, supra note 236, at 1;
Bodolay Interview, supra note 144.
597. Huang Interview, supra note 22.
598. In other cases of less than clear liability-for example, cases marked by novel policy
issues, substantial questions of statutory interpretation, or the chance to have an unfortunate
precedent overruled-the agency may choose not to predict judicial outcome with a discount
for uncertainty, but rather to deny the claim and let the court speak.
599. Huang Interview, supra note 22.
600. See, eg., Newman Interview, supra note 148; Wieland Interview, supra note 152.
601. Understandably, agency regulations do not directly address this issue. The Air
Force comes closest to a formula:
Air Force Policy on Claims:...
b. Make prompt, just, and reasonable adjudications of all claims.
c. Pay meritorious claims in the amount necessary to restore the claimant, as
nearly as possible, to his or her position before the incident on which the claim is
based.
Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386, at 1-10.
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tial justice. This does not mean that they will seek bottom dollar
in a settlement negotiation. What it means is that they will ap-
proach the evaluation more objectively-more fairly-and will
not attempt to "steal" a claim for pennies when its value is in
dollars.
60 2
J. Negotiating the Claim
Where the agency upon investigation tentatively determines that
a claim may be worth paying,60 3 the case enters the negotiation
stage. Though often intermittent, negotiations may extend through-
out most of the settlement period. Each side presents its view of the
claim, perhaps overstating the strength of its case and the weakness
of the other party's. 6°  Further exchanges of argument and infor-
mation will follow, culminating in what may be the first of several
offers and counteroffers.
The question whether to engage in this process and at what pace
and rhythm to do so is a matter of individual style. The head of tort
claims adjudication at the Postal Service, for example, finds it most
productive to stake out a fair settlement figure early on and hold
steadfastly to it.6 ° 5 But he credits with considerable success the ap-
titude of a colleague for settlement through dickering. 60 6 Although
the ultimate level of settlement may be the same, dickering begins
with what one attorney calls "initial lowballing," leaving room for
602. 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, at 15-8. The excerpt describes settlement policy at the
litigation stage, but the comments are equally applicable to agency-level practice.
603. An obvious reason for not conducting negotiations at an earlier stage is conservation
of agency resources. A less obvious but equally important reason is the fear that, whatever
the statute may say about the inadmissibility of settlement offers at trial, see supra note 340,
the agency's mere willingness to negotiate may be taken as a concession of liability.
604. Agency regulations rarely treat the negotiation process as such, but Veterans Ad-
ministration regulations are an exception:
In most instances, the best approach requires a candid and full presentation of the
reasons for the Government's position, pointing out strong points, difficulties of
proof for the claimant, availability of Government medical experts, the authority of
the Department of Justice to obtain the services of non-Governmental medical ex-
perts, and the amount awarded in similar situations in litigated and unlitigated
claims. The basic thrust is to generate a substantial doubt in the mind of the claim-
ant's attorney concerning liability in the United States All related Government pay-
ments, past, present and future, should be used to reduce damages. Loss of earnings
should be reduced to present value whereas future Government payments should
not. Inflation factors should be used to increase future Government payment
figures.
Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, § 18.12a (emphasis added). The regulation
confirms that agencies make use of the usual negotiation devices-including perhaps a mod-
erate amount of factual manipulation-in negotiating with claimants.
605. Newman Interview, supra note 148.
606. Id.
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later agreement at or near the targeted amount." 7 Dickering pro-
vides greater room for maneuver and greater flexibility, but it takes
time and carries its own risks.6" 8 Clearly, the quality of negotia-
tions depends on the particularities of the claim and the working
relationship between the government attorney and the claimant's
representative. In this respect, tort claims negotiation is no differ-
ent in the government setting than in any other, and its outcome is
as usual a function of "appropriate and realistic concessions on both
sides in light of all elements of the case."60 9
K. Monitoring the Progress of a Claim
A typical claims attorney in a busy agency may have as many as
eighty to one hundred claims in one stage or another at any time.61°
The delays entailed in delegating the investigation, waiting for re-
ports to be prepared or examinations conducted, and eliciting re-
sponses by claimants to requests for documentation or to the
agency's latest settlement position all make it probable that claims
will be forgotten for relatively long stretches. Slippage of a month
or six weeks is significant in a settlement procedure that Congress
intended most often not to exceed six months. An obvious disad-
vantage is that the government may find itself in court before it has
had a fair chance to settle.61'
In no agency does the problem seem even remotely out of con-
trol.6 12  Many officers have developed individual systems-logs,
charts, and the like-for tracking the claims for which they are re-
607. Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
608. For example, if the government's "lowballing" aims excessively low or the process
becomes unpleasant, the chances of settlement prior to suit will be reduced.
609. 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 84, at 15-9.
610. Levin Interview, supra note 140; Newman Interview, supra note 148.
611. Although the GAO has not studied the timeliness of the agencies in handling tort
claims, it did examine the Justice Department's administration of swine flu claims. The GAO
concluded that while the Department's procedures were reasonable, unnecessary delays re-
sulted from inadequate follow-up efforts when claimants failed to produce requested informa-
tion and from an insufficient number of physicians to conduct medical reviews. Letter from
Gregory J. Ahart, Director of the U.S. General Accounting Office, to Sen. John A. Durkin 8-
10 (Jan. 14, 1981) ("Processing of Claims Resulting from the Swine Flu Program").
612. The risk of prolonged delay is minimal for minor claims that can almost be resolved
on the face of the claim itself, and for which the process from start to finish may take no more
than six to eight weeks.
Prolonged agency silence may also be deliberate, as where the agency is prepared to con-
cede liability, but the parties are simply too far apart on damages to warrant active negotia-
tions. The time would not yet seem ripe for a denial letter. More questionable is the practice,
admitted to by at least one claims attorney, of ignoring a claim that holds no real settlement
promise, but as to which the agency does not relish the prospect of litigation. This practice
may be used for claims that raise novel or difficult issues of law or bring embarrassment to the
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sponsible, and they report good results.613 However, agencies that
have channeled their computer capability into a systematic program
of claims tracking are proving most efficient. With appropriate pro-
gramming, each officer within a claims unit can chart the course of
all pending claims and the intervals that have passed between the
usual stages.614 Attorneys who use computer techniques for moni-
toring the progress of their claims strongly endorse the enter-
prise.6 15 Moreover, supervisory personnel find that it enables them
to keep track of the pace and productivity of their staff attorneys,
and thereby the efficiency of the entire office.616 Computerized
claims monitoring holds even more potential where there is delega-
tion to field and regional officers of the authority to investigate,
evaluate and settle claims.
The program of the Air Force claims service-Claims Adminis-
trative Management Program (CAMP)-illustrates a successful
computer operation. 617 Every Air Force claims officer in the world
completes and mails to headquarters a new Air Force Form 176 at
every stage in the course of a claim, starting with its initial filing.
The forms are keypunched and entered into a central system.618
According to Air Force claims personnel, CAMP revealed a much
higher incidence of overdue claims than expected, and showed
which bases were most responsible for them.6 19 The computer has
been programmed to show the average claims processing time for
each base and to print out an "overage list," that is, a list of longest-
pending claims.62 ° While the greatest advantage of CAMP and
similar systems is the ability to gauge the efficacy of an agency's
claims settlement operations, 621 the information stored has much
agency. An express denial letter could trigger litigation over a case that otherwise might go
away.
613. Huang Interview, supra note 22.
614. Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at 6.
615. Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
616. Semeta Interview, supra note 151.
617. For detailed regulations on the operation and uses of CAMP, program by program,
see Air Force Reg. No. 112-1, supra note 386, at ch. 3.
618. Personnel in charge of CAMP estimate that some 28,000 to 30,000 such transactions
are entered in Washington each month. The system is not exclusively used for tort claims. It
also tracks other kinds of claims as well as debt collection efforts, military justice and clem-
ency matters, and even inventories of supplies. Purdon Interview, supra note 236; Semeta
Interview, supra note 151.
619. Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
620. The Air Force also has in place one of the most extensive networks of training ses-
sions for claims officers, paralegals and medical-legal consultants as well as on-site inspec-
tions. Id.
621. Id.
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wider potential value for planning and evaluative purposes. For ex-
ample, the fact that many claims units have an astonishingly crude
sense of their claims demography622 probably implies missed oppor-
tunities for improvements in agency risk management.
Interestingly, there appears to be no direct correlation between
the claims volume in a given agency and the sophistication of its
data collection system. Both the high volume Air Force and rela-
tively low volume NASA623 are pioneers in data collection and
management. On the other hand, both the high volume Interior
Department and low volume FBI have lagged in these respects.
Since all agencies would benefit, the Justice Department should
spearhead efforts to develop data collection and retrieval systems
adapted to the tort claims context, and should promote the system-
atic sharing of technology by those agencies that have developed
and successfully used it.
L. Final Denials and Reconsiderations
Recognizing how strict the courts have been on the question of
what constitutes a proper formal denial for statute of limitations
purposes,624 most attorneys are scrupulously detailed when they
come to the conclusion that negotiations have irrevocably broken
down. They include in their denial letters the same recitals re-
quired in the case of an outright rejection.625 This is sensible self-
protection.
On the other hand, most final denial letters are notably short on
reasons.6 26 For example, some officers merely state that a claim is
622. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
623. NASA has installed a computer system which tracks all its litigation and contract
appeals matters and is in the process of extending it to all categories of claims. Wieland
Interview, supra note 152.
624. See supra note 345.
625. The Veterans Administration has a specific formula for situations where settlement
has proved impossible only because of a failure to agree on damages. The letter will state
either that "the claim appears not to be amenable to administrative resolution and is therefore
denied," or that "your demand for settlement exceeds our evaluation of the injuries sustained;
you may accept this letter as a final denial of your claim." It has found such a letter prefera-
ble to combining denial letter language with a last counteroffer, as in the following: "You are
invited to accept our counteroffer in the amount of [x] dollars by [a stated future date] or else
your claim is deemed denied as of the date of this communication." For an example of the
latter, see Heimila v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 350, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
626. Feeley Interview, supra note 147; Kelley Interview, supra note 24. Although Justice
Department regulations do not require a statement of reasons for a denial, some agencies
routinely provide one. Conway Letter, supra note 152, at 2; Sklute Letter, supra note 236, at
3.
Army regulations specifically direct that a denial be general when issued under a statute
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not cognizable rather than cite a specific statutory exemption which
justifies denying it.627 Others remark, without more, that the claim
fails to state a basis upon which the government has submitted to
liability or, equally uninformative, that "no tort was committed for
which the government under the circumstances is responsible. 628
Behind such broad statements may lurk any number of findings:
that the statute of limitations has run,629 that the employee who
caused the injury was acting beyond the scope of employment, that
government action was not the proximate cause of injury, that no
fault was proven, and so on. To what extent the agencies thereby
exhibit normal bureaucratic behavior, or have taken the Justice De-
partment's cue that justifications for denial are unnecessary, is inde-
terminable. To be sure, in some cases a statement of reasons for
denial would be formalistic and superfluous, as in situations where
the issues already were fully and explicitly ventilated. Nonetheless,
few officers seem to acknowledge that offering a claimant a reason-
ably specific ground for denying a claim would serve a useful pur-
pose.630 For reasons already mentioned, the Attorney General's
regulations should be amended to require a brief statement of the
basis for the denial of a claim that comports with prevailing stan-
dards under the Administrative Procedure Act.631
Although Justice Department regulations give disappointed
claimants the right to request that an agency reconsider its denial of
a claim,632 not every agency attorney mentions this right in the de-
nial letter.633 Veterans Administration and Interior Department
allowing a judicial remedy or judicial review, on the curious rationale that the Justice Depart-
ment is responsible for explaining the government's position in such cases. Denials under
statutes providing for only administrative remedies are to be "much more explicit and cer-
tain." "[O]nly in this way," the regulations state, "can the claimant be required to com-
pletely particularize his grounds for appeal." 32 C.F.R. § 536.1 l(a) (1984).
Several claims attorneys report that they generally give claimants represented by counsel
less specific and informative denial letters than they give those who file their claims pro se.
Semeta Interview, supra note 151.
627. Bodolay Interview, supra note 144; Huang Interview, supra note 22.
628. Bodolay Interview, supra note 144.
629. However, most claims attorneys specifically cite the statute of limitations if that is
the ground for denial. Doing so has the merit of possibly averting a pointless lawsuit.
630. See, e.g., Axelrad Letter, supra note 152, at 6.
631. See supra notes 350-51 and accompanying text. See also ACUS Recommendations,
1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(5)(a) (1984).
632. See supra notes 352-54 and accompanying text.
633. Compare Axelrad Letter, supra note 152, at 8 (notice would confuse claimants), with
Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at 6 (notice routinely given). The Administrative Conference
recommends that claim denial letters inform claimants that they may request agency recon-
sideration of a denial and that such a request extends the waiting period before suit may be
filed on the claim. ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(6)(a) (1984).
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denial letters, for example, typically contain such a recital, though
those coming from the Postal Service and the Departments of Agri-
culture, the Air Force, and the Army do not.634 In the case of the
Veterans Administration, the notice may be related to the fact that
there, contrary to the procedure in most other agencies, reconsider-
ation takes place at the Office of General Counsel in Washington on
the basis of a de novo review.635 If, as is more usual, reconsidera-
tion occurs in the same office that rendered the initial decision, the
matter is often handled by a colleague of equal rank to the original
decisionmaker or by an immediate superior.636
Having another claims attorney take a fresh look at the record
upon reconsideration has distinct advantages. Once a claim file is in
order, a second in-house opinion does not present a significant cost
to the agency.637 At present, claimants file requests for reconsidera-
tion in well under ten percent of all final denials.63 8 Conceivably, an
announced promise of fresh reconsideration would increase the re-
quest rate and the number of reversals of final denials at the agency
level, thereby lowering the incidence of FTCA litigation. But one
needs to be cautious in any such prediction. The rate of reversal on
reconsideration is generally extremely low, and it does not seem to
climb appreciably in agencies that place responsibility for reconsid-
eration in new hands. This is not surprising when one considers
that the chief reason reconsideration produces different results, in
the rare cases that it does, is that the claimant has introduced new
evidence of some significance.639 Under those circumstances, the
634. Agency Interviews.
635. Vet. Admin. Reg. No. M-02-1, supra note 301, at § 18.09b. However, reconsidera-
tion is normally had on the record compiled below, with some possibility for additional inves-
tigation and direct claimant contact. Bradshaw Interview, supra note 149. By contrast, in
the Department of Agriculture, reconsideration is conducted in the same office as the original
determination and by the same personnel. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
636. E.g., 32 C.F.R. § 842.89(a) (1984) (Air Force provides for reconsideration by next
higher authority). See also Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at 6; Sklute Letter, supra note 236,
at 4.
637. Axelrad Letter, supra note 152, at 9 (opposing reconsideration by different officers).
638. Bodolay Interview, supra note 144; Huang Interview, supra note 22. One claims
attorney put the incidence at as low as two percent. Purdon Interview, supra note 236. The
chief reason for the low number of requests for reconsideration appears to be that many
disappointed FTCA claimants are eager for their day in court. Reconsideration, at best not a
very promising prospect, will only postpone litigation for as long as six months. This theory
is supported by reports that the rate of reconsideration is appreciably higher under statutes
like the Military Claims Act which provide neither a judicial remedy nor even judicial review
on the merits. Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
639. Nesvet Interview, supra note 23.
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identity of the person giving reconsideration may not be especially
important.
M. The Role of the Justice Department in Agency Claims Action
Apart from its regulatory authority under the FTCA, the Jus-
tice Department has two principal nonlitigation functions. It for-
mally approves or disapproves proposed agency settlements above
$25,000, as required by the FTCA, 4 and it provides agency attor-
neys on request with informal guidance on the settlement of specific
claims. For the first of these functions, the Department has devel-
oped a structured procedure; the second, because of its nature, de-
mands maximum flexibility.
1. Requests for Approval
In conformity with the express terms of the FTCA,64 Justice
Department regulations require the prior written approval of the
Attorney General or his designee for any proposed settlement above
$2 5,0 00.642 They further require that agencies furnish the Depart-
ment "(a) [a] short and concise statement of the facts and of the
reasons for the referral or request, (b) copies of relevant portions of
the agency's claim fie, and (c) a statement of the recommendations
or views of the agency." 3 By custom, the Justice Department also
demands a signed settlement agreement between the claimant and
the agency that is made expressly conditional on the Justice Depart-
ment's approval.6 "
Some agency claims attorneys do not like the Department's re-
quirement of an agreement prior to approval action."S Basically,
their inability to make binding concessions in negotiations impairs
their ability to win concessions from the claimant or the claimant's
attorney. Agency claims attorneys are in an especially awkward sit-
uation if the Justice Department withholds approval of a proposed
settlement. The attorney not only has conspicuously failed to win
the support of government colleagues for the settlement, but now
must persuade the claimant to accept what may be a substantially
640. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982).
641. Id.
642. 28 C.F.R. § 14.6(a) (1984).
643. Id. § 14.7. In practice, when agencies seek approval of a settlement as a whole,
rather than advice on a specific issue, they refer the entire file to the Justice Department, not
just portions of it. The prepared introductory statement will, however, highlight those por-
tions of the file that are most relevant to the merits of the proposed settlement.
644. Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
645. Agency Interviews.
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lower sum. 6' There is little incentive for the claimant to do that.
Claimants often feel that if the agency attorney could be persuaded
of the appropriateness of the higher settlement, so too might a court
be persuaded. As a result, the attorney's credibility and leverage
suffer. On the other hand, the Justice Department is understanda-
bly loath to assume the burden of final negotiations with the claim-
ant, or to spend its limited resources scrutinizing what may prove to
be only a hypothetical settlement. One solution would be to raise
the agencies' level of settlement authority, perhaps to $100,000 as
many claims attorneys suggest,' 7 so that fewer settlements would
need Department approval. If the number of settlements needing
approval is low enough, the Department may be more willing to
consider them on a hypothetical basis.
The Torts Branch has well-established procedures for handling
agency requests for approval. Incoming requests are forwarded, de-
pending on their subject matter, to one of three assistant direc-
tors.64s They are then assigned to a team consisting of a Torts
Branch attorney and a reviewer, usually the assistant director. This
team examines the claim on the record, considering law, fact, and
policy, and exercising what the Torts Branch describes as a deferen-
tial standard of review. In other words, the agency's disposition to
settle is sustained "if it falls within the realm of reason." 649 If the
attorney and reviewer support the settlement, the claim is sent to
the Director for approval. If not, they personally consult with the
Director, and, if he concurs, arrange a conference with a representa-
tive of the agency legal department and sometimes the regional in-
vestigator or coordinator.65 There are several possible outcomes.
646. Largely for this reason, the Torts Branch may take over negotiations with a claimant
after rejecting the initial settlement agreement. Purdon Interview, supra note 236.
647. Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at I; Horn Letter, supra note 438, at 1; Rouse Letter,
supra note 488, at 6; Sklute Letter, supra note 236, at 4; Nesvet Interview, supra note 23. But
see Axelrad Letter, supra note 152, at 9 (opposing such a substantial increase). That figure,
$100,000, is the current level of settlement authority of the United States Attorneys. One
agency attorney complains that claimants sometimes refuse to negotiate seriously with the
agencies because of the limits on agency settlement authority; after litigation begins, claim-
ants can win a settlement from the local United States Attorney for as much as $100,000
without Justice Department approval. Rouse Interview, supra note 141.
648. The assistant directors have responsibility, respectively, for general torts, regulatory
torts, and malpractice. Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
649. Id. The reason for using a deferential standard is to give the agencies an incentive to
seek and achieve administrative settlements. The Torts Branch claims as its purpose to
strengthen that incentive. Its review of lower level action on tort claims arising out of the
Justice Department's own activities, as well as compromise settlements by United States At-
torneys, is more searching. Id.
650. Id.
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Settlement for any sum above $25,000 may be rejected; settlement
in excess of $25,000 may be approved, but at a lower level than
initially proposed;65 1 or settlement at the proposed level may be
agreed to after all.652
Since the Director has settlement authority only up to $150,000,
he or she cannot finally approve proposed settlements above that
amount. Assuming they have the Director's approval, they must be
taken still one step further: to the Assistant Attorney General for
amounts up to $750,000 and to the Deputy Attorney General for
amounts beyond. 65 3 On the other hand, upon disapproving a pro-
posed settlement above $150,000, the Director nonetheless invites
agency counsel to request consideration of the proposed settlement
by the Assistant or Deputy Attorney General. Agency counsel
rarely press the matter that far,654 but if they do, the file is sent
along with memoranda from the Director and from agency counsel,
and a conference may ensue.655
Agency claims attorneys commonly tell claimants that the need
for Justice Department approval may mean a substantial delay in
the settlement and payment of claims. They may also tell claimants
about the risk that the Justice Department will view their claim less
sympathetically, given its stricter interpretation of the FTCA and
less liberal approach to damages. 6  These warnings may induce
some claimants to accept settlements of $25,000 or less when other-
wise they might not do so. Though there are dangers in this prac-
tice, there is also virtue in claimants appreciating the risks they run
651. In this event, the agency will receive advance written authorization to reopen negoti-
ations with a view to settlement not in excess of the lower amount. If the agency succeeds in
getting the claimant's assent, no further Justice Department action will be needed. Id.
652. In this event, the agency processes the settlement as usual, attaching written evi-
dence that Justice Department approval has been obtained. Id.
653. Id.
654. The appeal is more likely to be pursued where a litigation rather than an administra-
tive settlement in excess of $150,000 has been disapproved. Id.
655. Matters become more complex where the Director refuses to approve the proposed
level of settlement, but would approve a lower one that likewise lies beyond his final approval
authority of $150,000. Agency officers then have a choice. They may immediately appeal to
the Assistant Attorney General just as before; if successful, the affair is virtually over. But
even if they acquiesce in the Director's view, which is the more likely response, the matter is
not at an end. Not only must negotiations with the claimant be reopened to secure assent to
the less generous settlement, but once that is achieved, the new settlement must still be ap-
proved by the Assistant General Counsel whose views are not yet known. This scenario
illustrates how each level of the Justice Department can avoid having to consider a settlement
until agreement at all lower levels, including the claimant's and the agency's, has been se-
cured. Id.
656. Newman Interview, supra note 148; Rouse Interview, supra note 141; Wieland Inter-
view, supra note 152.
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in pressing for a higher sum than the agency can award. Still,
claims officers should be careful not to coerce claimants into ac-
cepting artificially low settlements.
There are also less obvious risks associated with the perception
that the Torts Branch uses its approval authority to impose on the
agencies an unduly narrow interpretation of the FTCA and an un-
reasonably low measure of damages. One agency attorney acknowl-
edges not seriously negotiating difficult claims likely to yield
proposed settlements above $25,000, for the reason that success in
doing so will only provoke an uphill battle with the Torts Branch
for approval. He prefers to let six months pass and have the Justice
Department meet the claimant directly in court.6 57
It is not clear how to interpret these charges. First, by no means
every agency voices them. Moreover, there are countervailing con-
siderations. To the extent the Torts Branch requires agencies in
large settlements to interpret the law correctly, to make balanced
and defensible characterizations of the facts, and to avoid giveaways
in the form of tort claim settlements, it is only performing its proper
function. And it is hardly surprising that agency attorneys resent
being overridden by other government lawyers, especially when it
embarrasses them before disappointed and possibly angry claim-
ants. The fact remains, however, that Congress did not intend, in
conditioning large agency settlements on prior Justice Department
approval, that the Department should routinely block defensible
agency-level settlements simply because it would take a harsher po-
sition in litigation and possibly even prevail. Judging by its stated
policy of deference on requests for approval,658 the Torts Branch
evidently agrees, at least in principle. The matter bears further ex-
amination because, apart from the impact that pressure from the
Torts Branch may have on agency morale, any short-circuiting of
the administrative process should be avoided. Whether these
problems have materialized to a significant degree cannot be deter-
657. This claims officer is not alone. Rather than ignore a claim under these circum-
stances, an attorney in another agency reports the even more anomalous practice of issuing
an actual denial letter on the claim, though in his judgment the claim is valid and worth
paying. As this attorney sees it, the claim will then go to court and likely be settled for an
appropriate amount of money, up to the United States Attorney's settlement authority of
$100,000, without the Torts Branch becoming involved.
An attorney in another agency facing similar difficulties acknowledges that an opposite
pressure was exerted under a previous Administration. At that time, the Justice Department
allegedly rejected proposed settlements as insufficiently generous to claimants. No agency
attorney reported that kind of pressure from the current Administration.
658. See supra note 649 and accompanying text.
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mined without a close and systematic review of Justice Department
approval practices which this general procedural study of the
FTCA could not accomplish.659
2. Consultation upon Request
The overwhelming majority of cases never reach the Justice De-
partment unless a proposed settlement exceeds $25,000 or a failure
to settle provokes litigation.660 However, there are several excep-
tions. First, Justice Department regulations bar agency settlement
without prior consultation with the Department when in the opin-
ion of the agency:
(1) A new precedent or a new point of law is involved; or
(2) A question of policy is or may be involved; or
(3) The United States is or may be entitled to indemnity or con-
tribution from a third party and the agency is unable to adjust
the third party claim; or
(4) The compromise of a particular claim, as a practical matter,
will or may control the disposition of a related claim in which the
amount to be paid may exceed $25,000.66 1
Consultation also is required "when the agency is informed or is
otherwise aware that the United States or an employee, agent, or
cost-plus contractor of the United States is involved in litigation
based on a claim arising out of the same incident or transaction.
662
As a practical matter, agency claims attorneys decide whether
either condition exists and, if so, bring the matter to the Depart-
ment's attention.663
According to the regulations, any referral or request for advice
addressed to the Torts Branch should be in writing and contain a
brief statement of the facts and reasons for the referral or request,
copies of relevant portions of the claim file, and a statement of the
agency's own views.6 In practice, claims attorneys in the agencies
consult Torts Branch attorneys on a less formal basis when they feel
sufficiently unsure or uneasy for any reason about the proper course
of action on a given claim. In most cases in which referral is not
659. The Administrative Conference of the United States has addressed the problem in a
general way. ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(A)(5)(b) (1984).
660. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982).
661. 28 C.F.R. § 14.6(b) (1984).
662. Id. § 14.6(c).
663. The situation is different with the Justice Department approval required in settle-
ments above $25,000. The GAO will not certify a tort claim in excess of $25,000 for payment
out of the judgment fund without evidence of such review and approval. Id. § 14.10(a).
664. Id. § 14.7.
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obviously mandatory, there is neither a file transfer nor a written
communication. A simple telephone call is the usual practice.
Both the Torts Branch Director and the agencies indicate that
communication between them is easy and frequent, and that the
Branch stands ready to guide agency officers in resolving factual,
legal, or policy issues arising in any FTCA claim.665 The Torts
Branch provides structured guidance through annual FTCA semi-
nars for United States Attorneys and agency claims personnel. It
also publishes well-documented and up-to-date manuals presenting
the relevant case law on every significant substantive and proce-
dural issue arising under the FTCA. 666
N. Effectuating the Settlement
1. Mode and Source of Payment
Settlements are usually made simply as lump sum payments.667
Those in an amount of $2500, or less are paid out of agency appro-
priations.668 In most agencies the claimant receives a voucher6 69
and a formal notice of approval of the claim. When the claimant
signs and returns the voucher, a fiscal officer arranges for the Treas-
ury Department to issue a check, which normally takes a week or
two. The standard voucher contains release language identical to
that contained in both the FTCA and Justice Department
regulations.670
If the amount of settlement exceeds $2500, the FTCA provides
for payment in the same manner as final judgments and litigation
settlements, that is, out of the judgment fund.67' According to the
regulations, if the claimant is represented by an attorney, the
voucher should designate both the claimant and attorney as pay-
665. Agency Interviews; Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
666. In the belief that the manuals, though not prepared in anticipation of any particular
piece of litigation, reflect the Department's legal theories and strategies for FTCA litigation,
the Torts Branch Director views them as attorney work product not for release to the general
public. However, he allowed the author to examine a complete set on Torts Branch premises.
667. Axelrad Interview, supra note 144.
668. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982) (substantially restated in 28 C.F.R. § 14.10(a) (1984)).
However, all judgments and settlements against the United States arising out of Postal Ser-
vice activities are payable by the Postal Service from revenues. 39 U.S.C. § 409(e) (1982).
669. Standard Form 1145. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
670. Acceptance of an award constitutes a complete release of the United States and any
federal employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim on account of the same subject
matter. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982); 28 C.F.R. § 14.10(b) (1984).
671. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 2672 (1982); 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (1982). Again, Postal
Service claims are payable from postal revenues. See supra note 668.
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ees. 672 Once executed and returned by the claimant, the form is
sent to the Claims Group of the General Accounting Office, to-
gether with evidence of Attorney General approval for settlements
above $25,000.673 The time for processing payment of awards
above $2500 from certification to the GAO to receipt of the check,
is between six and eight weeks.674
The difference in source of payment for large and small settle-
ments is largely historical, reflecting the fact that until 1959 agen-
cies could settle and pay only claims of $1000 or less, and from 1959
to 1966 only claims of up to $2500.675 Although processing pay-
ments from the judgment fund may take slightly longer than
processing from agency appropriations, it has certain advantages.
Basically, the judgment fund is automatically replenished, while
agency funds are not. On rare occasions, agency funds available for
the payment of tort claims run so low toward the end of the fiscal
year that claimants do not get paid until the agency receives either a
supplemental appropriation or its appropriation for the next fiscal
year. 676
More interesting are the questions whether and how the differ-
ence in source of payments affects agency assessment of claims.
One critic of the 1966 amendments argued that the system makes
agency officials more likely to settle claims at a level above $2500 in
order to conserve agency funds, and to be more cautious below
$2500.677 To avoid potential distortions of this sort, Congress
should discard the provision that settlements up to $2500 be paid
from agency funds. 678 Given its low threshold, the provision does
not significantly enhance agency accountability; 679 any substantial
672. 28 C.F.R. § 14.10(a) (1984).
673. Id. In lieu of a Standard Form 1145 executed by the claimant, the agency may send
GAO a Form 1145 accompanied by either a claims settlement agreement or an executed
Standard Form 95. Id.
674. For the better portion of that period, the paperwork is at the GAO for review of the
documentation, preparation of the GAO's own documents, investigation into any possible
setoffs, and entry into the computer system. At the Treasury, there is additional paperwork,
followed by issuance of a check through the disbursing office. However, should the Torts
Branch request expedited action, the entire operation can be reduced to ten working days.
Telephone interview with Sharon Green, Chief of Claims Adjudication, Claims Group, Ac-
counting and Financial Management Division, General Accounting Office (Feb. 21, 1984).
675. See supra notes 95-96, 115 and accompanying text.
676. I. GOTTLIEB, supra note 123, at 40 n.38.
677. Corboy, supra note 158, at 76-77.
678. For agency support of such a change, see Hertz Letter, supra note 233, at 5; Axelrad
Letter, supra note 152, at 10.
679. However, the GAO opposes the change precisely on grounds of agency accountabil-
ity as well as the added administrative burdens. Letter from Milton J. Socolar, Special Assis-
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administrative settlement, like any tort judgment or litigation settle-
ment regardless of amount, comes from the judgment fund.680
2. The Structured Settlement
The Justice Department now uses structured administrative set-
tlements in appropriate cases. 6 81 The two leading approaches to
structured settlement are, first, the combination of a direct cash
payment with an annuity for a stated number of years or for life
and, second, a similar combination of direct cash payment with a
reversionary trust.682 Structured settlements are designed to pro-
tect vulnerable claimants against the possibility of early dissipation
of large awards. They also protect the government by averting any
unjust enrichment that may result from lump sum awards based on
unrealistic life expectancies and unknown future medical ex-
penses. 83 Although agreement on the particulars of a structured
settlement is not easy,684 the Justice Department continues trying to
educate government attorneys in the use and utility of this mode of
tant to the Comptroller General of the United States, to Charles Pou, Jr., Administrative
Conference of the United States (May 23, 1984).
680. Prior to the 1966 amendments, all settlements, whether administrative or litigation-
related, were paid out of funds of the agency whose employee was responsible for the tort. 28
U.S.C. § 2672 (1964 ed.), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. IV (1965-1968)). In an appar-
ent effort to lighten the burden on agency appropriations, the amendments made all litigation
settlements, as well as all administrative settlements in excess of $2,500, payable out of the
judgment fund. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
If Congress was truly interested in promoting the fiscal accountability of agencies for
incidents giving rise to tort claims, it would do essentially what it did in the Contract Dis-
putes Act of 1978, that is, provide that payment of monetary awards and judgments be reim-
bursed to the judgment fund by the agency whose acts gave rise to the liability. Pub. L. No.
95-563, § 13(c), 92 Stat. 2388 (1978) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 612 (1982)).
681. However, only 18 of the 120 administrative settlements approved by the Torts
Branch in 1983 took a structured form. Of these, all but three were medical malpractice
claims. Memorandum from Lawrence Klinger to Jeffrey Axelrad, "Administrative Claims
for 1983" (Jan. 4, 1983), at 2 (on file at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Office).
682. Typically, the United States supplies the corpus of the trust in an amount settled
upon by the parties, or ordered by the court in the case of litigation, and supplements the
fund as needed. However, any amount remaining in the trust at the victim's death reverts to
the government. Second Axelrad Interview, supra note 368.
683. The problem of unrealistic life expectancies is particularly significant when the
award is to replace lifetime income; the problem of unknown future medical expenses comes
to the fore when the award is for life-threatening injuries. See generally 1 L. JAYSON, supra
note 20, at 10-6. See also Ciecka, A Comparison of Lump-Sum and Structured Settlements, 27
TRIAL LAWYERS GuIDE 450 (1983); Mangino, Tailoring the Structured Settlement, 10 THE
BRIEF 8 (May 1981).
684. Structured settlement can complicate the calculation of allowable attorneys' fees.
See, eg., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1981), rey'g in part 503 F.
Supp. 982, 983-85 (N.D. Ill. 1980). On attorneys' fees limitations, see supra notes 690-95 and
accompanying text.
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settlement.685
At least one court has held that the FTCA does not authorize a
court to issue an award in the form of a judicially established trust
or indeed in any form other than lump sum damages.68 6 While not-
ing that Congress probably never considered the matter, the court
preferred not to endorse "novel types of awards against the govern-
ment" until Congress "affirmatively authorize[s] them., 617  One
court's unwillingness to entertain the structured resolution of an
FTCA lawsuit should not bar agencies and claimants from adminis-
trative resolutions on such a basis. If the view that the FTCA does
not allow structured settlements prevails, it certainly will affect
agency practice, but this does not seem likely. First, the case is
considered an aberration; other courts have endorsed the use of
structured settlements in FTCA litigation awards.688 Moreover, the
case is naturally confined to the situation where the government
presses for a trust or annuity over a claimant's objection. Although
the case may have some bearing on the willingness of courts to
make structured awards, its impact on agency-level settlements
should be negligible.689
3. The Attorney's Fee
The FTCA specifically requires that attorneys' fees in FTCA
cases come out of the award; it also makes it a crime to accept as a
fee more than a certain percentage of the award.690 That limit is
twenty percent of the award in prelitigation administrative settle-
ment and twenty-five percent in compromise settlement or judg-
ment.69 1 The ceiling, found in numerous federal statutes affording
monetary recovery against the government, is designed to protect
685. Letter from Jeffrey Axelrad, Director, Torts Branch, Civil Division, Department of
Justice, to the author (Apr. 27, 1984) at 4.
686. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1972).
687. Id. The court also alluded to "the continuing burden of judicial supervision that
would attend a judgment creating a life trust." Id. at 1229.
688. For an endorsement of the use of a reversionary trust in FTCA litigation awards, see
Robak v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 658
F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981). The Comptroller General has expressly approved the practice with
respect to administrative tort claims. Op. Comp. Gen. No. B-162924 (Dec. 22, 1967) (avail-
able on WESTLAW, Fed. Gen. Library, Comp. Gen. file); GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at
11-49 to -50.
689. An agency claims attorney with long experience in the field strongly urges that the
FTCA and regulations be amended specifically to embrace structured settlement. Rouse Let-
ter, supra note 488, at 8.
690. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982). See generally United States v. Cohen, 389 F.2d 689, 691-
92 (5th Cir. 1967). No prosecutions have been reported under the FTCA provision.
691. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982).
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claimants from improvident bargains, reduce the incentive to file
fraudulent or inflated claims, and help ensure that public funds go
to those intended to benefit from them.
Some claims officers routinely remind claimants and their coun-
sel of the fee ceiling and the sanctions for its violation. This is suffi-
cient by way of government involvement in the policing of fees.
The Treasury should not, for example, issue separate checks to the
claimant and the attorney reflecting their respective shares of the
award under any previously agreed upon allocation. This practice
is awkward and impractical when the attorney has been engaged on
any basis other than a fixed percentage fee. In any event, the gov-
ernment has good reasons not to become the attorney's collection
agency.
692
The government has not yet had to consider whether the FTCA
impliedly restricts the fees of an attorney who is unsuccessful in
settlement negotiations. When the parties have agreed upon a cus-
tomary contingent fee and there is no recovery, there is no claim to
a fee and therefore no issue. If they have agreed upon a fixed or
hourly fee, does an attorney who collects or seeks to collect the fee
violate the FTCA by exacting "in excess of 20 per centum of any
award, compromise, or settlement? ' 693 Congress, most likely as-
suming that FTCA attorneys would charge a fee contingent on suc-
cess, 694 did not address the question. Still, it seems anomalous for
an attorney who is strictly forbidden to collect more than $200 on a
$1000 settlement to be able to collect an unrestricted amount where
settlement fails. This could conceivably offer attorneys a greater
financial reward for disserving their clients' interests than for serv-
ing them. The concern is probably more theoretical than real, since
contingent fee arrangements are customary in government tort
claims. From a similarly practical standpoint, even when the par-
ties set a fixed fee, attorneys rarely serve their long-term profes-
sional interests by winning a client nothing on a valid tort claim for
the sake of a higher fee. In any event, the government achieves its
principal objective of ensuring that the lion's share of compensation
for government torts reaches the victims when it confines the ceiling
to fees on actual recoveries, leaving fees in the absence of recovery
692. There may be a genuine dispute over the quality or other aspect of the representa-
tion in which the government should avoid becoming involved.
693. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982).
694. D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, supra note 1, at 49.
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to the wisdom of the parties concerned.695
0. The Audit and Review of Claims Settlements
The decision whether and on what terms to settle a claim ad-
ministratively under the FTCA is vested in the legal departments of
the agencies, subject only to possible Justice Department advice or
approval. The FTCA originally required each agency to report an-
nually to Congress on the administrative payment of claims under
the act, giving a brief description of each claim paid, the name of
the claimant, the amount claimed, and the amount actually
awarded.696 Although agencies had far less settlement authority
then, Congress evidently thought it desirable that they account for
their settlement decisions. Congress dropped the reporting require-
ment in 1965,697 one year before it made the filing of an administra-
tive claim a prerequisite to suit and lifted the ceiling on agency-level
settlements.
Apart from occasional investigation by a congressional commit-
tee, the only possibility of legislative review of agency tort claims
activity lies with the General Accounting Office (GAO). However,
the role of the GAO is limited. The GAO maintains the view that
its sweeping statutory authority to settle and adjust all claims of or
against the United States698 does not entitle it to intervene on the
merits of monetary claims when Congress has specifically vested
settlement authority elsewhere.6 99 This is clearly the case for tort
695. See Bulman, Federal Tort Claims: Attorney Fees and Interest, TRIAL AND TORT
TRENDS 103 (M. Bellied. 1965).
696. 28 U.S.C. § 2673 (1964 ed.) (repealed 1965).
697. Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-348 § 1(1), 79 Stat. 1310. Specific agencies may
continue to make claims reports to particular congressional committees. The Veterans Ad-
ministration, for example, periodically reports on its claims activities through its General
Counsel to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Vet. Admin. Reg.
No. M-02-1, supra note 301, at § 18.14.
698. 31 U.S.C. § 3702 (1982). Despite the sweeping statutory language, the GAO takes
the view that monetary claims normally should be presented to the appropriate agency, if
any, before being brought to it. Apart from audit or action upon agency request, the GAO
normally intervenes, if at all, by way of review or reconsideration at the claimant's request. 4
C.F.R. § 31.4 (1984); GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 1-3, 11-14 (individual claimants
generally may request review or reconsideration by the Comptroller General of settlements
disallowing their claims in whole or in part); Note, The Comptroller General of the United
States: The Broad Power to Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARV. L. REV.
350 (1956); Note, The Control Powers of the Comptroller General, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1199
(1956). For a description of the largely investigatory procedures and practices of GAO's
Claims Group on review and reconsideration of agency settlement determinations, see 4
C.F.R. §§ 31.2-.8 (1984); GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-15 to -19; Baer, Practice
Before the General Accounting Office, 19 FED. B. J. 275 (1959).
699. Where the GAO exercises review on the merits, a six-year statute of limitations
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claims, and probably equally so for claims arising under many of
the meritorious claims statutes.7"o With a merits review barred, the
GAO has only oblique means of control: the audit of a particular
claim or an agency's claims handling procedures,701 control inci-
dent to the mechanics of payment on a claim that has been set-
tled,702 and issuance of advance decisions to an agency upon its
request. 70 3 Even these avenues are not well-developed in the federal
tort claim area. The GAO rarely conducts audit reviews of the ad-
ministration of the FTCA or other tort claim statutes.7° More-
over, the GAO exercises little review incident to the mostly
ministerial processing of tort settlements for payment by the Treas-
ury. As for advance GAO rulings on agency request, they simply
do not play an important role in implementation of the FTCA.7 °5
Agency claims officers prefer to seek advice on the wisdom or legal-
ity of settlement from the Justice Department, the body they con-
sider most expert in the matter.70 6
Looking specifically at the GAO's control incident to the pay-
ment process, the GAO may examine threshold questions of
cognizability, but not the merits of a settlement under statutes like
the FTCA that make agency action final and conclusive. This effec-
applies. 31 U.S.C. § 3702(b)(1) (1982). GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-21 to -26.
GAO rulings bind the executive branch, but not private parties. United States ex rel. Skinner
& Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1927); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. United States,
268 U.S. 169, 174 (1925); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 545 F.2d 624, 637-38 (9th
Cir. 1976); Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1031 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
700. The situation is clearest under meritorious claims statutes that, like the FTCA, ex-
pressly make the agency determination final and conclusive. See Op. Comp. Gen. No. B-
176147 (July 5, 1972); Op. Comp. Gen. No. B-161131 (Apr. 18, 1967) (available on
WESTLAW, Fed. Gen. Library, Comp. Gen. file). See also Military Personnel and Civilian
Employees' Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3721 (1982); 41 Comp. Gen. 235, 238 (1961) (claims
under Military Claims Act are beyond GAO settlement jurisidiction); 3 Comp. Gen. 22, 24
(1923) (claims under Small Claims Act are beyond GAO settlement jurisdiction).
701. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3521-26 (1982).
702. Id. § 1304(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.10(a) (1984).
703. 31 U.S.C. § 3529 (1982). The GAO takes the view that agencies should refer any
monetary claims which involve doubtful questions of law or fact to the GAO for an advance
ruling. GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-14.
704. But see Ahart Letter, supra note 611.
705. This is not to say that the GAO does not issue advance rulings on the meaning or
coverage of the FICA. E.g., 49 Comp. Gen. 758 (1970); 35 Comp. Gen. 511 (1956); 26
Comp. Gen. 891 (1947). Certainly, it has had more frequent occasion to interpret other
claims legislation, presumably because the expertise and indeed the authority of the Justice
Department in connection with the FTCA do not extend to these other statutes. E.g., 62
Comp. Gen. 641 (1983) (Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act); Op.
Comp. Gen. No. B-197052 (Feb. 4, 1981) (Panama Canal Act) (available on WESTLAW,
Fed. Gen. Library, Comp. Gen. file); 40 Comp. Gen. 691 (1961) (Military Claims Act).
706. Agency Interviews.
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tively forecloses GAO scrutiny of the decision to pay a given tort
claim. The GAO will not reexamine issues calling for an agency's
exercise of discretion or judgment, such as whether an employee
acted negligently or within the scope of employment, or whether
the claimant is entitled to the specific amount of damages
awarded.7"7 In fact, it rarely looks beyond matters that can be de-
termined facially, for example, whether an agency impermissibly
seeks to pay a claim that plainly arose in a foreign country or is
time-barred.7 °8 The GAO's incidental review of an agency's exer-
cise of meritorious claims settlement authority is similarly superfi-
cial.7" 9 Thus, although the GAO enjoys sweeping authority to
settle monetary claims against the government, to conduct audits of
agency operations, to issue advance advisory rulings, and to process
the payment of FTCA settlements above $2500, its actual involve-
ment in tort claim determinations is decidedly modest.
From the point of view of disappointed claimants, the lack of
meaningful access to the GAO should not cause concern. Under
the FTCA, now and for the foreseeable future, claimants consider
the courts their refuge. However, there may be a significant vac-
uum as far as audits of manifestly unfounded or excessive settle-
ments are concerned. Though watchdog activities of the Justice
Department in settlements above $25,000 constitute an adequate
safeguard against fraud and collusion in the largest tort claims
under the FTCA, they have no application to the vastly greater
number of settlements below that amount. In addition, the Depart-
ment has no role in the agencies' use of the less well-defined merito-
rious claims statutes. Consideration should be given to making the
prospect of GAO audits of tort claims more credible or, alterna-
tively, to encouraging the agency Inspectors General to give the au-
707. GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-10.
708. Application of the discretionary acts exemption is the best example of an issue sure
to be avoided. GAO personnel who process claims for payment from the judgment fund
report that fewer than one percent of claims presented for payment raise a substantial ques-
tion. That question is most likely to be whether the claim is in tort, or rather reflects an
operating or program expenditure for which the agency's own funds should be used. Green
Interview, supra note 142. Personnel in the GAO claims division lend support to the suspi-
cion that some payments processed as tort claims to be drawn from the judgment fund actu-
ally should be charged to agency appropriations. Id.
709. GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-10, discussing 21 Comp. Dec. 250 (1914),
which involved the Secretary of Agriculture's authority to reimburse owners of horses, vehi-
cles and other equipment lost or damaged while being used for official business. See 16
U.S.C. § 502(d) (1974), 37 Stat. 843 (1913) [as amended] (authorizing Secretary to reimburse
owners).
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dit of agency tort settlements a higher priority.71° Either approach
would introduce a healthy deterrent in the tort claim setting.7 '
V. CONCLUSION
Although a plausible argument may be made that federal agen-
cies have inherent authority to consider and pay claims for the pri-
vate losses they cause, a sounder view is that they need express
statutory authority before doing so. Existing settlement authority
over tort and tort-like claims is based on an extensive but haphaz-
ard collection of statutes, the most significant of which is the
FTCA. Some of the legislation fills gaps of one kind or another in
FTCA coverage of claims against the government sounding in tort.
Meritorious provisions, however, authorize payment of just or equi-
table claims regardless of fault. A comprehensive review of this
proliferation of claims settlement authority is needed to ensure that
the arrangement is rational and, more specifically, that the relation-
ship between the various ancillary statutes and the FTCA is reason-
ably clear. The time is similarly ripe to consider raising the
monetary ceilings on agency settlement authority under the FTCA
and other claims legislation.71 2
However, the main concern of this Article is agency-level proce-
dure for handling claims under the FTCA. To a modest extent in
1946, and more broadly in 1966, Congress authorized federal agen-
cies under the FTCA to settle tort claims arising out of the negli-
gent or otherwise wrongful acts of their employees while acting
within the scope of their employment, insofar as the government
has waived its sovereign immunity to such claims. The 1966
amendments sought to shift principal responsibility for handling
federal tort claims from the courts to the agencies, much as the
original Act meant to shift it from Congress to the courts.
Before they may sue under the FTCA, claimants first must have
presented their claim to the responsible agency within two years of
its accrual. The presentation of a valid claim gives the agency a
minimum of six months to consider and act upon it. Although
neither the statute nor the Justice Department regulations issued
710. Agency attorneys believe Inspectors General have not placed much emphasis on the
audit of agency tort claims settlements. E.g., Wieland Interview, supra note 152.
711. For a summary of the statutory provisions imposing civil and criminal penalties for
the filing of false or fraudulent claims, see GAO PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 11-133 to -136.
Agencies also are authorized to treat fraudulent presentation as entirely vitiating the claim-
ant's rights. Id. at 11-134.
712. See ACUS Recommendations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7(B)(1) (1984).
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pursuant to it give much structure to agency-level claims proce-
dures under the FTCA, the agencies by their own practice and reg-
ulations have done so. The volume of claims varies greatly among
the agencies, as does the way the agencies allocate responsibility for
investigating and adjudicating them. Settlement rates differ as well.
Nevertheless, from a procedural point of view, all agencies adhere
to a basically investigatory model. That model is generally appro-
priate to the task and, given a claimant's right to seek a full de novo
trial in federal district court no later than six months from the filing
of an administrative claim, also consonant with procedural due
process.
Unfortunately, the data maintained by the agencies do not fur-
nish a basis for assessing how far the 1966 amendments actually
have shifted final disposition of tort claims from court to agency or
for gauging the fairness and objectivity of agency outcomes. From
the available information, however, the displacement of tort litiga-
tion by tort claims administration seems to be meeting Congress'
expectations. The agencies have achieved this result both by resolv-
ing a high proportion of claims worth paying and by exposing the
meritless character of many claims that are filed. A more refined
claims tracking system would give a still better picture of the effi-
cacy of agency settlement efforts. In addition, it could readily im-
prove the monitoring of pending claims and generate data useful for
risk management.
Because tort claims adjudication is not the principal mission of
any federal agency, the administrative process that has developed
for this purpose remains relatively inconspicuous. Ultimate author-
ity usually rests in each agency's legal department, subject only to
the requirement of Justice Department approval of proposed settle-
ments above $25,000 and Justice Department consultation in claims
raising novel policy questions or related to pending litigation. But
although agency procedures for handling tort claims have devel-
oped without much direction or supervision from the legislative or
executive branch, they are significant in terms of the number of dol-
lars at issue and the quality of the government's relationship with
individual members of the public. They will become more impor-
tant if Congress expands the government's liability under the FTCA
to encompass constitutional torts and terminates private tort ac-
tions against individual federal officials.
The current procedures generally serve Congress' purposes, but
at the same time leave room for substantial improvement.
Although most claims attorneys appear to be fair-minded, the sys-
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tem allows them to operate in an inappropriately adversarial man-
ner. When this happens, fairness and equity suffer, as indeed may
the very efficacy of prelitigation settlement. The difficulties stem in
part from a residual ambiguity in the administrative tort claim pro-
cess itself. Congress, in 1966 as in 1946, left the process closely tied
to litigation. For example, despite available arguments to the con-
trary, Congress almost certainly did not mean to give agencies set-
tlement authority broader than the government's exposure to
liability in litigation. Thus time-barred, statutorily exempt, or
otherwise invalid administrative claims may not be settled by the
agencies under the FTCA. More important, by preserving a de
novo action in federal court as the claimant's fundamental tort rem-
edy against the government, Congress lent the process a distinctly
adversarial flavor.
On the other hand, Congress clearly expressed a policy favoring
fair and adequate compensation for the losses of deserving tort
claimants, preferably at the administrative level. To that extent, it
created something along the lines of an entitlement, albeit an enti-
tlement subject to so many uncertainties-such as proof of fault and
proximate causation, determination of the losses that are compensa-
ble, and difficulties of valuation, to name a few-that it can only be
described as highly inchoate. In addition, despite the litigation ori-
gins and premises of the FTCA, the agencies have developed a dis-
tinct administrative process for handling tort claims and manage to
dispose of the great bulk of claims through those channels.
In other words, administrative tort claim settlement lies some-
where between, on the one hand, an autonomous dispute resolution
process in which the claims officer acts as a neutral decisionmaker
and, on the other, a simple prelude to litigation in which officer and
claimant already are adversaries. The extent to which features of
the objective-entitlement or adversarial-bargaining models
predominate in any case depends, of course, on the situation. Most
agency claims officers appear to be aware of and sensitive to the
tensions between these competing models. Restructuring the
agency claims process to eliminate the underlying ambiguity would
require backing away from agency-level disposition of claims or, al-
ternatively, developing a quasi-judicial mechanism in the different
agencies or in a separate government-wide tribunal that would seg-
regate the function of agency advocate from that of decisionmaker.
The first change is undesirable as a policy matter. The second
would entail unwarranted administrative burdens, including the
creation of a new corps of administrative law judges, and probably
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reduce the efficiency and informality that characterize the current
investigatory model.
Preference should be given to less ambitious reforms that accept
the ambiguity inherent in the system, but also mitigate those aspects
that have produced misunderstandings and occasional hardship for
claimants. Examples of such improvements would be greater will-
ingness by the agencies to consider claims under the FTCA even
though they were not presented as such, to entertain properly filed
FTCA claims under other payment authority where reasonable and
appropriate, and to give claimants timely notice of formal defects in
their FTCA filings and an opportunity to remedy them. Other
agency practices in need of reform include an overly technical atti-
tude toward the sufficiency of a claim, the position that all regula-
tory specifications of claims and all agency requests for information
are equally "jurisdictional," a tendency to resolve doubtful proce-
dural questions against the claimant even in the absence of substan-
tial prejudice to governmental interests, unduly restrictive policies
on information disclosure in connection with a pending claim, and a
sometimes less than fully fair and objective approach to determining
the merits and monetary value of a claim. Finally, this Article sug-
gests a series of modest changes including more liberal rules on the
timing and transfer of claims, effective notice to claimants about the
meaning and effect of the sum certain requirement, the inclusion of
a statement of reasons in denial letters, and some fine tuning of the
reconsideration process.
It bears emphasis that claims personnel within and among agen-
cies have adopted diverse practices and exhibit important attitudi-
nal differences toward claimants. Claimants, for their part, are
sometimes less than cooperative during the administrative process,
and the attorneys who represent them may knowingly or unknow-
ingly heighten the adversarial element. Agency claims officers
rightly and inevitably guide their conduct accordingly. Still, the ad-
ministrative process as a whole could be made fairer and more effec-
tive by efforts to reduce its adversarial character and to increase
cooperation between claimant and claims officer. Confidence in the
process and its results in turn would increase. The challenge of
these adjustments, however, is that they must be made in the con-
text of a system that continues to promise tort claimants full access
to the courts as their basic, if no longer their first, avenue of relief.
A number of tort claims officers express concern about the Jus-
tice Department's commitment to fair and reasonable compensation
in exercising its approval authority over prospective settlements
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above $25,000. A few find that their own willingness to negotiate
with claimants over large and difficult claims suffers as a result.
This problem would be eased, though not eliminated, by raising the
ceiling on agency settlement autonomy. A different but related
problem is the Justice Department's apparent practice of routinely
raising technical defects in a claim as a jurisdictional defense in
FTCA litigation, even when the defect relates to purely regulatory
as opposed to statutory requirements and even though the agency
processed and denied the claim on its merits during the administra-
tive phase.
Since claimants still need wait only six months under the FTCA
to obtain a trial de novo before an increasingly sympathetic judici-
ary, the perceived fairness of administrative claims handling has
special importance. Significantly, the cumulative effect of the mod-
est changes in agency practice recommended in this Article may be
substantial enough to overcome the larger procedural problems, like
nondisclosure of information by claimants, that continue to ob-
struct agency-level negotiations. They are in any event likely to
render an already adequate administrative process still more open
and productive.
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